Grounded knowledge, place and epistemic virtue

Ethics, Place and Environment

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 361-371

  Kawall, Jason ^a  

^a Assistant Professor in the University Libraries   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

KNOWLEDGE; SENSE OF PLACE;

EID: 30844449867     PISSN: 1366879X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13668790500348380     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Christopher J. Preston, Grounding Knowledge: Environmental Philosophy, Epistemology, and Place (Athens, GA, University of Georgia Press, 2003).
2. That is, knowledge that a given proposition is true. For example, 'Alicia knows that snow is white'. Such propositional knowledge ('knowledge that') is often contrasted with 'knowledge how', e.g. knowing how to perform CPR or knowing how to use a compass. The locus classicus for this distinction is Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1949), esp. ch. 2.
3. The knowledge how/knowledge that distinction has recently been subject to much scrutiny. It is beyond the scope of the current essay to address the recent debate. Suffice to say that even if knowledge how can be reduced to knowledge that, the basic claim would still stand: We should focus more on how we actively acquire knowledge that and also focus on how knowledge (be it how or that) allows us to act effectively as living creatures in complex environments. For recent work on the distinction see Paul Snowdon, 'Knowing how and knowing that: A distinction reconsidered', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CIV (2004), pp. 1-29;
4. Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, 'Knowing how', Journal of Philosophy, XCVIII (2001), pp. 411-444;
5. Stephen Schiffer, 'Amazing Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, XCIX (2002), pp. 200-202.
6. Ernest Sosa, 'Intellectual virtue in perspective', in Ernest Sosa (ed.), Knowledge in Perspective (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 286. Note that Sosa further refines this basic account of intellectual virtue in the same paper; these modifications are not crucial for our purposes here.
7. Preston refers to Mark Rowlands, The Body in Mind (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999)
8. and Mark Rowlands, The Environmental Crisis (New York, St Martin's Press, 2000).
9. And note that these may be among the most interesting and valuable environments in terms of cognitive impacts and diversity.
10. Rachel Kaplan and Stephen Kaplan, The Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 82-83.
11. They refer to P. A. Miller, Visual Preference and Implications for Coastal Management: A Perceptual Study of the British Columbia Shoreline, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1984.
12. See Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1987). Johnson defines a schema as 'a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience' (p. xiv). As Preston noted, Johnson believes that most of our schemas arise out of our being embodied creatures interacting with our environment. These schemas can then provide structure to our thinking in other areas. Thus, our balance schema (which arises for us as teetering bipeds who need to stand upright, carry loads, run, etc.) provides a 'structure for our conceptions of legal justice, moral fairness, psychological health, systemic balance, and mathematical equality' (p. 33). If Johnson is correct, then changes to our basic physical environment could lead to new schemas, which in turn could influence and reshape our thought in a wide range of areas beyond perception.
13. Perhaps less realistically, we can recall Frank Jackson's thought experiment (in a rather different context) involving Mary, a young woman who was raised in a manipulated environment where she never encountered the colour red. See Frank Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal qualia', Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 127-136.
14. This is not to deny that refocusings of attention, etc., would occur in artifactual environments designed to create unique cognitive impacts. Rather, the point is that quite different refocusings of attention, etc., would occur in various non-artifactual environments.
15. Note that Preston's emphasis on the 'variability and unpredictability' of natural environments dovetails nicely with the work of those who argue for the value of wildness. See, for example, Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, 'Refocusing ecocentrism: De-emphasizing stability and defending wildness', Environmental Ethics, 21 (1999), pp. 3-21. There is, of course, much recent debate over such concepts as 'wildness' and 'wilderness' that we need not delve into here.
16. I would like to thank Christopher Preston and Peter T. Hooper for helpful discussion and comments.