An examination of the influence of theory and individual theorists on empirical research in microeconomics

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 151-155

  Chiappori, Pierre André ^a   Levitt, Steven D ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942715191     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321946967     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (8)

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3. Glaeser, Edward; Sacerdote, Bruce and Scheinkman, Jose. "Crime and Social Interactions." Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1996, 111(2), pp. 507-48.
4. Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Special issue 1991, 7, pp. 24-52.
5. Lucas, Robert. "On the Mechanics of Economic Development." Journal of Monetary Economics, July 1988, 22(1), pp. 3-42.
6. Milgrom, Paul and Weber, Robert. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding." Econometrica, September 1982, 50(5), pp. 1089-1122.
7. Rothschild, Michael and Stiglitz, Joseph. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information." Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1976, 90(4), pp. 629-49.
8. Wilson, William Julius. The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.