Advance selling for services

California Management Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 37-54

  Shugan, Steven M ^a   Xie, Jinhong ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942531090     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41166220     Document Type: Review

References (13)

1. Recent articles on this topic include: Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance Pricing of Services and Other Implications of Separating Purchase and Consumption," Journal of Service Research, 2 (February 2000): 227-239; Jinhong Xie and Steven M. Shugan, "Electronic Tickets, Smart Cards, and Online Prepayments: When and How to Advance Sell," Marketing Science, 20/3 (Summer 2001): 219-243; Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance-Selling Strategies with Competition," Review of Marketing Science working paper series, WP No. 2001213, February 2001, 〈http://roms.utdallas.edu/ working_series.asp〉.
2. Recent articles on this topic include: Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance Pricing of Services and Other Implications of Separating Purchase and Consumption," Journal of Service Research, 2 (February 2000): 227-239; Jinhong Xie and Steven M. Shugan, "Electronic Tickets, Smart Cards, and Online Prepayments: When and How to Advance Sell," Marketing Science, 20/3 (Summer 2001): 219-243; Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance-Selling Strategies with Competition," Review of Marketing Science working paper series, WP No. 2001213, February 2001, 〈http://roms.utdallas.edu/ working_series.asp〉.
3. Recent articles on this topic include: Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance Pricing of Services and Other Implications of Separating Purchase and Consumption," Journal of Service Research, 2 (February 2000): 227-239; Jinhong Xie and Steven M. Shugan, "Electronic Tickets, Smart Cards, and Online Prepayments: When and How to Advance Sell," Marketing Science, 20/3 (Summer 2001): 219-243; Steven Shugan and Jinhong Xie, "Advance-Selling Strategies with Competition," Review of Marketing Science working paper series, WP No. 2001213, February 2001, 〈http://roms.utdallas.edu/ working_series.asp〉.
4. I b i d.
5. For example, see Eyal Biyalogorsky and Eitan Gerstner, "Contingent Pricing to Reduce Price Risks," Marketing Science (forthcoming).
6. Ramarao Desiraju and Steven Shugan, "Strategic Service Pricing and Yield Management," Journal of Marketing, 63/1 (Winter 1999): 44; Jeffrey I. McGill and Garrett J. Van Ryzin, "Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects," Transportation Science, 23/2 (May 1999): 233-256.
7. Ramarao Desiraju and Steven Shugan, "Strategic Service Pricing and Yield Management," Journal of Marketing, 63/1 (Winter 1999): 44; Jeffrey I. McGill and Garrett J. Van Ryzin, "Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects," Transportation Science, 23/2 (May 1999): 233-256.
8. James D. Dana, Jr., "Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets," The Journal of Political Economy, 106/2 (April 1998): 395-422.
9. James D. Dana, Jr., "Using Yield Management to Shift Demand When the Peak Time Is Unknown," The Rand Journal of Economics, 30/3 (Autumn 1999): 456-474.
10. Note that we can view this example as a problem in hidden knowledge contracting framework. For example, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory Of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). However, unlike extant models: our model is self-enforcing (in period 2, the buyer wants to consume and it is always profitable for the seller to produce); the buyer is unable to extract a rent from hidden knowledge; and risk-aversion has a different impact on our agents. For a discussion on risk-aversion, see Xie and Shugan, op. cit.
11. Note that we can view this example as a problem in hidden knowledge contracting framework. For example, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory Of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). However, unlike extant models: our model is self-enforcing (in period 2, the buyer wants to consume and it is always profitable for the seller to produce); the buyer is unable to extract a rent from hidden knowledge; and risk-aversion has a different impact on our agents. For a discussion on risk-aversion, see Xie and Shugan, op. cit.
12. For more discussion of this issue, see Shugan and Xie (2000), op. cit., as well as Xie and Shugan, op. cit.
13. For more discussion of this issue, see Shugan and Xie (2000), op. cit., as well as Xie and Shugan, op. cit.