Implications of "victim pays" infeasibilities for interconnected games with an illustration for aquifer sharing under unequal access costs

Water Resources Research

Volumn 40, Issue 5, 2004, Pages

  Just, Richard E ^a   Netanyahu, Sinaia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Common pool resources; Interconnected games; Victim pays principle

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS; FEASIBILITY; NEGOTIATIONS;

WATER RESOURCES;

AQUIFER; GAME THEORY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; WATER ECONOMICS; WATER RESOURCE;

EID: 2942711680     PISSN: 00431397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1029/2003WR002528     Document Type: Article

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