Iranian foreign policy towards occupied Iraq, 2003-05

Middle East Policy

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 28-47

  Taremi, Kamran ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN   (Iran)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 31144441310     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2005.00222.x     Document Type: Review

References (88)

1. This comment regarding the importance of Iraq was recently made by Hojjatoleslam Ali Yunesi, the minister of intelligence and security. He went on to explain that this was so because the security of Iran was so closely linked with the security of Iraq. Shargh, September 1, 2004, p. 1.
2. The responsibility for formulating Iran's policy vis-à-vis Iraq rests chiefly with the Office of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The task of implementing the policy was entrursted to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). It does so through its Qods Force, sometimes referred to as Qods Headquarters. It is important to note that the IRGC is made up of five branches: the ground forces, the navy, the air force, the mobilization forces (Basij) and the Qods Force. The Qods Force is responsible for all military matters that involve foreign countries or groups. Qods Force handled Iraqi affairs through one of its affiliates called Nasr Headquarters. After 2000 it was decided to involve the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in Iraqi affairs too. In that year a body was set up in SNSC called the Special Committee for Policy Making in Iraqi Affairs. This committee is headed by the Secretary of the SNSC, Mr. Ali Larijani. The ministers of defense, foreign affairs and interior are amongst its members. It appears that the committee was formed not so much to undertake policy making, which still rests chiefly with the Office of the Supreme Leader, but to ensure that the government would have a voice in policy making towards Iraq. Anyhow, the IRGC's critical role in Iraqi affairs means that Iraqi opposition groups, Shiite or Kurdish, have always had close ties to it.
3. According to information provided by the Ministry of Interior, by the year 2000 there were 595,000 Iraqi refugees and migrants living in Iran. This figure includes children born to Iraqi familities during their stay in Iran. For more information on Iraqi refugees in Iran, see Ali Babakhan, "The Deportation of Shi'is during the Iran-Iraq War: Causes and Consequences," in Faleh Abdul-Jabar, ed., Ayatollahs, Sufis, and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2002), chapter 14.
4. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 198.
5. For a good discussion of Iranian-Iraqi relations under the shah, see Graham E. Fuller, The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) chapters 2, 3 and 4;
6. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) chapters 4, 5, and 6;
7. and R. K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1978: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), chapter 16.
8. For the Iranian leadership's views of the Iraqi aggression against Iran, see Imam Khomeini, In Search of the Way from Imam's Words: War and Jihad, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications, 1984), p. 20.
9. On the U.S. policy towards Iran in this era, see Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 70-93;
10. Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (March/April 1994), pp. 45-55;
11. Garry Sick, "Rethinking Dual Containment," Survival, vol. 40, no. 1, (Spring 1998), pp. 5-32;
12. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Policy, no. 107 (May/June 1997), pp. 20-41;
13. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony," Survival, vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 95-120;
14. and Sami G. Hajjar, "Framing a Rogue: U.S.-Iran Relations in the Gulf," Strategic Review, vol. 25, no. 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 19-28.
15. For a discussion of Iran-Iraq relations after the war, see Dilip Hiro, Neighbors not Friends: Iran and Iraq after the Gulf Wars (New York: Routledge, 2001).
16. Ettelaat, April 10, 2003, p. 3.
17. President Khatami as quoted by Kayhan , January 25, 2003, p. 2.
18. Also see comments by President Khatami in his meeting with the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, in Ettelaat April 26, 2003, p. 2. Ayatollah Khamenei made the same point in one of his speeches;
19. see Ettelaat April 13, 2003 . p. 7.
20. Also see comments made by Mohsen Armin, a prominent member of the Majlis's Foreign Relations Committee in Kayhan, April 8, 2003, p. 3.
21. Similar comments were also made by Brigadier General Salimi, Commander in Chief of the armed forces; see Kayhan, April 8, 2003, p. 3.
22. See the Friday prayer sermons by Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ettelaat April 13, 2003, p. 7.
23. See comments made by Rear-Admiral Shamkhani, Iran's minister of defense, in Kayhan, January 13, 2003, p. 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Hashemi Rafsanjani's interview for Rahbord Journal as reprinted in Ettelaat, April 14, 2003, p. 12.
27. See Dr. Kharrazi's comments in his meeting with the Algerian deputy foreign minister in Tehran. Kayhan, January 5, 2003, p. 2.
28. See comments made by Dr. Kharrazi in his meeting with the Kuwaiti crown prince who was visiting Iran some two months prior to the invasion. Kayhan, January 12, 2003, p. 2.
29. These figures were provided by Mr. Ahmad Hosseini Head of the Office for Aliens, Ministry of Interior. Ettelaat August 12, 2003, p. 3.
30. Kayhan, April 4, 2003, p. 3.
31. See the comments made by Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister, to that effect in Kayhan, January 4, 2003, p. 3.
32. Also see his comments in meeting with the Portuguese prime minister in Tehran. Kayhan, January 7, 2003, p. 3.
33. Kayhan, January 12, 2003, p. 2.
34. See remarks by President Khatami about Iranian efforts to prevent war in Ettelaat, April 17, 2004, p. 4.
35. Mohammad Mohammadi Qarasui, "Main Political Developments in and the Challenges Facing the Iraqi Shiite Opposition Groups Two Decades after the Victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 1979-1999" (M.A. Thesis, Islamic Azad University, 2003), p. 200.
36. From the regular military the following units were stationed along the border: The 92nd Armored Division stationed in the southwest, the 81 st Division stationed in the central section of the border, the 28th Division stationed in Iranian Kurdistan, and the 21st Hamzeh Division stationed in Iranian Azerbaijan in the northwestern section of the border with Iraq. These units were reinforced by a number of the IRGC ground forces divisions. These forces were given orders to engage the coalition troops should they open fire on them or cross the Iran-Iraq border without waiting for authorization from Tehran.
37. Kayhan, March 10, 2003, p. 3.
38. See remarks by Rear-Admiral Ali Shamkhani at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3 accessed on December 9, 2004.
39. Ettelaat, April 12, 2003, p. 7.
40. See the transcript of President Khatami's speech made on the Island of Kish in Ettelaat, April 4, 2003, p. 2.
41. Kayhan, March 10, 2003, p. 3.
42. Ettelaat, April 16, 2003, p. 2.
43. Hashemi Rafsanjani's interview for Rahbord Journal as reprinted in Ettelaat, April 14, 2003, p. 12.
44. Ettelaat, April 30, 2003, p. 3.
45. See Ayatollah Rafsanjani's Friday prayer sermons in Ettelaat, May 9, 2003, p. 2.
46. That is why Iran welcomed the decision by the Spanish government to withdraw its forces from Iraq. Ettelaat, April 22, 2004, p. 4.
47. Also see comments by the Iranian foreign minister regarding the undesirability of the presence of NATO troops in Iraq. Ettelaat, June 22, 2003, p. 16.
48. Ettelaat, November 22, 2004, p. 2.
49. Ettelaat June 9, 2003, p. 2. Ayatollah Haeri was one of a number of clerics who were expelled to Iran by the Baath government in 1971 because they had Iranian birth certificates. After expulsion he took up residence in the city of Qom.
50. Jomhuri Eslami, June 1, 2004, p. 6.
51. Jomhuri Eslami, June 5, 2004, p. 16.
52. Ettelaat, June 9, 2003, p. 2.
53. See President Khatami's comments concerning the clashes between Sadr's forces and those of the coalition in Ettelaat, April 12, 2004, p. 2.
54. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL, Iran Report [online] Vol. 7, No. 15, April 19, 2004, available from: http://www.rferl.org/iran-report (henceforth cited as REF/RFL, Iran Report)
55. See President Khatami's comments concerning the issue in Ettelaat, August 23, 2004, p. 1.
56. Similar comments were made by Ayatollah Rafsanjani; see Ettelaat, August 28, 2004, p. 2.
57. RFE/RL, Iran Report [online] Vol. 7, No. 53, September 27, 2004, available from: http://www.rferl.org/iran-report
58. Ettelaat, May 21, 2004, p. 16.
59. Iranian leaders on many occasions declared that Iran was not working for the creation of an Islamic republic
60. in Iraq. Nor was Iran working for the creation of a Shiite state. See Ettelaat, September 20, 2003, p. 2,
61. and Ettelaat April 22, 2004, p. 4.
62. Ettelaat, August 16, 2003, p. 16.
63. Ettelaat, October 18, 2003, p. 2.
64. See comments by Dr. Kharrazi in Ettelaat, July 1, 2004, p. 16.
65. Similar comments were made by Hossein Kazemi Ghomi, Iran's chargé d'affaires in Baghdad. Ettelaat, July 2, 2004, p. 16.
66. See comments by the Speaker of the Iranian government in Ettelaat, May 21, 2004, p. 16.
67. Ettelaat, August 2, 2004, p. 4.
68. For more information on the supply of electricity to Iraq visit the website of the Iranian Ministry of Energy at www.moe.org.ir. For political reasons the Iraqi side asked Iran to provide electricity to central Iraq which includes Baghdad.
69. Donyay-e Eghtesad, June 28, 2005, p. 5.
70. See comments by President Khatami in Ettelaat, August 17,2003, p. 2.
71. Similar comments were made by Ayatollah Rafsanjani; see Ettelaat, September 1, 2003, p. 16.
72. Iran, August 2, 2004, p. 3.
73. See comments by President Khatami in Ettelaat, July 19, 2003, p. 2.
74. Shargh, August 17, 2004, p. 2;
75. and Hayat-e Now, August 12, 2004. p.1.
76. For example, see comments by Sirus Naseri, a senior Iranian diplomat, as cited in Louis Charbonneau, "US too stretched to attack Iran, says Iran envoy," at http: //www.reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=7716859 accessed on January 25, 2005.
77. Ettelaat, October 30, 2004, p. 2.
78. For Mr. Yunesi's comments see Ettelaat, October 2, 2003, p. 4. Similar upbeat assessments were advanced by Ayatollah Khamenei in his New Year address to the Iranian people.
79. Ettelaat, September 11, 2003, p. 2.
80. Ettelaat, July 4, 2004, p. 16. These figures are provided by Ayatollah Hassan Rouhani, the secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security.
81. This commission consists of five committees, one of which deals with economic issues.
82. Iran had consulates in Karbala and Basra, and Iraq in Khorramshahr and Kermanshah.
83. Donyay-e Eghtesad, June 28, 2005, p.5.
84. RFE/RFL Iran Report vol. 8, no. 27, July 13, 2005.
85. RFE/RFL Iran Report vol. 8, no. 28, July 19, 2005.
86. RFE/RFL Iran Report vol. 8, no. 29, July 26, 2005.
87. For the Iraqi position on the question of reparations, see Kayhan, November 8, 2004, p. 14.
88. Interview with Mr. Asghar Khaji, head of the Office for the Reconstruction of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.