Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements

Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-210

  de Beistegui, Miguel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

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References (268)

1. WhD, 3/6. While a certainly acceptable translation of the German "was heißt denken?" the English "what is called thinking?" fails to capture the various senses of the German, specifically those addressing thinking in its meaning ("what does it mean to think?") and its calling ("what calls for thinking, and calls it forth?"). The latter sense of the question will turn out to be decisive here.
2. See E. Husserl's marginal annotations to his copy of Heidegger's Being and Time, originally published in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung (Halle and Saale: Niemeyer Verlag, 1927), vol. VII
3. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bonn: Cohen Verlag, 1929)
4. As well as the lecture entitled "Phenomenology and Anthropology" (Husserliana XXVII, Aufsätze und Vorträge [1922-37], ed. T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp), delivered on three occasions in June 1931.
5. See SZ, 54/80, where Heidegger refers the preposition "in" of Dasein's being-in-the-world to the old German verb innan, to dwell.
6. Wm, 200/281.
7. GA 24, 393/277-78.
8. Wm, 155/247.
9. See Wm, 191-92/274.
10. Wm, 155-56/247.
11. SZ, 133/171.
12. SZ, 220/263.
13. SZ, 226/269.
14. See SZ, §§15-18.
15. See GA 19, Introductory Part.
16. SZ, 69/98.
17. SZ, 67/95.
18. GA 19, §7.
19. In that respect, Division One of Being and Time is in agreement with Husserl's analyses of the lived body or the flesh (Leib) in Ideas . . . II. There the body is described as the instrument or the immediate expression of the ego, not as an "I think," but as an "I can." Thus, subjectivity is rearticulated along the lines of power or potentiality, in other words, along the lines of a certain power to be, more than a mere power to think. Thinking would thus need to be seen as a specific power, as indicative of what the lived body can do, in what would amount to an overcoming of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, res cogitans and res extensa. See Edmund Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, ed. Marly Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952) (Husserliana IV), §§35-42.
20. Wm, 30/26; my emphasis in the last sentence.
21. GA 19, §8 and §22.
22. SZ, 307-8/355.
23. SZ, 236/280.
24. SZ, 243/287; my emphasis.
25. SZ, 325/373.
26. GA 19, 51/36.
27. SZ, 251-52/295.
28. SZ, 254/298.
29. SZ, 261/305.
30. SZ, 310/358.
31. SZ, 262-63/307.
32. Insofar as the repetition involved here brings existence to a greater level of intensity, it is not a mere reiteration, but the very beginning of ethics. Repetition as an ethical, that is, life-enhancing, concept must therefore be distinguished from a purely mimetic and ontologically redundant concept of repetition, which reiterates the same. A more sustained discussion of the issue of repetition is carried out in Chapter 2 ("The Politics of Repetition") of this book.
33. SZ, 264/309. The possibility of such an ethical turn is explicitly addressed in the context of the somewhat undeveloped and therefore incomplete discussion of "metontology," which took place in the years 1928-30. In GA 26, and following the problematic of fundamental ontology, Heidegger argues in favor of a special problematic concerned with the whole of being (das Seiende im Ganzen).
34. This problematic, referred to as metontology, in the sense of an overturning (Umschlag, metabolø) of fundamental ontological questions back into existentiell questions, coincides with "the domain of the metaphysics of existence." And there, "the question of an ethics may properly be raised for the first time" (GA 26, 199/157).
35. SZ, 264/308; my emphasis.
36. SZ, 266/311.
37. SZ, 298/344-45.
38. GA 29/30, 247/165.
39. This is where, despite Heidegger's acknowledgment of his debt to Kierkegaard's concept of the moment, his conception of the Augenblick becomes irreconcilable with Kierkegaard's. See SZ, 338 note/497.
40. SZ, 328/376.
41. SZ, 338/387-88.
42. GA 29/30, 224/149.
43. GA 29/30, 224/148.
44. GA 29/30, 247/165.
45. GA 29/30, 248/166.
46. GA 29/30, 248/166.
47. SZ, 300-301/347-48.
48. SZ, 146/186.
49. GA 19, 163-64/112-13.
50. GA 29/30, 10/7.
51. GA 29/30, 5/4.
52. SU, 11-12.
53. See GA 19, §25.
54. GA 19, 175/120.
55. GA 19, 175/120.
56. Wm, 145/239.
57. GA 19, 178/122-23.
58. When, in 1946, at the demand of Jean Beaufret, Heidegger takes up again the question of ethics, his interpretation of the Greek concept of «qoj remains unchanged: "If the name 'ethics,' in keeping with the basic meaning of the word «qoj, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics" (Wm, 187/271).
59. For the latter, see "Letter on Humanism," in Wm, 185ff./351ff.
60. Wm, 187/271.
61. GA 29/30, 28-29/19.
62. GA 29/30, 31/21.
63. GA 29/30, 33/22.
64. Plato, Republic, 476 c f., 520 c, 533 c.
65. GA 29/30, 34/23.
66. GA 29/30, 35/23.
67. SZ, 385-86/436-38;
68. GA 26, 265-67/205-7;
69. GA 24, 407/287.
70. GA 26, 266/206.
71. SZ, 385/437.
72. Ten years after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger will recapture his statements in the following way: "The properly temporal is the stirring, exciting, but at the same time conserving and preserving extension and stretch from the future into the past and from the latter into the former. In this extension, man as historical is in each case a 'spread.' The present is always later than the future; it is the last. It springs from the struggle of the future with the past" (GA 45, 42/40).
73. SZ, 386/438.
74. GA 26, 197/155.
75. GA 26, 197/155.
76. GA 20, 187/138.
77. GA 20, 188/138.
78. SZ, 22/24.
79. See Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65, especially Part Two ("Der Anklang");
80. Nietzsche, GA 6.2, "Der europäische Nihilismus."
81. I have tried to tackle this delicate and complex issue in my Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998).
82. GA 45, 40-41/38.
83. GA 45, 41/39.
84. GA 26, 196-202/154-59.
85. In addition to the works already mentioned, see "Was ist Metaphysik?" (Wm, 103-21/82-96)
86. "On the Essence of Ground" (Wm, 123-73/97-135)
87. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (GA 29/30).
88. GA 3, 232/158.
89. The following works and articles should nonetheless be mentioned: David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), Part I, Chapter 3;
90. Parvis Emad, "Boredom as Limit and Disposition," Heidegger Studies 1 (1985): 63-78;
91. R. J. A. van Dijk, "Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: zur formalanzeigenden Struktur der philosophischen Begriffe bei Heidegger," Heidegger Studies 7 (1991): 89-109;
92. William McNeill, "Metaphysics, Ontology, Metontology," Heidegger Studies 8 (1992): 63-79.
93. SZ, 186/231.
94. SZ, 187-88/232-33.
95. GA 29/30, 7/5.
96. I have tried to say a few things regarding these connections in Chapter 4 ("The Free Use of the National") of my Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998).
97. SZ, 344/394.
98. GA 29/30, §44.
99. GA 45, §§36-38.
100. GA 29/30, 236/157.
101. GA 29/30, 122/75.
102. GA 29/30, 115/77.
103. GA 29/30, 207/137.
104. GA 28/30, 216/144.
105. GA 29/30, 531/366.
106. GA 29/30, 218/145.
107. GA 29/30, 224/149.
108. GA 29/30, 243/162-63.
109. GA 29/30, 245/164.
110. GA 29/30, 244/163.
111. The reader may wish to contrast this increasingly politically oriented analysis with the ethics of potentiality exposed in Chapter 1 ("Homo Heideggerians").
112. GA 29/30, 245/164.
113. GA 29/30, 254/171.
114. GA 29/30, 255/172.
115. GA 29/30, 255/172.
116. GA 29/30, 254/171.
117. GA 29/30, 7.
118. On a previous page, Heidegger rejects with vehemence the idea that philosophy would need to model itself after the sciences: "perhaps even to judge philosophy according to the idea of science is the most fateful debasement of its innermost essence" (GA 29/30, 4). The somewhat polemical tone of these formulations, perhaps due to the boldness of youth, is toned down, if not altogether dismissed, some twenty years later, when Heidegger, in another lecture course, speaks of philosophy's relation to science with the following words: "it would be both tactless and tasteless to take a stand against science upon the very rostrum that serves scientific education.
119. Tact alone ought to prevent all polemics here. . . . Any kind of polemics fails from the outset to assume the attitude of thinking" (WhD, 49/13).
120. This dialogue is one which, following Hölderlin's poetic project, expressed in the verse of a sketch for an unfinished poem, according to which "we are a dialogue" (ein Gespräch wir sind), Heidegger restricted to art and thought, to language in the most essential sense. See "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" (EHD, 36-38).
121. WhD, 49/14.
122. "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (Wm, 191-99/148-54).
123. For further developments on the question of the human, see above, Chapter 1 ("Homo Heideggerians").
124. WhD, 16-17/41-42; translation modified.
125. WhD, 142/234; translation modified.
126. Beiträge zur Philosophie, GA 65.
127. GA 65, 111/78.
128. GA 65, 111/78.
129. GA 65, 111/78.
130. GA 65, 141/98.
131. EHD, 36-38.
132. SZ, 49-50/75; my emphasis.
133. GA 29/30, 313/214.
134. GA 29/30, 275/187.
135. GA 29/30, 278-79/189.
136. On this part of the course, see above, Chapter 3 ("Boredom: Between Existence and History").
137. GA 29/30, 282/191.
138. GA 29/30, 280/190.
139. GA 29/30, 282/191.
140. GA 29/30, 277-78/188.
141. GA 29/30, 378-79/260.
142. See Hans Driesch, Die Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgänge. Ein Beweis vital. Geschehens (Leipzig, 1899). Other embryologists, such as Boveri (whom Heidegger also refers to in the lecture course of 1929-30 [386/261]), the Hertwig brothers, or Loeb, could also be mentioned in the context of Heidegger's discussion.
143. See François Jacob, La Logique du vivant (Paris: Gallimard "tel," 1970), p. 232.
144. This holistic approach was already favored by Lamarck, who insisted that what needed to be considered in a being was not each and every one of its parts in isolation, but the totality, "the composition of every organization in its totality, that is, in its generality" (Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres [Paris, 1815-22], vol. 1, pp. 130-31;
145. Cited in Jacob, La Logique du vivant, p. 99.
146. GA 29/30, 380/261.
147. See Jacob, La Logique du vivant, pp. 14-15.
148. GA 29/30, 318/217.
149. See N. Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1948).
150. See Jacob, La Logique du vivant, pp. 104-14. This is how Jacob describes the problem up until the middle of the nineteenth century: "All the efforts to reproduce the mechanisms [les jeux] of nature through the art of the chemist had failed. . . . Unable to associate carbon with hydrogen, chemistry thought the obstacle separating the organic from the mineral to be insurmountable. The vital force alone was able to counteract the forces acting on matter"
151. (La Logique du vivant, pp. 248-49).
152. Founder of the Institute of Umwelt Research in Hamburg University in 1926, and author of a book entitled Umwelt und Innenwelten der Tiere (2nd, expanded and improved edition, Berlin, 1921), which Heidegger draws from in his own discussion of animal life.
153. Other works by Uexküll available in English include Theoretical Biology, trans. D. L. MacKinnon (London:Kegan Paul, 1926);
154. "A Stroll through the World of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds," Semiotica 89, no. 4 (n.d.): 319-91.
155. For a rather different interpretation of Uexküll's work, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Mille Plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980), p. 113ff.
156. For a comparison of Heidegger's and Deleuze and Guattari's interpretations, see Keith Ansell Pearson, Viroid Life (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 118-22
157. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 185-89.
158. GA 29/30, 321/227.
159. GA 29/30, 342/234-35.
160. GA 29/30, 343/235-36.
161. GA 29/30, 371/255.
162. GA 29/30, 371-72/255.
163. GA 29/30, 360/247.
164. GA 29/30, 361/248.
165. GA 29/30, 349/239.
166. GA 29/30, 377/259.
167. See, for example, Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-organization and Selection in Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
168. At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Complexity (London: Penguin, 1995).
169. GA 29/30, 385/265.
170. GA 29/30, 385-86/265.
171. GA 29/30, 386/265.
172. Heidegger refers here to T. Boveri's Die Organismen als historische Wesen (Würzburg, 1906).
173. GA 29/30, 386/266.
174. GA 29/30, 388/267.
175. Schelling, in the very last pages of his System of Transcendental Idealism (F. W. J. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Manfred Schröter [Munich: Beck, 1917], vol. II, pp. 624-29), and naturally from within his own problematic, takes up this image and displaces it, and speaks of the "natural affinity" (Verwandtschaft) between philosophy and art.
176. See Simon Sparks, Fatalities: Truth and Tragedy in Heidegger and Benjamin, Ph.D. dissertation, Warwick University, 2000.
177. See also Robert Bernasconi, "Literary Attestation in Philosophy: Heidegger's Footnote on Tostoy's 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,'" in Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1993), pp. 76-98.
178. Platon: Sophistes, GA 19.
179. GA 19, 11/8.
180. See Hannah Arendt's testimony in "Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt," originally published in Merkur 23 (1969), pp. 893-902, and reprinted in Briefe, pp. 179-92.
181. See also Walter Biemel, Heidegger (Reinbeck bei Hamburg:Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973), Chapter 2
182. "The Development of Heidegger's Thought,"
183. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Le Rayonnement de Heidegger," in Michel Haar, ed., L'Herne: Martin Heidegger (Paris: Éditions de l'Herne, 1983), pp. 138-44.
184. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139b15ff.
185. Heidegger's translation is in GA 19, 21/15.
186. GA 19, 49/34.
187. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2, 983a4.
188. GA 29/30, 5/7. The text consists of a lecture course given at the University of Freiburg in the winter semester of 1929-30. The passage from which the quotation is extracted reads as follows: "Let us merely recall that art- which includes poetry too-is the sister of philosophy and that all science is perhaps only a servant with respect to philosophy." I address the question regarding the nature of the relation between philosophy and science above in Chapter 4 ("Science, 'Servant of Philosophy'?").
189. See Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), especially §§15-18.
190. See John Sallis, Force of Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), Chapter 6 ("The Elemental").
191. As for the "first" version, it is virtually identical with the Freiburg version; see UK, 17-22.
192. "Brief über den 'Humanismus,'" in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967/1976), 158.
193. SZ, 16/37.
194. US, 190/85.
195. WhD, 87.
196. US, 232/151.
197. US, 196/90.
198. "Bauen Wohnen Denken," in VA, 139-40;
199. Translated as "Building Dwelling Thinking" (BDT, 146).
200. For a thoughtful and insightful interpretation of Hegel's views on architecture, see John Sallis, Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), Chapter 3 ("From Tower to Cathedral").
201. SZ, 103/136.
202. SZ, 103/136-37.
203. Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 129.
204. SZ, 103-4/137.
205. SZ, 105/139.
206. SZ, 105/139.
207. SZ, 106/140.
208. SZ, 105/140.
209. SZ, 108/143.
210. Casey, Getting Back into Place, p. 132.
211. SZ, 111/146.
212. SZ, 112/147.
213. "Letter on Humanism" (Wm, 163/253).
214. Wm, 169-70/258.
215. "The Origin of the Work of Art" is the text where Heidegger mentions the "founding of the state" and "essential sacrifice" as happenings of truth alongside the artwork; see Hw, 50.
216. Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis (1936-38) constitutes possibly Heidegger's most sustained and convincing effort to think time and space together, in a single, strifely yet harmonious relation, precisely as the en-counter between dispersion or dissemination (time as intrinsically ecstatic, enrapturing) and gathering (space, or place, as intrinsically withholding, capturing, and enclosing).
217. "Das Ding" (VA, 161);
218. "The Thing" (T, 169).
219. VA, 164;
220. (Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick Etchells [New York: Dover Publications, 1986], p. 204).
221. This analysis of early Greek architecture should be supplemented, however, by the analysis Heidegger provides of other buildings, especially the old bridge over the Neckar; see BDT, 152-54.
222. In this regard, I can only agree with Massimo Cacciari, who, reading Heidegger, claims that "non-dwelling is the essential characteristic of life in the metropolis." Contemporary "urban planning," Cacciari suggests, is the effort to organize this "unpoetical dwelling." See M. Cacciari, "Eupalinos or Architecture," in Architecture Theory since 1968, ed. K. Michael Hays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), p. 400.
223. This article is a review of Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co's Architettura contemporanea (Milan:Electra Editrice, 1976), which itself engages significantly with Heidegger's thought on dwelling.
224. Cacciari's writings on architecture (including "Eupalinos or Architecture") are collected in Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture, trans. Stephen Sartarelli (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1993). Cacciari participated in the seminars of the Istituto Universitario di Architettura di Venezia, Departimento di Storia dell'Architettura, directed by Manfredo Tafuri from 1968 to 1996.
225. It is Mies who, after all, in his 1923 text Building declared, "We want building to signify truly and only building." "Building," Cacciari comments, and therefore not dwelling. The problem of dwelling in the metropolis is simply set aside: only building is of concern in the modern metropolis, not the home; see Cacciari, "Eupalinos or Architecture," pp. 403-404.
226. Theo Van Doesburg, "Towards a Plastic Architecture," in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads, trans. Michael Bullock (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975), p. 79.
227. For a good example of such a construction (seemingly) defying the laws of physics, see Paulsen and Gardner, Shapero Hall of Pharmacy, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1965.
228. See, for instance, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Crown Hall, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, 1952-56.
229. See Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Chapel, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, 1949-52
230. Mies van der Rohe, Boiler House, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, 1940.
231. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, "Baukunst und Zeitwille" (1924)
232. Quoted by Leland M. Roth in Understanding Architecture (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 459.
233. "ABC Demands the Dictatorship of the Machine," in Conrads, ed., Programs and Manifestoes, p. 115.
234. "Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?" This short text, originally written as a radio allocution broadcasted in Berlin and Freiburg in March 1934, in which Heidegger explains his reasons for not accepting a Chair at Berlin University offered to him in 1933, is published in volume 13 of the Gesamtausgabe, pp. 9-13.
235. BDT, 160.
236. Paola Coppola Pignatelli, "The Dialectics of Urban Architecture: Hestia and Hermes," Spring (1985).
237. For an exhaustive and seminal account of the ancient Greek conception of space in relation to religion and politics, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1994), Chapter 3, "L'Organisation de l'espace," and especially the sections entitled "Hestia-Hermes. Sur l'expression religieuse du mouvement et de l'espace chez les Grecs" and "Espace et organisation politique en Grèce ancienne."
238. For a briefer account of the question, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, "La nouvelle image du monde" in Les Origines de la pensée grecque (Paris: PUF, 1962).
239. Pignatelli, "The Dialectics of Urban Architecture," p. 43.
240. See GA 55, 5-13.
241. Demetrakopoulos, "Hestia," pp. 59-60;
242. Quoted by Casey in Getting Back into Place, p. 143.
243. Symptomatic of the process I am trying to describe here, and the anxiety it generates, is the following comment by the Mexican architect Luis Barragán, who, criticizing the overexposed landscape of the contemporary suburb, writes, "Everyday life is becoming much too public. Radio, TV, the telephone all invade privacy. Gardens should therefore be enclosed, not open to public gaze" (in Clive Bamford-Smith, Builders in the Sun: Five Mexican Architects [New York: Architectural Book Publishing, 1967], p. 74). And so the garden, so often seen as opening onto the outside, the public, as already inscribing the home as a system open to difference, is here folded back on the home, or on the hestial.
244. Drawing on Foucault's own work thoughts on contemporary architecture and space (in "Des espaces autres," in Cercle d'Études Architecturales, 14 March 1967)
245. Cacciari writes, "The present-day space of the metropolis is made up of the non-hierarchical flow of information connecting disciplines and functions, of discrete, aleatory currents, whose movements are not teleologically comprehensible but only stochastically analyzable" (in "Eupalinos or Architecture," p. 403).
246. Pignatelli, "The Dialectics of Urban Architecture," p. 46.
247. Frank Lloyd Wright, Edgar Kaufmann residence, Fallingwater, Pennsylva-nia, 1936-38. See also Kenneth Frampton's commentary on the house in Modern Architecture: A Critical History, 3rd ed. (London: Thames & Hudson, 1980/1992), p. 188.
248. Kenneth Frampton also stresses Wright's "obsessive exaltation of the hearth," and quotes G. C. Manson, who traces Wright's concern with "the fireplace and chimney as an expression of shelter and emphasized as the one desired solid substance in an entire of ever-increasing fluidity" back to Japanese architecture, which had a considerable influence on Wright, and to the tokonoma in particular, as "the permanent element of Japanese interior" see Frampton, Modern Architecture, pp. 58-59.
249. Frank Lloyd Wright, The Natural House (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1971), p. 13.
250. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture (London: Academy Editions, 1980), p. 67.
251. In his seminal essay "Towards a Critical Regionalism," Frampton speaks (somewhat provocatively) of the need for a critical arrière-garde, or an architecture of "resistance" that embraces neither the myth of progress through technology nor the reactionary impulse to return to the architectural forms of the preindustrial past. See K. Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," in Hal Foster, ed., The Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, Wash.:Bay Press, 1983). Working in this vein, Frampton argues, are architects such as Mario Botta, Jørn Utzon, Alvaro Siza Vieira, Luis Barragán, and Tando Ando.
252. W. Benjamin, "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers," in Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), vol. X, p. 12.
253. See Christian Berner's "presentation" of Friedrich Schleiermacher, in Des différentes méthodes de traduire (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, "Points," 1999), p. 21.
254. There is even a sense in which the translation of Bildung by culture is justified primarily through the practice of translation. To translate (überstezen), F. Schleiermacher argues, is to "transplant into a foreign soil [im fremden Boden zu verpflanzen] that which a language produces in the area of the sciences and the arts of discourse, with a view to broadening the sphere of action of such products of the mind" ("Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens," in Sämmtliche Werke [Berlin: Reimer, 1838], vol. II.2, p. 208;
255. Henceforth SSW, followed by volume and page number). Friedrich Schlegel had already used the term "transplantation" in relation to translation: "Every translation [Übersetzung] is a transplantation [Verpflanzung] or transformation [Verwandlung] or both at once" (Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel Ausgabe [Zurich: E. Behler, 1963], vol. XVIII, frag. 87, p. 204). Uprooted, yet pricked out in another linguistic system, the elements of an idiom are reborn and bear new fruits in another idiom.
256. Such as the seventh Olympic ode, in GA 54, 109-10/74.
257. In GA 53, §§10-16.
258. GA 54, 62/42.
259. See GA 54, §3.
260. GA 54, 73/50.
261. I am thinking, here, first and foremost, of Lacoue-Labarthe's work on the logic of mimesis governing so much of German culture, from Hölderlin to Heidegger, and of the privileging of the Greek moment in the question regarding the possibility of a German national identity. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, L'Imitation des modernes. Typographies II (Paris: Galilée, 1986).
262. See "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit," in Wm.
263. Eliane Escoubas, "Ontology of Language and Ontology of Translation," in Reading Heidegger, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 341-47.
264. I am following Escoubas's analysis here. Heidegger's analysis is in GA 54, §2.
265. Friedrich Hölderlin, Werke und Briefe, ed. Friedrich Beissner and Jochen Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1982).
266. The first turn was enacted in 1935 in Introduction to Metaphysics, and led to a first translation and analysis of the chorus. The second analysis, which differs in tone and substance, takes place in 1942 in the context of a lecture course devoted to Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister." See GA 53, 73/60.
267. Sophocles, Antigone, in David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, eds., Greek Tragedies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), vol. 1, p. 194.
268. Sophocles, Antigone, in Dudley Fitts and Robert Fitzgerald, eds., The Oedipus Cycle (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 199.