New and re-emerging infectious diseases: Epidemics in waiting

Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 265-270

  Peleman, Renaat A A M ^a  

^a GHENT UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Globalization; Influenza; Monkey pox; Severe acute respiratory syndrome; Vaccinia; West Nile virus

Indexed keywords

ANTIBIOTIC AGENT; INSECTICIDE;

ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE; CLINICAL FEATURE; EPIDEMIC; HEALTH CARE; HUMAN; INFECTION; INFLUENZA; INSECT; MICROBIAL CONTAMINATION; MICROORGANISM DETECTION; MONKEYPOX; NONHUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC HEALTH; REVIEW; SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME; SMALLPOX; VACCINATION; WEST NILE FLAVIVIRUS;

EID: 3042749971     PISSN: 09527907     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/00001503-200406000-00012     Document Type: Review

References (36)

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