The shrinking middle in the US Congress

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 429-451

  Fleisher, Richard ^a   Bond, John R ^b  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042737831     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000122     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. Quoted in Charles Babbington, 'Jeffords leaves GOP, shifts Senate control', Washington Post, 24 May 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ articles/A71000-2001 May24.html (accessed 24 May 2001).
2. Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1996); Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 729-48; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era', in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 2000), pp. 1-8.
3. Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1996); Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 729-48; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era', in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 2000), pp. 1-8.
4. Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1996); Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 729-48; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era', in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 2000), pp. 1-8.
5. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), was among the first to document party polarization in the House. Evidence of polarization in the mass public can be found in Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' ; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens', in Jeffrey E. Cohen, Richard Fleisher and Paul Kantor, eds, American Political Parties: Resurgence and Decline (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001); and Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics:The Electoral Connection', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30. For evidence of polarization on the Supreme Court, see Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, 'Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the US Supreme Court', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 869-85.
6. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), was among the first to document party polarization in the House. Evidence of polarization in the mass public can be found in Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' ; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens', in Jeffrey E. Cohen, Richard Fleisher and Paul Kantor, eds, American Political Parties: Resurgence and Decline (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001); and Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics:The Electoral Connection', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30. For evidence of polarization on the Supreme Court, see Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, 'Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the US Supreme Court', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 869-85.
7. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), was among the first to document party polarization in the House. Evidence of polarization in the mass public can be found in Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' ; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens', in Jeffrey E. Cohen, Richard Fleisher and Paul Kantor, eds, American Political Parties: Resurgence and Decline (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001); and Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics:The Electoral Connection', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30. For evidence of polarization on the Supreme Court, see Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, 'Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the US Supreme Court', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 869-85.
8. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), was among the first to document party polarization in the House. Evidence of polarization in the mass public can be found in Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' ; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens', in Jeffrey E. Cohen, Richard Fleisher and Paul Kantor, eds, American Political Parties: Resurgence and Decline (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001); and Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics:The Electoral Connection', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30. For evidence of polarization on the Supreme Court, see Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, 'Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the US Supreme Court', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 869-85.
9. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), was among the first to document party polarization in the House. Evidence of polarization in the mass public can be found in Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?' ; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens', in Jeffrey E. Cohen, Richard Fleisher and Paul Kantor, eds, American Political Parties: Resurgence and Decline (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001); and Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics:The Electoral Connection', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30. For evidence of polarization on the Supreme Court, see Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, 'Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the US Supreme Court', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 869-85.
10. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House; John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 31-72.
11. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House; John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 31-72.
12. Some members respond by retiring, opening an opportunity for replacement by a mainstream partisan.
13. Shelby won re-election as a Republican in 1998 with 63 per cent of the vote, only slightly less than the 65 per cent in his previous election as a Democrat.
14. James MacGregor Burns. The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 43-5.
15. James MacGregor Burns. The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 43-5.
16. Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, 'Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn', American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 411-25; John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, 'The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 7th edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001).
17. Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, 'Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn', American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 411-25; John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, 'The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 7th edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001).
18. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House; John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House".
19. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House; John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House".
20. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House; John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House".
21. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics' ; Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era'; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 154-85.
22. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics' ; Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era'; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 154-85.
23. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics' ; Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era'; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 154-85.
24. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics' ; Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era'; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 154-85.
25. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict Among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics' ; Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era'; Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress', in Bond and Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics, pp. 154-85.
26. Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 44-5; Fleisher and Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress'.
27. Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 44-5; Fleisher and Bond, 'Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress'.
28. Although it is conceivable that the number of individuals in the extreme opposing tails of each party distribution could shrink and be replaced by moderates, we suspect that the electoral changes that alter the ideological distribution in the parties are more likely to shrink the middle.
29. Aldrich, Why Parties? Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House.
30. Aldrich, Why Parties? Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House.
31. Aldrich, Why Parties? Aldrich and Rohde, 'The Consequences of Party Organization in the House'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House.
32. Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
33. Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 327-41; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House.
34. Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 327-41; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House.
35. Kevin A. Hill, 'Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 384-401.
36. Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer and Mack D. Mariani, Diverging Parties; Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2002), p. 438. North is defined as Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York. Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
37. Fleisher and Bond, 'Congress and the President in a Partisan Era', pp. 3-4.
38. Keith T. Poole, 'NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History', http://voteview.uh.edu/nominate/nominate.htm (accessed 30 May 2003); Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
39. Keith T. Poole, 'NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History', http://voteview.uh.edu/nominate/nominate.htm (accessed 30 May 2003); Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
40. Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 44-5.
41. John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 805-23, identify a number of problems associated with roll-call based measures of ideology. For evidence that roll-call based measures of ideology are valid and reliable, see Richard Herrera, Thomas Epperlein and Eric R. A. N. Smith, The Stability of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Political Research Quarterly, 48 (1995), 403-16; Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna and Sahar Shafqat, 'Liberal-Conservative Ideology of US Senators: A New Measure', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1395-414; and Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera and Cheryl L. Herrera, 'The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 283-95.
42. John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 805-23, identify a number of problems associated with roll-call based measures of ideology. For evidence that roll-call based measures of ideology are valid and reliable, see Richard Herrera, Thomas Epperlein and Eric R. A. N. Smith, The Stability of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Political Research Quarterly, 48 (1995), 403-16; Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna and Sahar Shafqat, 'Liberal-Conservative Ideology of US Senators: A New Measure', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1395-414; and Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera and Cheryl L. Herrera, 'The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 283-95.
43. John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 805-23, identify a number of problems associated with roll-call based measures of ideology. For evidence that roll-call based measures of ideology are valid and reliable, see Richard Herrera, Thomas Epperlein and Eric R. A. N. Smith, The Stability of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Political Research Quarterly, 48 (1995), 403-16; Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna and Sahar Shafqat, 'Liberal-Conservative Ideology of US Senators: A New Measure', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1395-414; and Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera and Cheryl L. Herrera, 'The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 283-95.
44. John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 805-23, identify a number of problems associated with roll-call based measures of ideology. For evidence that roll-call based measures of ideology are valid and reliable, see Richard Herrera, Thomas Epperlein and Eric R. A. N. Smith, The Stability of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Political Research Quarterly, 48 (1995), 403-16; Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna and Sahar Shafqat, 'Liberal-Conservative Ideology of US Senators: A New Measure', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1395-414; and Eric R. A. N. Smith, Richard Herrera and Cheryl L. Herrera, 'The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 283-95.
45. Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.
46. Keith T. Poole, 'Description of NOMINATE Data', Keith Poole's website 23 October 2001, http://voteview.uh.edu/page2a.htm (accessed 30 May 2003). Another approach is to use liberalism scores constructed by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) adjusted for time as suggested by Tim Groseclose, Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time: Adjusted ADA Scores for the US Congress', American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 33-50. These indicators are highly correlated (r > 0.90). ADA scores are less useful for our purposes than DW-NOMINATE, because ADA penalizes for absences, which can make a very liberal member look more moderate.
47. Keith T. Poole, 'Description of NOMINATE Data', Keith Poole's website 23 October 2001, http://voteview.uh.edu/page2a.htm (accessed 30 May 2003). Another approach is to use liberalism scores constructed by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) adjusted for time as suggested by Tim Groseclose, Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time: Adjusted ADA Scores for the US Congress', American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 33-50. These indicators are highly correlated (r > 0.90). ADA scores are less useful for our purposes than DW-NOMINATE, because ADA penalizes for absences, which can make a very liberal member look more moderate.
48. Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena.
49. Decades refer to apportionment periods (year ending in '2' to the year ending in '0'). The number of conservatives, moderates and liberals in each party by Congress are in the Appendix available with the website version of this article
50. To see the effect of different definitions, we show trends based on both + / - 0.2 and + / - 0.15 cut-points. The percentage of partisan non-conformists is lower with the 0.15 standard, but the trends are the same regardless of the standard used.
51. Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington and Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 510-29; Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th edn (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
52. Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington and Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 510-29; Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th edn (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
53. Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington and Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 510-29; Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th edn (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
54. Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington and Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 510-29; Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th edn (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
55. Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington and Richard Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 510-29; Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th edn (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
56. On the effects of scandal, see Susan Welch and John R. Hibbing, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982-1990', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 226-39; and John G. Peters and Susan Welch, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 697-708. For a discussion of national tides, see Jacobson, Electoral Origins, pp. 75-80.
57. On the effects of scandal, see Susan Welch and John R. Hibbing, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982-1990', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 226-39; and John G. Peters and Susan Welch, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 697-708. For a discussion of national tides, see Jacobson, Electoral Origins, pp. 75-80.
58. On the effects of scandal, see Susan Welch and John R. Hibbing, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982-1990', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 226-39; and John G. Peters and Susan Welch, 'The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 697-708. For a discussion of national tides, see Jacobson, Electoral Origins, pp. 75-80.
59. Measures of public opinion in the National Election Studies are problematical because of small samples in congressional districts. Measures of citizen ideology at the state level do not reflect ideology in congressional districts, except for the handful of states with a single House seat. For estimates of public opinion in states, see Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright and John T. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The US Census reports population characteristics for states and congressional districts, but characteristics of the 'geographical constituency' do not accurately reflect preferences of voters in members' 're-election' and 'primary' constituencies. Richard F. Fenno Jr, Home Style: House Members and Their Districts (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1978), discovered that representatives tend to view constituencies in these terms.
60. Measures of public opinion in the National Election Studies are problematical because of small samples in congressional districts. Measures of citizen ideology at the state level do not reflect ideology in congressional districts, except for the handful of states with a single House seat. For estimates of public opinion in states, see Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright and John T. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The US Census reports population characteristics for states and congressional districts, but characteristics of the 'geographical constituency' do not accurately reflect preferences of voters in members' 're-election' and 'primary' constituencies. Richard F. Fenno Jr, Home Style: House Members and Their Districts (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1978), discovered that representatives tend to view constituencies in these terms.
61. William T. Bianco. 'Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in US Congressional Districts', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9 (1984), 351-64; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality'; Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher and Jeffery C. Talbert, 'Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994', Political Research Quarterly, 50 (1997), 279-97; David Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
62. William T. Bianco. 'Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in US Congressional Districts', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9 (1984), 351-64; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality'; Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher and Jeffery C. Talbert, 'Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994', Political Research Quarterly, 50 (1997), 279-97; David Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
63. William T. Bianco. 'Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in US Congressional Districts', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9 (1984), 351-64; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality'; Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher and Jeffery C. Talbert, 'Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994', Political Research Quarterly, 50 (1997), 279-97; David Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
64. William T. Bianco. 'Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in US Congressional Districts', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9 (1984), 351-64; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 'Explaining Challenger Quality'; Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher and Jeffery C. Talbert, 'Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994', Political Research Quarterly, 50 (1997), 279-97; David Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
65. Norman R. Luttbeg and Michael M. Gant, American Electoral Behavior (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1995), p.71.
66. This standardized presidential vote measure performs as well as one based on district-level voting returns for multiple offices in years when data for both are available (see Bond, Fleisher and Talbert, 'Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races').
67. We also tested for regional differences in electoral outcomes to see if there have been systematic changes in the tendency for conservative Democrats to come from the South and liberal Republicans to come from the Northeast. We added dummy variables for South (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virgina), and Northeast/Midwest (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin). The analysis indicated that after controlling for Democratic party strength in the constituency, Democrats were more likely to win House and Senate elections in the South during the 1960s, but this electoral advantage declined across the decades so that by the 1990s Republicans had an advantage in the South. Partisan advantages in the Northeast were less clear. Democrats had advantages in some decades and Republicans in others, but there was no increasing or decreasing trend.
68. The presidential vote in congressional districts is not available in 1962 and 2000.
69. Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in US Senate Delegations: 1972-1988', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Thomas L. Brunell and Bernard Grofman, 'Explaining Divided US Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A Realignment Approach", American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 391-5.
70. Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in US Senate Delegations: 1972-1988', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Thomas L. Brunell and Bernard Grofman, 'Explaining Divided US Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A Realignment Approach", American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 391-5.
71. Segura and Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in US Senate Delegations', at p. 87; Brunell and Grofman, 'Explaining Divided US Senate Delegations', at p. 394.
72. Segura and Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in US Senate Delegations', at p. 87; Brunell and Grofman, 'Explaining Divided US Senate Delegations', at p. 394.
73. Thomas A. Kazee, Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1994), p. 13.
74. Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts, pp. 51 and 59.
75. Paul S. Hermson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 3rd edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000).
76. John Bresnahan and Susan Crabtree, 'Moderates fume at GOP leaders: Roukema race helps spark talk of revolt', Roll Call, 16 March 2000.
77. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'.
78. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'.
79. Fleisher and Bond, 'Why Has Party Conflict among Elites Increased if the Electorate Is Dealigning?'; Fleisher and Bond, 'Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary Citizens'; Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Polities'.
80. In regions outside the Northeast, there were 11-12 per cent fewer moderate and liberal Republican voters and identifiers in the 1990s than in the 1970s.