Between advantage and virtue: Aristotle's theory of political friendship

History of Political Thought

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 565-585

  Irrera, Elena ^a  

^a NONE   (Italy)

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EID: 31144478345     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (118)

1. How can the Aristotelian account of friendship contribute to an understanding of the notion of politikē philia? The aim of this paper is to sketch out a general description of political friendship in the light of Aristotle's well-known distinction between friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure and friendships between virtuous people drawn in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics. I shall define the boundaries of political friendship through the analysis of resemblances to and differences from both friendship according ethical excellence and friendship grounded in mere utility. Political friendship seems to be a kind of advantage-friendship sui generis, where the search for utility does not prevent people from displaying other-regarding qualities like cooperation, trust and loyalty, that are typical of friendship according to ethical excellence. I will also show that activity according to justice replaces the form of mAttendutual and intimate love that should subsist in a friendship based on ethical virtue.
2. See J. Annas, Comments on J. Cooper, in Aristotle's Politik. Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum 1987, ed. G. Patzig (Göttingen, 1990), pp. 242-8, p. 248,
3. quoted by S. Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship (Albany, NY, 1995), p. 153.
4. See J.M. Cooper, 'Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship', Review of Metaphysics, 30 (1977), pp. 619-48, p. 645. However, it is worth noticing that Cooper deems the topic of friendship to be 'of decisive significance for an understanding of Aristotle's moral theory' (p. 648).
5. B. Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley, 1993), p. 110.
6. See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, pp. 153-4: 'The answer to these perplexities [i.e. those upon the relevance of political friendship in Aristotle's thought] lies, I submit, not in Aristotle's unconcern with civic friendship but in his assumption that civic friendship is but the reflection, in the lives of individuals, of the constitution of the state. Considered in itself, civic friendship is neither noble nor pettily contractual, neither disinterested nor manipulative, neither stable nor unsteady. It is the constitution of the state which, to a large extent, determines not only the nature and the extent of the civic bond but also its moral worth. Like the criteria of good citizenship, those of civic friendship, according to this interpretation, will vary with the constitutions. While sound constitutions encourage all citizens to have regard for each other, defective and deviant ones prompt rulers to be solely concerned with securing a balance of power...There is little in common between the kinds of civic friendship that these constitutions generate.'
7. NE VIII, 1161a10-b12.
8. All the passages of the Nicomachean Ethics quoted in this paper will be taken from Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, ed. S. Broadie and C.J. Rowe, trans. C.J. Rowe (Oxford, 2002).
9. NE VIII, 1155a3-5.
10. See M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, 1986), p. 343.
11. In more than one case Aristotle implies a conceptual distinction between 'mere living' (zēr) and 'living well' (eu zēn); see for instance Politics I, 1252b29-30,
12. where it is said that the polis 'grows for the sake of mere life', but 'it exists for the sake of a good life' (Aristotle. Politics, trans. E. Barker (Oxford, 1948));
13. cf. Politics, III, 1280b33-5);
14. see also Politics, I, 1253b24-5 (with reference to the art of acquiring property Aristotle says: 'it is impossible to live well, or indeed to live at all, unless the necessary conditions are present').
15. Metaph. Δ, 1015a20-l.
16. Metaph. Δ, 1015a22-3.
17. NE VIII, 1155a5-9.
18. EE VII, 1234b31-4.
19. My italics.
20. See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 366.
21. On Aristotle's frequent appeal to and confidence in endoxa see T.H. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, 2002), pp. 30-1.
22. The notion of to kalon occurs many times in Aristotle's ethical works, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he repeatedly stresses that acting according to ethical excellences is a fine thing (see for instance NE II, 1109a29-30, where it is said that getting the intermediate in actions and passions is a rare thing and something fine; see also its relationship with voluntariness of actions at NE III, 1113b). As for the employment of to kalon in Aristotle's metaphysical thought,
23. see Metaph. Δ, 1013a20-3,
24. where to kalon (alongside to agathon), is mentioned as the principle of knowledge and movement; see also Metaph. A, 1072a27-30, where the object of desire, which coincides with the object of nous, is what appears fine to us, and the primary object of boulēsis is what is objectively fine (to on kalon);
25. again, at Metaph. A, 1074b24,
26. it is said that the divine nous thinks to kalon rather than anything whatever; finally, see Metaph. M, 1078a31-b5, where Aristotle claims that to kalon can be found not only in actions, but even in immovable things, and its supreme forms are orderly arrangement (taxis), proportion (symmetria) and definiteness (to ōrismenon).
27. On the relationship between philia and eudaimonia see Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 619;
28. A. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford, 1992), pp. 45-55;
29. see also Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 343-72.
30. NE I, 1102a9-10.
31. Cf. EE VII, 1234b22-5.
32. NE VIII, 1155b18-19.
33. See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, p. 148.
34. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, NY, 1958), p. 218. Arendt defines respect as 'a regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us'.
35. The same passage is quoted by Yack in The Problems of a Political Animal, p. 113.
36. The expression 'kata symbebēkos' is often employed in Aristotle's Metaphysics as distinct from expressions employed to qualify ousia, like 'to kath' hauto'. See for instance Metaph. A, 1017a7-8,
37. where he claims that Being (to on) can be said 'accidentally' or 'for itself'; cf. Δ, 1015bl6-17; see also Γ, 1003b32-3; Γ, 1007a29-32. When Aristotle applies the notion of 'kata symbebēkos' to friendship, he seems to be referring to his idea that 'only character friends are essentially and without adventitious qualification' (Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 636).
38. NE VIII, 1156b10.
39. Cf. NE VIII, 1156b7;
40. 1156b34.
41. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 625.
42. S.A.D.M. Walker, 'Aristotle's Account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics', Phronesis,24 (1979), pp. 180-96, p. 187.
43. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 630.
44. NE VIII, 1156b7-9.
45. See NE VIII, 1155b31.
46. My italics. Aristotle. Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. C. Barnes (2 vols., Princeton, 1984).
47. Rhet. II, 1380b36-1381a1.
48. EE VII, 1241a1-14.
49. See Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 632.
50. NE VIII, 1158b5-10.
51. The treatment of resemblance between perfect friendship and friendships kata sumbebēkos in the Nicomachean Ethics seems to differ greatly from that provided in the Eudemian Ethics. See A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford. 1989), p. 131:
52. 'It is characteristic of the Eudemian Ethics that it offers a more logical theory, or presentation of a theory, than does the Nicomachean about the relation between the varieties of friendship.' In the Eudemian Ethics friendship of goodness is described as 'primary' (see for instance EE VII, 1236b2: prōtēphilia),
53. presumably in accordance with the meaning of 'primary' at EE VII, 1236a19-22:
54. 'The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not implicit in that of surgeon' (cf. Metaph. Z, 1028a34-6; M, 1077b3-4). As is claimed at EE VII, 1236a17-20, different kinds of friendships are defined exclusively with reference to one kind of friendship, i.e. the primary (pros mian [philian] . . . kai prōtēn).
55. This kind of comparative analysis has led Owen to claim that friendships of utility and pleasure appear to be 'focally related', even in the Nicomachean Ethics (see G.E.L. Owen, Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle, in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. During and G.E.L Owen (Göteborg, 1960), pp. 163-90, p. 169;
56. cf. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L' Éthique à Nicomaque. Introd., Traduction et commentaire (Louvain, 1970), pp. 669 and 686).
57. By contrast, Annas claims that no trace of focal meaning, so prominent in the Eudemian Ethics, can be found in the Nicomachean account of friendship (see J. Annas, 'Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism', Mind, 86 (1977), pp. 532-54, p. 547).
58. tend to agree with Annas, although, on my view, a 'focal' approach might.be tracked down in NE VIII, 1157al-2,
59. similarly to EE VII, 1236a17-20.
60. Cf. NE VIII, 1156b19-23, where Aristotle points out that 'every kind of friendship is because of some good or because of pleasure, either without qualification or for the person loving', and that 'the good without qualification is also pleasant without qualification'.
61. See W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance and Focal Meaning', Phronesis, 20 (1975), pp. 51-62, p. 56. Fortenbaugh maintains that on some occasions in the Nicomachean Ethics the three forms of friendship described by Aristotle appear to be analogically related. For an explanation and a criticism of Fortenbaugh's view,
62. see Walker, Aristotle's Account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics.
63. On the notions of focal and analogical homonymy see J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto, 1963), pp. 116-25.
64. See footnote above.
65. See Walker, Aristotle's Account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 185-90.
66. See Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, pp. 642-3. With reference to NE VIII, 1167a13-14 he claims: 'So what Aristotle denies here is that oio. precedes, and possibly turns into, a friendship of one of the derivative sorts; he does not deny that once such a relationship has begun eunoia develops within it'.
67. EE VII, 1241a12-14.
68. Aristotle's main intention here is that of showing that eunoia is not a sufficient condition of friendship.
69. That well-wishing for the friend occurs in all three kinds of friendship identified by Aristotle is the thesis maintained by Cooper in Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship;
70. however, I do not agree with Cooper when he claims that Aristotle really makes general well-wishing and well-doing out of concern for the other person's good a condition of any kind of friendship, even of advantage- and pleasure-friendships, without specifying the particular way in which friends reciprocally love themselves. His point is that Aristotle 'does not maintain that friendships of the derivative kinds are wholly self-centered: pleasure- and advantage-friendships are instead a complex and subtle mixture of self-seeking and unself-interested well-wishing and well-doing' (p. 626). Criticism against Cooper's view, to which I subscribe, is lodged by Kahn in C.H. Kahn, 'Aristotle and Altruism', Mind, 90 (1981), pp. 20-40, p. 21, footnote 1. Kahn thinks that the evidence provided by Cooper is inconclusive.
71. See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, p. 38.
72. See Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, pp. 625-6.
73. For an opposite view see J.E. Whiting, 'Impersonal Friends', Monist, 74 (1991), pp. 3-29, p. 20.
74. With refer ence to NE IX, 1167a10-18, Whiting claims that, in Aristotle's thought, characterfriendship alone is founded on eunoia.
75. ATE VIII, 1155b31-4.
76. See Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, p. 620.
77. At NE V, 1129530-3 it is claimed that universal justice prescribes complete excellence of character to the highest degree, since the person who possesses it exercises his excellence in relation to other people, and not just by himself; such a view finds support in the common belief that justice is an allotrion agathon (
78. see NE V, 1130a2-5). On the notion of allotrion agathon,
79. see G. Zanetti, La Nozione di Giustizia in Aristotele (Bologna, 1993), p. 21: 'La giustizia universale si differenzia dalle altre virtù grazie al suo costitutivo rapportarsi all' altro: essa rappresenta dunque il fondamento intersoggettivo della virtù, la fondamentale interazione presupposta da Aristotele nella sua concezione della giustizia come virtù sociale, ponte teorico fra ciò ehe in epoca moderna sarebbero stati definiti come ambiti dell'etica e della politica'.
80. Cf. R. Bodćüs, La Véritable Politique et ses Vertus Selon Aristote (Leuven, 2004), pp. 109-12.
81. See NE V, 1130b30-1131a1.
82. See D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of "Particular Justice" ', Classical Review, 8 (1894), pp. 185-92, p. 185. Ritchie maintains that the concept of reciprocity is at the basis of those forms of particular justice; he coins the term 'Catallactic justice' with reference to the ground of reciprocity which makes the practice of particular justice possible. On his account of Catallactic justice see p. 192 of his article.
83. Cf. Bodéüs, La Véritable Politique et ses Vertus Selon Aristote, p. 107;
84. cf. B.A.O Williams, Justice as a Virtue, in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A.O. Rorty (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 188-99.
85. EE VII, 1237b9-10.
86. NE VIII, 1156a19-21.
87. NE VIII, 1156a21-4.
88. Cf. Aristotle, Politics V, 1301a20-5.
89. NE VIII, 1155a22-3.
90. See Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, pp. 645-6.
91. NE 1162b16-21;
92. 1163a9-16;
93. EE 1243a2-b38.
94. Politics I, 1252b28-30.
95. Cf. Politics III, 1280a31-2;
96. 1280b32-5. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, pp. 399-406. See in particular p. 402: 'Since the city is comprehensive, seeking to plan for everything that is needed for the complete good, a rational agent has good reason to want to share in its deliberations. This argument implies that a virtuous person does not value the city simply because of its general concern with the expedient (Cf. EN 1160a9-14). Aristotle suggests that essentially political activities are them-selves part of the complete and happy life. If the city provides only the instrumental resources needed for a complete and happy life, it is not clear why the virtuous person values just action for its own sake'.
97. See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, p. 45.
98. Ibid.
99. NE VIII, 1156b7-9.
100. I will not treat the issue in detail; however, the notion of friend as allos autos has often been thought to represent 'the crucial concept which permits Aristotle to pass from virtuous self-love to an altruistic concern for the interests of others' (Kahn, Aristotle and Altruism, p. 29).
101. It might also be taken as implying that the virtuous person's attitude towards herself might serve as a normative paradigm for her attitudes towards her friends (see Whiting, Impersonal Friends, p. 4),
102. in other words, that relations of philia to others derive from one's relations to oneself (see Annas, Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism, p. 539).
103. The idea of friend as 'allos autos' casts a new light on the relationships egoism and altruism. It seems that, on Aristotle's view, there is some compatibility between egoism (as involving rational desire towards what is good in absolute, e.g. ethical excellence) and altruism (conceived as a form of concern for the welfare of others for their own sake). See for instance T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ, 1970).
104. See also J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, 1977), p. 132,
105. who speaks of 'self-referential altruism', i.e. a 'concern for others who have some special connection with oneself'; cf. pp. 84 f. (he has adopted this terminology from C.D. Broad, 'Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives', Hibbert Journal, 48 (1949-50), pp. 105-14).
106. The logical priority of egoism over altruism is stressed by Kahn, Aristotle and Altruism, p. 26
107. (cf. Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, pp. 70, 76 and 103).
108. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 398.
109. Cf. Kahn, Aristotle and Altruism, p. 31: 'The excellence and pleasure of the good life partially consists in the observation of moral activity; but we are better placed to observe the actions of others; hence the happy man will need others around him, who are like him in goodness and bound to him in friendship, so that he can observe their actions as akin to his own (1169b30-70a4)'.
110. Cf. Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, p. 41.
111. NE VIII, 1157b19-24.
112. NE VIII, 1158a10-12.
113. See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1156b10-12.
114. Cf. EEVII, 1237b10-13, where it is claimed that there is no stable friendship without confidence.
115. WE VIII, 1155a23-4.
116. NE VIII, 1155a26-7.
117. See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship, p. 150.
118. UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM