Teleofunctions and oncomice: The case for revising varner's value theory

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 171-188

  Delancey, Craig ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT OSWEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142533335     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200426228     Document Type: Review

References (57)

1. Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 121.
2. Notably recently in Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3. Gary Varner, "Biological Functions and Biological Interests," Southern Journal of Philosophy 281, no. 2 (1990): 251-70; In Nature's Interest?: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
4. Gary Varner, "Biological Functions and Biological Interests," Southern Journal of Philosophy 281, no. 2 (1990): 251-70; In Nature's Interest?: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
5. Alan Carter, "Review of In Nature's Interests?" Mind 109, no. 435 (2000): 657-60.
6. Mark Rowlands, "Review of In Nature's Interests?" Philosophical Review 109, no. 4 (2000): 598-601. See also Warren Neill, "An Emotocentric Theory of Interests," Environmental Ethics, 20 (1998): 163-82.
7. Mark Rowlands, "Review of In Nature's Interests?" Philosophical Review 109, no. 4 (2000): 598-601. See also Warren Neill, "An Emotocentric Theory of Interests," Environmental Ethics, 20 (1998): 163-82.
8. The most noteworthy criticism of biocentric individualism is that it is insufficient to establish a defense of ecosystems. See J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics, 2 (1980): 311-38; "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Tom Regan, ed. Matters of Life and Death, 2d edition (New York: Random House, 1986): 381-42; "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994): 51-60.
9. The most noteworthy criticism of biocentric individualism is that it is insufficient to establish a defense of ecosystems. See J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics, 2 (1980): 311-38; "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Tom Regan, ed. Matters of Life and Death, 2d edition (New York: Random House, 1986): 381-42; "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994): 51-60.
10. The most noteworthy criticism of biocentric individualism is that it is insufficient to establish a defense of ecosystems. See J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental Ethics, 2 (1980): 311-38; "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Tom Regan, ed. Matters of Life and Death, 2d edition (New York: Random House, 1986): 381-42; "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994): 51-60.
11. Varner, In Nature's Interests, pp. 88-97. The idea is that ground projects are a set of goals and desires that in some sense define who one is. The idea comes from Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Other attempts at offering a hierarchy of interests include Nicholas Agar, "Biocentrism and the Concept of Life," Ethics 108 (1997): 147-68.
12. Varner, In Nature's Interests, pp. 88-97. The idea is that ground projects are a set of goals and desires that in some sense define who one is. The idea comes from Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Other attempts at offering a hierarchy of interests include Nicholas Agar, "Biocentrism and the Concept of Life," Ethics 108 (1997): 147-68.
13. Varner, In Nature's Interests, pp. 88-97. The idea is that ground projects are a set of goals and desires that in some sense define who one is. The idea comes from Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Other attempts at offering a hierarchy of interests include Nicholas Agar, "Biocentrism and the Concept of Life," Ethics 108 (1997): 147-68.
14. I mean here that we might best emend the term biocentric individualism to something like "teleocentric individualism," but since I argue below that there are as yet no known non-biological systems with the kind of complexity that I believe is needed for interests, my concern remains biological organisms, and I continue to use the established term of biocentric individualism.
15. Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design," in Peter French, Theodore Uehling Jr., and Howard Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), vol. 18, pp. 379-97.
16. John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, "Functions," Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4 (1987): 185-86.
17. Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).
18. Larry Wright, Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 25.
19. Ibid., p. 81.
20. Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28, no. 3 (1994): 344-62; Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409-422; Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design"; Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1993); K. Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: the Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 58 (1991): 168-84.
21. Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28, no. 3 (1994): 344-62; Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409-422; Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design"; Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1993); K. Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: the Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 58 (1991): 168-84.
22. Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28, no. 3 (1994): 344-62; Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409-422; Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design"; Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1993); K. Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: the Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 58 (1991): 168-84.
23. Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28, no. 3 (1994): 344-62; Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409-422; Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design"; Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1993); K. Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: the Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 58 (1991): 168-84.
24. Peter Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions," Nous 28, no. 3 (1994): 344-62; Paul E. Griffiths, "Functional Analysis and Proper Functions," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409-422; Philip Kitcher, "Function and Design"; Ruth G. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); and White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1993); K. Neander, "Functions as Selected Effects: the Conceptual Analyst's Defence," Philosophy of Science 58 (1991): 168-84.
25. Varner, In Nature's Interest, p. 68.
26. Varner is also concerned to accomplish a third task, the defense of the normative claim that the interests are prima facie deserving of moral consideration. As already noted, his discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. See ibid., pp. 71-74.
27. Ibid., p. 62.
28. Ibid., p. 64.
29. In fact, it is plausible that some forms of software have ancestors in the relevant sense, when genetic programming or extensions of genetic algorithms are involved. I return to the issue of artifacts in sec. 6.
30. C. Boorse, "Wright on Functions," Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 70-86.
31. Godfrey-Smith, "A Modern History Theory of Functions."
32. See Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 176-78.
33. For the Harvard oncomouse, see E. Sinn, W. Muller, P. Pattengale, I. Tepler, R. Wallace, and P. Leder, "Coexpression of MMTV/v-Ha-ras and MMTV/c-myc Genes In Transgenic Mice: Synergistic Action of Oncogenes In Vivo," Cell 49 (1987): 465. A source for references and details on shaker-2 mice is the Mouse Genome Database, Mouse Genome Informatics Web Site, The Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, Maine, http://www.informatics.jax.org.
34. For the Harvard oncomouse, see E. Sinn, W. Muller, P. Pattengale, I. Tepler, R. Wallace, and P. Leder, "Coexpression of MMTV/v-Ha-ras and MMTV/c-myc Genes In Transgenic Mice: Synergistic Action of Oncogenes In Vivo," Cell 49 (1987): 465. A source for references and details on shaker-2 mice is the Mouse Genome Database, Mouse Genome Informatics Web Site, The Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, Maine, http://www.informatics.jax.org.
35. Derived with some first-order logic from Varner, In Nature's Interest, p. 68.
36. Callicott, "Animal Liberation."
37. Varner, In Nature's Interest, p. 76.
38. Ibid., p. 70.
39. Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
40. Ernest Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," Journal of Philosophy 74, 5 (1977): 261-301; Gerhard Schlosser, "Self-Re-Production and Functionality: A Systems-Theoretical Approach to Teleological Explanation," Syntheses 116 (1998): 303-54;. Gerd Sommerhoff, Analytical Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).
41. Ernest Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," Journal of Philosophy 74, 5 (1977): 261-301; Gerhard Schlosser, "Self-Re-Production and Functionality: A Systems-Theoretical Approach to Teleological Explanation," Syntheses 116 (1998): 303-54;. Gerd Sommerhoff, Analytical Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).
42. Ernest Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," Journal of Philosophy 74, 5 (1977): 261-301; Gerhard Schlosser, "Self-Re-Production and Functionality: A Systems-Theoretical Approach to Teleological Explanation," Syntheses 116 (1998): 303-54;. Gerd Sommerhoff, Analytical Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).
43. Nagel, "Teleology Revisited," p. 273.
44. Ibid, p. 274.
45. "Self-Re-Production and Functionality." See also Wayne Christensen, "A Complex Systems Theory of Teleology," Biology and Philosophy 11 (1996): 301-20.
46. Ibid., p. 305. In addition to recognizing the necessity that the structure of the system must be relatively complex (if X and F produce each other in a tight, trivial loop, then we are disinclined to think of F as a teleofunction), Schlosser also points out that the system must have some temporal complexity or duration: the cycles of production must be more than one loop, and we should identify a system as homeostatic and therefore interestingly self-organizing only if it is homeostatic for some amount of time. This too is a matter-of-degree issue which, though requiring further analysis, poses no serious difficulty for the view.
47. Ibid., p. 315.
48. That the theory refers to types is important in part because (as noted above) some structures can have functions that are never exercised. The structure still has the teleofunction because the structure can play that role; and we are able to see that it can play that role because other instances of the structure exercise that role in other instances of its type (e.g., in other individuals of that species).
49. Edmund T. Rolls, The Brain and Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 205.
50. Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging this clarification.
51. Pace Heidegger, there is a sense in which not just human beings, but all organisms, are homeless.
52. An ambiguity must be noted here, to avoid a potential misunderstanding: this kind of systematic teleofunction reaches across a number of instances of kinds - such as a number of individual bees which have stingers. Thus, for example, a species is an appropriate kind of category since it is a population sustained over time; however, if the purpose in question served some smaller population, here we would understand "population" not as a collection of organisms at a moment, but rather as an ongoing, reproducing, group.
53. See Michael Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); David Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976): 174-91; "A Matter of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 335-60; Science as a Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).
54. See Michael Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); David Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976): 174-91; "A Matter of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 335-60; Science as a Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).
55. See Michael Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); David Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976): 174-91; "A Matter of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 335-60; Science as a Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).
56. See Michael Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); David Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976): 174-91; "A Matter of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 335-60; Science as a Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).
57. See Michael Ghiselin, "A Radical Solution to the Species Problem," Systematic Zoology 23 (1974): 536-44; Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); David Hull, "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976): 174-91; "A Matter of Individuality," Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 335-60; Science as a Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).