Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 175-192

  Kerschbamer, Rudolf ^a   Puppe, Clemens ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Nonnormality; Private provision; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042861193     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01237190     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., and Varian, H. (1986): "On the Private Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Public Economics 29: 25-49.
2. Buchholz, W., Konrad, K. A., and Lommerud, K. E. (1997): "Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods." Review of Economic Design 3: 29-43.
3. Gramlich, E. M., and Rubinfeld, D. L. (1982): "Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Test of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses." Journal of Political Economy 90: 536-560.
4. Haslbeck, C. (1995): "Private Provision of a Public Good in a Stackelberg Game with Incomplete Information." Finanzarchiv 52: 364-377.
5. Kerschbamer, R., and Puppe, C. (1997a): "Sequential Contributions to Public Goods: a Note on the Structure of the Equilibrium Set." Mimeo, University of Vienna, Vienna.
6. _ (1997b): "Voluntary Contributions when the Public Good Is not Necessarily Normal." Working Paper nr. 9702, University of Vienna, Vienna.
7. Varian, H. (1994): "Sequential Contributions to Public Goods." Journal of Public Economics 53: 165-186.
8. Warr, P. (1983): "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is Independent of the Distribution of Income." Economics Letters 13: 207-211.