The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 25, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 381-418

  Fleurbaey, Marc ^a   Mongin, Philippe ^b  

^a Centre universitaire des Saints Pères   (France)

^b ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29144518314     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0010-1     Document Type: Conference Paper

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