Terrorism's role in re-shaping border crossings: 11 September and the US borders

Geopolitics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 741-766

  Olmedo, Carlos ^a   Soden, Dennis L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BORDER REGION; GEOPOLITICS; TERRORISM; WORLD TRADE CENTER;

EID: 30944456921     PISSN: 14650045     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14650040500318514     Document Type: Review

References (31)

1. Borderplex is defined as contiguous cities sharing a common international boundary, jointly serving as a traditional urban or metropolitan core. While other border areas are significant, such as San Diego, it does not share its boundary with its Mexico counterpart and does not serve as part of the core urban area of Tijuana. Similar borderplexes are emerging in other border areas, especially in Eastern Europe, as pre-Second World War relationships re-connect communities. Using San Diego as an example, while San Diego County does border Tijuana, the city of Chula Vista and empty land lie between the city of San Diego and the international boundary. Roughly 15 miles separate San Diego's downtown from the San Ysidro entry so transportation by road, bus or rail is used to link activity between Tijuana and San Diego in contrast to El Paso/Cd Juarez, where a crossing of the international bridge takes one from one central or core downtown to the other.
2. A maquiladora is a Mexican corporation operating under special customs status allowing it to temporarily import into México duty-free, raw materials, equipment, machinery, replacement parts, and other tools needed for the assembly or manufacture of intermediate or finished goods for subsequent export or sale in the domestic market (the latter requires payment of import tariffs on the US raw material used in the production process).
3. Dennis L. Soden, Mathew McElroy and Carlos Olmedo, 'A New Look at Comparative Advantage: Border Areas as Strategic Resources', paper prepared for presentation at the International Atlantic Economic Society, Lisbon, Portugal, March 2004.
4. Bill Linderking, 'The U.S.-Mexican Border and Nafta: Problem or Paradigm?', in Oscar J. Martinez (ed.), U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1996), pp.191-3.
5. David Newman and Nurit Kliot, 'Introduction: Globalisation and the Changing World Political Map', in Nurit Kliot and David Newman (eds), Geopolitics at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Changing World Political Map (London: Frank Cass Publishers 2000), p.8.
6. Jason M. Ackleson, 'Discourses on Identity and Territoriality on the U.S.-Mexico Border', in Kliot and Newman (note 5) p.155.
7. Ibid.
8. James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Divide: Governancne in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998).
9. El Paso 2001 population estimate - 688,039. Source: Census Bureau, QuickFacts, .
10. Ciudad Juárez 2000 population estimate - 1,218817. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000, .
11. Source for border crossings: US Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, based on data compiled from the US Customs Service.
12. Defined as a tractor with a loaded or empty trailer attached.
13. Approximately one-fifth of US trade is with Canada versus 12-13 per cent with Mexico.
14. Throughout the paper OTM refers strictly to the August to September 2001 change. For the OTY analysis August 2001 is chosen because it is the last month unbiased by 9/11. Also note that several ports contain underreported or not reported data creating gaps in respective graphs so in order not to bias downward the visual representations.
15. See as a source for this discussion: US Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, based on data compiled from the US Customs Service.
16. Some ports on the southern border have Dedicated Commuter Lanes (DCL), a system approved by dual governments that pre-clears individuals and vehicles categorised as low risk and allows them to drive through a lane with little interruption. In El Paso for example, the 9/11 disturbance at the international bridges increased the number of persons crossing via the DCL. Between January and September 2002 an average of almost 6,000 cars crossed daily through the DCL, an increase of over 140 percent from the daily 2001 average. This increase, however, accounts for only a small percentage of the loss in overall vehicle traffic reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for El Paso. In spite of its advantages, many citizens forego DCL crossings due to the cost and location (in El Paso in 2002 the annual cost was almost $400 and only available at one end of the city). Source for DCL crossings: US Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly Immigration and Naturalization Services), El Paso Branch.
17. Source: Michael Sprung, US Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Office of Transportation Analysis.
18. Multipliers are based on authors' calculations.
19. At the port level, general wait times per international bridge can be assessed by monitoring radio stations that provide such information via US Customs or from US Customs directly with the proper credentials. Tracking this information is complex since it varies by bridge, date, time, events and other factors inherent to the particular cities which are tied together. The Department of Homeland Security, US Customs website also provides snapshots of wait times and the number of open lanes for commercial and vehicle crossings for the international bridges at major ports of entry. These data, however, have proven not to be reliable. For example, the site transmitted from Washington DC can post a five minute delay at a specific bridge in El Paso when it is known for a fact by those living there that the delay is far greater. Furthermore, there exists no historical time series for these data as what is posted is quickly erased after the next time set is posted, thereby limiting comparisons. It should be noted, though, that recent postings of wait times are far more within the range of being plausible versus past collections. For these reasons mention of specific wait times would be flawed and hence are not provided by the authors - wait times are instead broadly implied or presented in ranges based on first-hand knowledge, personal crossing experience, and information about the individual ports that includes conversations with those who live there.
20. Source for El Paso bridge crossings: US Customs Service, El Paso Branch.
21. See Adriana M. Chavez, 'More to Visit U.S. to Shop, but Retailers Disappointed', El Paso Times, 9 December 2002, p.A-1.
22. A prime example of the region's integration is the area known as 'Chihuahuita' in El Paso. In 1963 presidents John F. Kennedy of the United States and Adolfo López Mateos of Mexico signed the Chamizal Convention that ended decades of bitter territorial conflict between the two nations. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which officially ended the US-Mexico War, provided that the new international boundary was to be the centre of the deepest channel of the Rio Grande River that lies between Texas from Mexico. Flooding and gradual southbound shifting of the Rio Grande left a considerable section of the land on the Texas side of the river. Eventually the land was settled and incorporated as part of El Paso but still claimed by Mexico. With the signing of the Chamizal Convention Mexico repatriated much of the land it had lost. A man-made channel to prevent the Rio Grande from blurring the international boundary was constructed of concrete and three new bridges were built. The US residents and businesses on the repatriated land were compensated and relocated northward. The remaining section of land that was previously part of Chihuahua, Mexico and not repatriated is known as 'Chihuahuita'. Another prime example of the region's integration is the night view from Scenic Drive in El Paso's Franklin Mountains (the tail of the Rocky Mountains). If one stares southward it is virtually impossible to locate the international boundary and difficult to differentiate where lights on the US side of the border end and the lights on the Mexican side begin. This is truly one region, two contiguous cities, two countries, separated only by river flow.
23. See Alberta H. Charney and Vera K. Pavlokovich, 'The Economic Impacts of Mexican Visitors to Arizona: 2001', Economic and Business Research Program, University of Arizona, 2002, .
24. Other survey-style studies much more limited in scope and statistical power have also tried to measure the extent of retail sales purchases by Mexican nationals but are by no means definitive.
25. See Keith Phillips and Carlos Manzanares, 'Transportation Infrastructure and the Border Economy', The Border Economy (Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2001).
26. See Sergio Peña Medina, 'Comercio Transfronterizo y su Impacto en la Región El Paso-Juárez: Una Propuesta de Financiamiento de la Planeación Binacional', Frontera Norte 14/29 (2003).
27. See Keith R. Phillips and Jesus Cañas, 'Business Cycle Coordination Along the Texas-Mexico Border', Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, San Antonio and El Paso Branches, unpublished manuscript.
28. Economic consequences are obvious, i.e., a US citizen foregoes making a trip to Mexico, thereby foregoing the opportunity for a Mexican service provider such as a restaurant to obtain dollars and personal income that may be spent on goods and services in the United States. An example of social impacts is the following: As mentioned in the Mexico and Canada Borders section, there are greater social and familial ties along the US-Mexico border that give rise to the large number of people and vehicle crossings. If a friend or relative chooses not to cross to the other side to visit because of wait times, these ties that make the US-Mexico border region are altered. Social interactions are also changed if one chooses not to cross to see a movie or a play or a theatre act or have a drink.
29. Border regions also bear a greater public health burden from increased trade and immigration in proportion to economic prosperity. These and other demographic and social factors on both sides of the border interact to create health conditions distinct from other areas in the United States, including a higher risk for certain health problems and reduced access to healthcare services. The flow of people back and forth also guarantees efficient transmission of communicable diseases. Additionally, an unknown but significant proportion of the millions of annual border crossings are health related - medically underserved US residents obtain lower-priced prescription and over-the-counter medications as well as basic medical and dental services in Mexico while affluent and indigent Mexican residents obtain improved, specialised or otherwise unavailable healthcare services in the United States. See Maria Alvarez Amaya, 'Health Issues on the U.S.-México Border', in C.T. Brenner, I. Coronado and D.I. Soden (eds), Dígame:POlicy & Politics on the Texas Border (El Paso, TX: University of Texas at El Paso, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company 2003), ch.14, pp.259-83.
30. Differing operating times between US and Mexican Customs further compounds congestion at the bridges. Cargo trucks begin lining on one side of the border as they wait for the other side of the border to open the inspection gates. Clearly a homogenous schedule would allow those first in line to be inspected before a bottleneck begins. Furthermore, the current inspection system is undermanned at a time when various politicians prefer a policy of 'stop and examine everything' without differentiating between what is high risk and what is low risk. Old technologies and compliances from Mexican exporters to pre-clear cargo before reaching US Customs, and new ones recently implemented should help facilitate the movement of goods to some extent.
31. See Maria Alvarez Amaya (note 27).