Moral luck and partialist theories

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 30, Issue 1-2, 1996, Pages 213-227

  Superson, Anita M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042884730     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00162892     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99. He is the one who named the thesis, and who gives this account on p. 83.
2. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
3. Nel Noddings, Caring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 28.
4. Ibid., p. 16.
5. Ibid., p. 86.
6. Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980, ed. Bernard Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981): pp. 1-19, esp. p. 18.
7. Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," p. 87.
8. Ibid., p. 97. See also John Cottingham, "Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality," The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 357-373, esp. p. 369.
9. Ibid., p. 97. See also John Cottingham, "Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality," The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 357-373, esp. p. 369.
10. Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," p. 90.
11. Michael Stocker, "Duty and Friendship: Toward a Synthesis of Gilligan's Contrastive Moral Concepts," in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1987): pp. 56-68, esp. p. 66.
12. Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories," The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-466, esp. p. 455.
13. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 3.
14. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreements (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
15. Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," in Mortal Questions, ed. Thomas Nagel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-38.
16. Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980, ed. Bernard Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39.
17. Nagel, "Moral Luck," p. 28.
18. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), AKA 394, pp. 7-8. Kant makes the same point at AKA 416.
19. Nagel, "Moral Luck," p. 28.
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. Ibid., p. 35.
22. Ibid., p. 28.
23. Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 98-99.
24. Annette Baier, "Pilgrim's Progress," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (June 1988): pp. 315-330, esp. p. 324.
25. David Copp, "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism," in Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, ed. Peter Vallentyne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 196-228, esp. pp. 212-216.
26. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 18.
27. Ibid., p. 19.
28. Ibid., p. 141.
29. Ibid., p. 72.
30. Ibid., p. 149.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., my emphasis.
33. This view can be found in James Nickels, "Discrimination and Morally Relevant Characteristics," Analysis 32 (March 1972): 113-114.
34. Cottingham, "Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality," p. 364.
35. Ibid., p. 365.
36. Stocker, "Duty and Friendship: Toward a Synthesis of Gilligan's Contrastive Moral Concepts," p. 457.
37. I thank John Bogart, Samantha Brennan, David Copp, Peter Dalton, Daniel Frank, Shelly Kagan, Richard Kraut, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.