Unauthorized humanitarian intervention

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Stein, Mark S ^a  

^a Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 3042511706     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052504211025     Document Type: Review

References (89)

1. For another utilitarian discussion, see Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 106-49.
2. 1999 Annual Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., UN Doc. SG/SM/7136/GA/9596; available on-line at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html [accessed December 4, 2002].
3. S/Res/929, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. (June 22, 1994). For accounts, see Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala, Sweden: Iustus Forlag, 1998), 59-65; Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2d ed. (Irvington, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997), 258-62; and Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 243-60.
4. S/Res/929, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. (June 22, 1994). For accounts, see Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala, Sweden: Iustus Forlag, 1998), 59-65; Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2d ed. (Irvington, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997), 258-62; and Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 243-60.
5. S/Res/929, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. (June 22, 1994). For accounts, see Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala, Sweden: Iustus Forlag, 1998), 59-65; Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2d ed. (Irvington, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997), 258-62; and Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 243-60.
6. Few performed well during this crisis, and Annan himself has much to regret.
7. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 47-52; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 262-66; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 198-217.
8. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 47-52; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 262-66; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 198-217.
9. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 47-52; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 262-66; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 198-217.
10. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 52-58; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 241-49; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 217-43.
11. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 52-58; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 241-49; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 217-43.
12. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 52-58; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 241-49; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 217-43.
13. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 65-70; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 249-57; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 260-81.
14. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 65-70; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 249-57; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 260-81.
15. For accounts, see Österdahl, Threat to the Peace, 65-70; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 249-57; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 260-81.
16. This was with the acquiescence of Indonesia. S/Res/1272, UN SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. (Oct. 25, 1999).
17. For an account, see Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 165-98.
18. For accounts, see Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 264-65; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 212-13.
19. For accounts, see Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 264-65; and Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 212-13.
20. A brief and admirably objective account of the background of the Kosovo campaign, from one of its supporters, is given in Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia," American Journal of International Law 93, no. 4 (1999): 828-34, at 828-29.
21. On the general problem of ambiguous Security Council authorizations, see Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires, and the Iraqi Inspection Regime," American Journal of International Law 93, no. 1 (1999): 124-54.
22. Commentaries by leading international law scholars are collected in "Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention," American Journal of International Law 93, no. 4 (1999): 824-62; available on-line at http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm [accessed December 14, 2002].
23. In accord with this view are Lobel and Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council," 126, 132-33. See Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 184-98, for a more equivocal view.
24. In accord with this view are Lobel and Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council," 126, 132-33. See Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 184-98, for a more equivocal view.
25. NATO was authorized to protect the safe havens, and Bosnian Serb forces were violating the safe havens. This was sufficient authority, even though NATO also had the broader purpose of compelling the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a settlement. For a contrary view, see Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 265.
26. Louis Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention'," American Journal of International Law 93, no. 4 (1999): 824-28 (humanitarian intervention is lawful if authorized by the Security Council).
27. UN CHARTER art. 39.
28. See generally Österdahl, Threat to the Peace.
29. UN CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
30. I b i d.
31. G.A. Res. 217 (1948), available on-line at http://193.194.138.190/udhr/ lang/eng.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
32. G.A. Res. 260 (1948), entered into force 1951, available on-line at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
33. G.A. Res. 2200 (1966), entered into force 1976, available on-line at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
34. G.A. Res. 2200 (1966), entered into force 1976, available on-line at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
35. UN CHARTER art. 2, para 4.
36. Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," European Journal of International Law 10, no. 1 (1999); available on-line at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/ab1.html; and Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991), 128-29.
37. Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," European Journal of International Law 10, no. 1 (1999); available on-line at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/ab1.html; and Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991), 128-29.
38. See Anthony A. D'Amato, International Law. Process and Prospect (Irvington, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995), 56-72. D'Amato offers an exhaustive history of the terms 'political independence' and 'territorial integrity'.
39. As noted below in Section II D, this may be the position of the International Court of Justice.
40. This position is particularly identified with W. Michael Reisman. See W. Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action, " American Journal of International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 82-84; and W. Michael Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law," American Journal of International Law 84, no. 4 (1990): 866-76.
41. This position is particularly identified with W. Michael Reisman. See W. Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action, " American Journal of International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 82-84; and W. Michael Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law," American Journal of International Law 84, no. 4 (1990): 866-76.
42. UN CHARTER art. 1, para 1.
43. "To achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...." UN CHARTER art. 1, para 3.
44. UN CHARTER art. 2, para 3.
45. "Messy War, Messy Peace," The Economist, June 12, 1999, 15-16.
46. ICJ STATUTE art. 38, para 1.
47. For a discussion of some of the controversies, see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, "Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation," American Journal of International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 757-91; available on-line at http://www.asil.org/ajil/roberts.pdf [accessed March 10, 2003].
48. As noted below in Section II D, this was the position of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.
49. Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention'," 828; and Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37-65.
50. Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention'," 828; and Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37-65.
51. Michael J. Glennon, "How War Left the Law Behind," New York Times, November 21, 2002, sec. A, p. 37, col. 2.
52. UN CHARTER art. 24, para 1.
53. Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, UN Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999).
54. The facts regarding U.S. intervention in Nicaragua are laid out (accurately, in my view) in the ICJ's decision on the merits in the Nicaragua case: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 IC] 14.
55. UN CHARTER art. 92.
56. ICJ STATUTE art. 36, para 2.
57. See Peter H. F. Bekker and Christopher J. Borgen, "World Court Rejects Yugoslav Requests to Enjoin Ten NATO Members from Bombing Yugoslavia," American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights (June 1999); available on-line at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh36.htm [accessed December 14, 2002].
58. Yugoslavia v. Belgium, Order of June 2, 1999, para. 17; available on-line at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
59. As indicated and further explained on the ICJ website: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002- 10_yugo_20020322.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request for Provisional Measures, 1984 ICJ 169 (Order of May 10); and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 'Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ 14.
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request for Provisional Measures, 1984 ICJ 169 (Order of May 10); and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 'Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ 14.
62. Nicaragua (merits), 1986 ICJ at paras. 263, 268.
63. ICJ STATUTE art. 59.
64. Nicaragua (provisional measures), 1984 ICJ 169, Order B(2); and Nicaragua (merits), 1986 ICJ at para. 288.
65. Nicaragua (provisional measures), 1984 ICJ 169, Order B(2); and Nicaragua (merits), 1986 ICJ at para. 288.
66. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ 226.
67. Nuclear Weapons case, 1996 ICJ at para. 47.
68. UN CHARTER art. 94.
69. "Court's Ruling Acceptable, State Department Declares," New York Times, May 11, 1984, sec. A, p. 8, col. 1.
70. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 141-47; and Hendrick Smith, "Reagan Fighting to Win Aid for Anti-Sandinistas," The New York Times, May 7, 1984, sec. 1, p. 12, col. 1. (The dispute over aid "reached a climax in early April with revelations that the C.I.A. had directed the mining of Nicaraguan ports, reinforced by a subsequent ruling of the International Court of Justice that called for a halt in the mining and asserted that Nicaragua's independence 'should not be jeopardized by any military or paramilitary activities.'") The Reagan Administration's attempt to obtain aid for the Contras in spite of the Congressional cutoff led to the Iran-Contra affair.
71. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 141-47; and Hendrick Smith, "Reagan Fighting to Win Aid for Anti-Sandinistas," The New York Times, May 7, 1984, sec. 1, p. 12, col. 1. (The dispute over aid "reached a climax in early April with revelations that the C.I.A. had directed the mining of Nicaraguan ports, reinforced by a subsequent ruling of the International Court of Justice that called for a halt in the mining and asserted that Nicaragua's independence 'should not be jeopardized by any military or paramilitary activities.'") The Reagan Administration's attempt to obtain aid for the Contras in spite of the Congressional cutoff led to the Iran-Contra affair.
72. See Curtis A. Bradley, "U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty," American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights (May 2002); available on-line at http://www.asil.org/ insights/insigh87.htm [accessed March 10, 2003].
73. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, para 1.
74. Art. 5, para 2 of the Rome Statute provides: "The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."
75. For recent proposals, see "Discussion Paper on the Definition and Elements of the Crime of Aggression, prepared by the Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression," in Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 10th Session, UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002); available on-line at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/ jul2002/english/pcnicc2002_2_add2e.doc [accessed September 29, 2002].
76. UN CHARTER art. 39.
77. See Coordinator's Discussion Paper, available on-line at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/jul2002/english/pcnicc2002_2_add2e.doc [accessed September 29, 2002].
78. Mark S. Stein, "The Role of the Security Council in Prosecutions for the Crime of Aggression," Accountability: Newsletter of the American Society of International Law, International Criminal Law Interest Group 1, no. 1 (2002): 8-10.
79. See Rome Statute, art. 12. By conferring jurisdiction on the ICC, intervenees would also subject their own leaders to possible prosecution before the ICC.
80. "[A] person promoting human welfare and social reform," Merriam-Webster OnLine, s.v. 'humanitarian'; available on-line at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary [accessed December 5, 2002].
81. Michael Walzer, "The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention," Dissent 49, no. 1 (2002): 29-37.
82. John C. Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice," Social Philosophy & Policy 2, no. 2 (1985): 125-26.
83. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 123.
84. To quote Annan again: To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask - not in the context of Kosovo - but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold? 1999 Annual Report of the Secretary-General (details at note 2).
85. David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a utilitarian response, see William H. Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 192-96.
86. David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a utilitarian response, see William H. Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 192-96.
87. Not that strong geopolitical interests mean that the use of force should necessarily be opposed. Self-defense is a strong geopolitical interest.
88. S/Res/1441, UN SCOR 57th Sess., 4644 mtg. (Nov. 8, 2002). For an explanation of this resolution, see Frederic L. Kirgis, "Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations," ASIL Insights (November 2002); available on-line at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh92.htm [accessed March 7, 2003].
89. The more serious brutality imputed to Yugoslavia, fairly or unfairly, was the brutality of the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian tragedy colors the attitude of many toward the Kosovo intervention, including possibly some ICJ judges.