The terminology of terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 231-247

  Deery, Phillip ^a  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNISM; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; LANGUAGE; POLITICAL DISCOURSE; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; TERRORISM; WAR;

ASIA; EURASIA; MALAYSIA; SOUTHEAST ASIA;

EID: 29744452024     PISSN: 00224634     EISSN: 14740680     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022463403000225     Document Type: Article

References (134)

1. Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Terrorism under democratic conditions: The case of the IRA', in Terrorism, legitimacy, and power: The consequences of political violence, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), p. 93.
2. Shawn J. Parry-Giles, The rhetorical presidency, propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), especially ch. 4;
3. Frances Stoner Saunders, Who paid the piper? The CIA and the cultural Cold War (New York: New Press, 2000);
4. Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America's strategy to subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000);
5. Scott Lucas, Freedom's war: The American crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press, 1999);
6. Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997);
7. and Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of disinformation: American propaganda, Soviet lies and the winning of the Cold War (New York: Arcade, 1995).
8. See, for example, Thomas Sorenson, The word war: The story of American propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968);
9. John Whitton and Arthur Larson, Propaganda: Towards disarmament in the war of words (New York: Oceania, 1964);
10. and Sig Mickelson, America's other voice: The story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983).
11. Vladimir Artemov, Information abused: Critical essays (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), p. 13.
12. See Deception operations: Studies in the East-West context, ed. David A. Charters and Maurice A. J. Tugwell (London: Brassey's, 1990), pt. 1;
13. Richard H. Schultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active measures in Soviet strategy (London: Brassey's, 1984);
14. and Roger Beaumont, 'Soviet psychological warfare and propaganda', Signal, 42, 3 (1987): 75-84.
15. See, for example, Caroline Page, U.S. official propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973 (London: Leicester University Press, 1996).
16. An exception is Jeffrey Race's fascinating semi-anthropological study, War comes to Long An: Revolutionary conflict in a Vietnamese province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), especially chs. 4-5.
17. A very comprehensive bibliographic essay on US psyops can be found in Christopher Simpson, Science of coercion. Communication research and psychological warfare 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.: 123-32.
18. This phrase was the chapter title of Noel Barber, The war of the running dogs. How Malaya defeated the Communist guerrillas (London: Collins, 1971), ch. 10.
19. Psychological warfare- but not semiotic warfare-is also discussed by Michael Tracey, A variety of lives: A biography of Sir Hugh Greene (London: Bodley Head, 1983), pp. 126-37;
20. Greene was the Head of Information Services in Malaya, 1950-51. Other studies include R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in retrospect: Organization of a successful counterinsurgency effort (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1972), section IX;
21. Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency. The Commonwealth's wars 1948-1966 (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 109-18;
22. John Coates, Suppressing insurgency: An analysis of the Malayan Emergency (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 114-37;
23. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 155-64, 180-4;
24. Brian Stewart, 'Winning in Malaya: An intelligence success story', in The clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western intelligence, propaganda and special operations, ed. Richard J. Aldrich et al. (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 267-83.
25. The one notable exception is Susan L. Carruthers, Winning hearts and minds: British governments, the media and colonial counter insurgency, 1944-1960 (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), ch. 2.
26. A passing reference to the use of the term 'bandit' can be found in Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its social and political meaning (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 88, n. 5.
27. Kumar Ramakrishna, 'A matter of confidence: Propaganda of word and deed in the Malayan Emergency June 1948-Dec. 1958' (Ph.D. diss., Royal Holloway, University of London, 1999), p. 152.
28. Even this fleeting reference disappeared from the published version; see Kumar Ramakrishna, Emergency propaganda: The winning of Malayan hearts and minds 1948-1958 (London: Curzon, 2002).
29. Victor T. LeVine, 'The logomachy of terrorism: On the political uses and abuses of definition', Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, 4 (1995): 45-59. LeVine's forensic-like dissection of a terrorist act (a deliberate bus crash in July 1989) by a Palestinian member of Islamic Jihad precludes broader lessons: 'the transformative power of names - including labels, characterisations, and definition - needs no elaboration here' (p. 49).
30. There is now a vast literature on the Malayan Emergency. The seminal studies are referred to by Karl Hack in his '"Iron claws on Malaya": The historiography of the Malayan Emergency', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 30, 1 (1999): 99-125.
31. Noteworthy recent discussions of the Emergency can be found in Karl Hack, idem., Defence and decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968 (London: Curzon, 2001)
32. and Timothy N. Harper, The end of empire and the making of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In none of these analyses is there more than at most a fleeting reference to the terminology used by the British.
33. Mueller, Politics of communication, pp. 18-24.
34. There are, of course, numerous examinations of the political uses of language ranging from the classic essay by George Orwell, 'Politics and the English language', in The collected essays, journalism and letters of George Orwell. In front of your nose 1945-1950 IV, ed. Sonia Orwell and lan Angus (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 127-40;
35. to Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 1-16. Neither of these deals with the Cold War period.
36. Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain's secret propaganda war: The Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1948-1977 (London: Sutton, 1998), ch. 4.
37. The IRD predated by one year its American counterpart, the United States Information Agency, which funded the 'Voice of America'. At its peak in the early 1970s, the IRD was a massive operation, employing 400 staff based at River-walk House on the South Bank in London and with an annual budget in excess of £1,000,000. See Brian Crozier, Free hand: The unseen war 1941-1991 (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 104; Crozier worked for the IRD throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.
38. Public Records Office, Kew, London (henceforth PRO), FO 1110/143,'Anti-Communist propaganda in Far East; opening of information bureau in Singapore', 10 Dec. 1948;
39. PRO, FO 1110/277, 'Progress report: Information Research Department 1st January to 31st July, 1949', para. 19.
40. According to Foreign Office historians, this Singapore office produced 'effective and widely-circulated output'; Library and Records Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Origins and establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946-48 (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 15.
41. National Archives (Washington, DC), General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, 841.20246 D/1-1049, Extract from letter, 6 Jan. 1949, from R. Murray, sent by US Embassy, Singapore, to Washington. (My thanks to John Prados for this reference.)
42. PRO, FO 1110/277, 'Progress Report';
43. see also PRO, FO 1110/210, 'Methods used in anti-Communist propaganda in foreign countries' (n.d.). Coates, Suppressing insurgency, p. 126, makes a tantalising reference to 'the Psychological Warfare Section' of the Emergency Information Services but does not elaborate. It seems certain this section was the jointly-run MI6/IRD operation.
44. See Index to the correspondence of the Foreign Office for the year 1950 (London: HMSO, 1980), p. 447;
45. PRO, FO 1110/277, 'List of articles despatched between April and July 1949', Annexe 'c';
46. PRO, FO 1110/1166, confidential correspondence, C. G. Costley-White, 15 Jan.1958, 'Use of IRD material in the Federation of Malaya'.
47. For MI6 involvement with the IRD see PRO, FO 110/184, correspondence from MI6 officer (identity withheld) to A. S. Halford, 31 Dec. 1948. See also Paul Lashmar, 'Covert in glory', New Statesman and Society, 8, 342 (3 Mar. 1995): 14.
48. There is some debate over whether the relationship between the two organisations was marked by warmth or rivalry. Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, British intelligence and covert action: Africa, Middle East and Europe since 1945 (Dingle, Ireland: Brandon, 1984) argue for closeness (p. 91).
49. while Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty years of special operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000) alleges that MI6 regarded the IRD as 'amateurs' (p. 488).
50. The CIA connection is mentioned in Dorril, MI6, p. 711.
51. SIFE is discussed in Richard J. Aldrich, The hidden hand: Britain, America and Cold War secret intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 507.
52. The Director of SIFE was Jack Morton, who Hack contends was influential primarily because of his accessibility to high officials and commanders in Singapore; Karl Hack, 'British intelligence and counterinsurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya', Intelligence and national security, 14, 2 (1999): 150, n. 47.
53. PRO, CAB 130/37, 'Cabinet Committee on Colonial Information Policy - Three-year plan for the expansion of publicity services in Commonwealth countries and the colonies', C.I. 49(66), 15 July 1949.
54. PR 704/G, 'Memorandum on the use of words in publicity about Communists', 1948 (Box: Anti-Communist propaganda, Labour Party International Department, Labour History and Archive Centre, Manchester).
55. The link between the British Labour Party and the IRD was personified by Denis Healey, who worked for the first (in the International Department) and collaborated with the second. See Denis Healey, The time of my life (London: M. Joseph, 1989), pp. 106-7.
56. and Denis Healey, idem., 'The Cominform and world Communism', International Affairs, 24, 3 (1948): 339-49.
57. PRO, FO 1110/191, emphasis added; FO 1110/2297, 'Standard words for use in propaganda about Russia'. Other terminology issues are discussed in memos from R. Murray, 26 Nov. 1948;
58. R. Fraser, 4 Sept. 1948;
59. A. Watson and C. Mayhew, 16 Dec. 1948;
60. J. Cloake and A. Watson, 31 Dec. 1948. See also the series of internal memos in late December 1948 relating to the criticisms made of the language used in the BBC's Russian broadcasts by Boris Shub, who helped establish the Voice Of America. In January 1949 a memo summarising and commenting on his criticisms was prepared for - but finally not sent to - Sir lan Jacob at the BBC;
61. see PRO, FO 110/16.
62. PR 704/G, 'Memorandum on the use of words'.
63. In the US, in contrast, 'red' was used with less compunction and more freely; Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, 'Red fascism: The merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American image of totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s', American Historical Review, 75, 4 (1970): 1046-64.
64. PRO, FO 953/1637, Top Secret, 'The work of the Regional Information Office at Singapore' (1949).
65. National Archives of Australia (ACT) [henceforth NAA], A4940/1, C3380, 'Nuclear weapons for Australian forces', Cabinet Minute 15 May 1962, Decision No. 241.
66. Tim Jones, Postwar counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945-1952: A special type of warfare (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 82. The Hindu term 'dacoits', referring to an organised gang of robbers, was applied to the insurgents in Burma in 1946-7.
67. PRO, CO 534/4762, 'Designation of bandits in Malaya', Minute, J. D. Higham to K. Blackburne, 12 Nov. 1948. Indicative of the importance attached to political terminology, this document was classified 'Top Secret' and was to be 'circulated by hand at all stages' (emphasis in original).
68. PRO, CO 717/172/52849/9/1948, Minute, O. H. Morris to A. Creech Jones, 21 June 1948.
69. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive rebels. Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963), pp. 5, 26.
70. On Asian movements see, for example, Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion. A study of peasant revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)
71. and Peasant rebellion and Communist revolution in Asia, ed. John W. Lewis (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974).
72. For the semantics of the original Spanish word guerillero see Coates, Suppressing insurgency, p. 355, n. 32. Despite this attention to etymology, Coates elsewhere and within the space of two pages (pp. 148-9) uses interchangeably the terms 'bandits', 'guerrillas', 'terrorists' and 'insurgents'.
73. Frank Furedi, 'Creating a breathing space: The political management of colonial emergencies', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21, 2 (1993): 94.
74. Furedi, however, is one of the few writers to recognise, even if fleetingly, the role of language in psychological warfare and the differences between the Colonial and Foreign Offices regarding the more appropriate euphemisms when referring to the forced repatriation of Chinese Malayans; see his Colonial wars and the politics of Third World nationalism (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 218-19.
75. Parliamentary debates (House of Commons), vol. 473, 6 Apr. 1950, col. 1380.
76. For an overview of the insurance issue, see PRO, FO 371/84478, R. H. Scott, 'Brief for the Minister of State for 3rd meeting of the Malaya Committee, 18 May 1950', FZ1017/11G;
77. and Barber, War of the ruuuing dogs, p.10.
78. PRO, CO 534/4762, JIC (48), 112th meeting, Minute 3, 4 Jan. 1949; No reason was given, presumably because the JIG decision was then consistent with government policy.
79. PRO, CO 537/6089, 'Attitude to be adopted in publicity towards Communism in Malaya and China', Dec. 1949.
80. See also PRO, FO 1110/1166, 'Use of IRD material in the Federation of Malaya', n.d.;
81. Williams' comment is in PRO, CO 537/3755, Memorandum, 'Communist influence in Malaya', 28 May 1948.
82. Interview with J. Cloake, 10 Dec. 1997, cited in Lashmar and Oliver, Britain's secret propaganda war, p. 86.
83. PRO, CO 104/263, Minutes of Malaya Committee, 14 Apr. 1950.
84. Foreign Relations of the United States [henceforth FRUS], 761.00/12-1748, 1948(6), p. 615, Acting Sec. of State Lovett to US Embassy (Moscow), 30 Dec. 1948.
85. PRO, CAB 21/2510, no. 1A, Shinwell to Atlee, 27 March 1950 ('disturbed'). Shinwell successfully pushed for the creation of a Cabinet Malaya Committee, which met regularly throughout 1950. PRO, CAB 21/1681, MAL C (50) 23, Appendix, para. 28, 24 May 1950 ('recrudescence'). PRO, CAB 21/1682, DO (50) 92, 'Present situation in Malaya', 24 Oct. 1950 ('grave anxiety').
86. NAA A452/2, 1968/4248, 'Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957 by the Director of Operations, Malaya' (Secret), p. 7.
87. Casualty statistics are from Department of Information, Communist banditry in Malaya. Ttie emergency. With a chronology of important events (Kuala Lumpur: Dept. of Public Relations, 1951).
88. PRO, FO 371/84478, Minutes of 2nd meeting of the Malaya Committee, 24 Apr. 1950.
89. PRO, FO 371/84478, Minute, A. E. Franklin to Malaya Committee, minutes of 3rd meeting of the Malaya Committee, 7 May 1950.
90. PRO, FO 371/84478, R. H. Scott, Brief, 'Top Secret', for Malaya Committee Meeting, 28 Apr. 1950, FZ1017/8.
91. James Griffiths, Pages from memory (London: J. M. Dent, 1969), p. 97.
92. PRO, FO 371/84478, Memo by R. H. Scott, 'Publicity in Malaya', 18 Apr. 1950; Scott went on to observe that 'however, the damage has been done and it is perhaps not worth while to take him up on this point'.
93. Ibid.; see also PRO, CAB 104/263, minutes of 1st meeting, Cabinet Malaya Committee, p. 5 for Shinwell's critical remarks about Briggs' press conference.
94. PRO, FO 371/84478, Minutes of 2nd meeting of the Malaya Committee, 24 Apr. 1950; PRO, FO 371/84478, Brief by Scott, 28 Apr. 1950.
95. PRO, CO 537/6089, 'Attitude to be adopted in publicity'. The contradictory policy was brought into sharp focus by the Attlee government's recognition of the People's Republic of China, as this document shows: 'The Chinese Communist Government must be distinguished from the Communist terrorist movement in Malaya, and it should not be suggested that the latter receives any aid from the Chinese Communist Government ... It is desirable to keep separate the issues of Communist subversive activities in Malaya and the relations of His Majesty's Government to the Communist Government of China.'
96. Aldrich, Hidden hand, p. 513.
97. PRO, FO 371/76005, correspondence, 'Top Secret', J. H. Watson to O. H. Morris, 1 Dec. 1949;
98. Watson was Britain's psywar liaison officer in Washington. Lessons for the Malayan experience were learnt and applied by Great Britain through its earlier involvement in the Greek Civil War (as well as in Burma); Jones, Postwar counterinsurgency and the SAS, pp. 88-90, 93-6.
99. NAA A452/2, 1968/4248, 'Review of the Emergency in Malaya', p. 3. This document was made available to the Australian Prime Minister's Department by the British High Commission in July 1967 for a meeting concerning defence and security arrangements in the South Pacific.
100. PRO, CO 537/2638; PRO, PREM 8/1406/2, MAL C(50) 12. It should be noted, however, that in regard to China's role, the Foreign Office sharply disagreed with the Colonial Office: 'We endeavoured to persuade the Colonial Office that the aim of the Chinese Communist Party was probably to persuade the Chinese community in Malaya to support the M.C.P. The Colonial Office remained unconvinced of this as late as Feb. this year [1950], believing that the M.C.P. was not an important enough force for the C.C.P. to support it'; PRO, FO 371/84478, Brief, 'Top Secret', R. H. Scott to Minister of State, FZ1017/8, 28 Apr. 1950. However, as Colonial Secretary Griffiths noted, the Attlee government's recognition of China in January 1950 considerably complicated matters; PRO, CAB 134/497, Minutes of Malaya Committee, 19 Apr. 1950.
101. PRO, FO 1110/33, Minutes of Meeting, Russia Committee, 14 Oct. 1948 ('Top Secret'). The 'Fifth Column' remark is in PRO, CAB 129/37/1, 'The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East', 27 Oct. 1949. Similarly Lt. General Briggs believed that 'the roots [of the uprising] may well lie outside Malaya, in Russia in particular'; PRO, CAB 104/263, statement by Sir Harold Briggs, 20 Apr. 1950. Briggs was appointed 'Director of anti-Bandit Operations' in Malaya in March 1950; he arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 3 April.
102. This referred to Andrei Zhdanov's widely distributed keynote speech to the inaugural conference of the Cominform, held in Szklarska Poremba, Poland in September 1947. The most famous thesis of his report was that the world was divided into 'two camps': a peace-loving, progressive camp led by the Soviet Union, and a war-mongering, imperialist camp led by the United States. For an illuminating discussion of the beginnings of the Cominform, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), ch. 4.
103. PRO, CAB 21/1682, COS (50) 468, 'An appreciation of the military and political situation in Malaya', 16 Nov. 1950;
104. the 'marked increase' quotation is from PRO, FO 1110/189, PR 2887/11/913, 'Outline of Communist strategy in South-East Asia', 15 Aug. 1949.
105. For comprehensive discussions of the 1948 Calcutta conferences see Ruth T. McVey, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian uprisings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958)
106. and Michael R. Stenson, The 1948 Communist revolt in Malaya: A note on historical sources and interpretation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971). It needs to be appreciated, which some historians do not, that there were in fact two Calcutta conferences. The first, organised by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students (19-25 Feb.), was attended by an MCP delegate; the second, the Congress of the Indian Communist Party (28 Feb.-6 March), was not.
107. PRO, CAB 21/1682, DO (50) 92, 'Present situation in Malaya', 24 Oct. 1950 (Top Secret brief for Defence Committee).
108. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, RG59, 846E.00/10-2448, W. Blue to D. Acheson, 24 Oct. 1948 (conversation with Fisher); Confidential Memorandum, 23 June 1948, 'Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 10 dated June 28, 1948' (conversation with Newboult).
109. PRO, PREM 8/1406, Part 2, DO(50)92, Memorandum from Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for War, 24 Oct. 1950. Creech Jones' remarks are in PRO, CO 717/172/52849/9/1948, no. 15, 22 June 1948.
110. FRUS, 890.00/9-1349,1949(7), pp. 1204-8, 'Report of discussions of Far Eastern affairs in preparation for conversations with Mr. Bevin', 13 Sept. 1949.
111. The Foreign Office believed that 'the full development of [Southeast Asia] can only be brought about with United States assistance, but at present there is an obvious reluctance on the part of the Americans to risk a further loss after their experience in China'; PRO, CAB 129/37/1, CP (49)207, Memorandum, E. Bevin, 'The United Kingdom in Southeast Asia and the Far East', 18 Oct. 1949.
112. Richie Ovendale suggests that the American administration was 'wary' because it was 'conscious that much of Asia was unconvinced of its devotion to peace, its lack of imperialistic ambition, and its interest in Asian freedom and progress'. He also refers to American 'naivety and selfishness' at this time; Richie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in South-East Asia, 1949-1950', International Affairs, 58, 3 (1982): 447, 462-3.
113. On Bevin's urgings see, for example, a reference to his meeting with US Secretary of State Acheson, in which the former emphasised that Malaya was 'vitally important for South East Asia"; PRO, FO 371/84478, 'Brief for the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the 10th Meeting of the Malaya Committee', 16 Oct. 1950.
114. PRO, FO 371/76005, correspondence, 'Top Secret', J. H. Watson to O. H. Morris, 1 Dec. 1949.
115. PRO, CAB 104/263, 'Press conference given by Lt.-Gen Sir Harold Briggs'.
116. PRO, PREM 8/1406/2, MAL C (50) 12, Note by J. Strachey, 12 May 1950. Malaya Committee discussions are in PRO, CAB 21/1681; CAB 104/263, CAB 134/497, DO (50) 42, 1 June 1950.
117. PRO, CAB 104/263, 'Summary of Malayan Communist Party publication'.
118. PRO, PREM 8/1406/2, Note by J. Strachey.
119. Parliamentary debates (House of Commons), vol. 475, 10 May 1950, col. 369. The reply to Col. Gomme-Duncan from A. Crawley, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, was cryptic: 'That is a matter of opinion.' See PRO, FO 371/84482, FZ10110/30G for the circulation of the paper.
120. Even the minutes of the Joint Information and Propaganda Committee, which met thirty-eight times prior to the change of policy, are silent on this question; see PRO, FO 1110/499. In line with prevailing policy, however, Gurney's assassins were still described as 'a gang of armed bandits'; PRO, FO 371/93118, 'Expression of condolence following the assassination of British High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, by members of the Malayan National Liberation Army, 1951'.
121. The quotation is from PRO, FO 371/116939, 'Brief for Sir Anthony Eden's visit to the Far East: The Emergency in Malaya' (1955).
122. Studies of Templer include John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya (London: Harrap, 1985)
123. and Anthony Short, The Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1975).
124. Karl Hack, 'British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya', Intelligence and National Security, 14, 2 (1999): 137,144;
125. the 'Struggle' directive is mentioned on p. 134. Regarding the CCP influence, Hack cites Ralph B. Smith, 'China and Southeast Asia: The revolutionary perspective, 1951', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 19, 1 (1988): 97-110.
126. Carruthers, Winning hearts and minds, p. 85.
127. PRO, CO 1022/48, Memorandum from the Minister for Defence, 'Official designation of the Communist forces', Executive Committee Paper No. 15/17/52. Min Yuen refers to the underground 'masses organisation' which provided the link between the rural population and the military wing (MRLA). The Min Yuen consisted of a district and branch organisation responsible for intelligence, political direction of the masses and obtaining money and supplies to sustain the insurgency.
128. Anthony J. Stockwell, '"A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya"? The origins of the Malayan Emergency", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21, 3 (1993): 79-80.
129. Walter Laqueur, 'We can't define "terrorism", but we can fight it', Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2002.
130. For recent, contrasting attempts to define the word 'terrorism', see V. Keeley, 'Trying to define terrorism', Middle East Policy, 9, 1 (March 2002): 33-40;
131. Michael J. Jordan, 'Terrorism's slippery definition', Christian Science Monitor, 4 Feb. 2002;
132. John V. Whitbeck, '"Terrorism": The word itself is dangerous', The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 21, 2 (March 2002): 52-3;
133. and Peter Beinart, 'Word play', New Republic, 226, 15 (22 Apr. 2002): 6.
134. PRO, CO 537/3758, correspondence, T. Lloyd to F. Gimson and A. Newboult, 23 August 1948; this presaged the overused aphorism that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.