Intervention, prevention, and the "responsibility to protect": Considerations for Canadian foreign policy

International Journal

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 723-734

  Zahar, Marie Joëlle ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b Research Group in International Security   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29144479985     PISSN: 00207020     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002070200506000309     Document Type: Review

References (18)

1. Paul Collier et al., "Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy," Washington, DC, World Bank research reports, 2003.
2. For the full version of the report, which was circulated to the 59th session of the UN general assembly on 21 March 2005, see www.un.org.
3. Jennifer Welsh, "Taking consequences seriously: Objections to humanitarian intervention," in Jennifer Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 52-68.
4. The full text of the statement is available at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.
5. For details about the controversy surrounding the CPIA criteria, see Jeff Powell, "The World Bank policy scorecard: The new conditionality?" Bretton Woods Project, London, 2004; www.brettonwoodsproject.org.
6. The decision is based on a number of considerations, including concerns for efficiency and transparency in the use of aid money and a strategy to consolidate Canada's programs, thought to help increase Canada's aid profile.
7. See particularly Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
8. International Commission on the Balkans, "The Balkans in Europe's future," Centre for Liberal Strategies with the Robert Boch Stiftung, King Baudoin Foundation, German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Charles Stewart Moss Foundation, Sofia, 2005.
9. The most obvious short-term consideration is the need to win the next electoral contest since the achievement of longer-term objectives requires being in power.
10. Denis Stairs et al., "In the national interest: Canadian foreign policy in an insecure world," Calgary, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003.
11. David Malone convincingly argues that US forbearance was essential to Canada's ability to carve out for itself an independent role as "helpful fixer" in international relations. See David Malone, "Canadian foreign policy post-9/11: Institutional and other challenges," paper published on the website of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute; www.cdfal.org.
12. In a November 2004 survey, 49 percent of Canadians cited international terrorism as an international threat as opposed to 75 percent of Americans. For Islamic fundamentalism, the proportions were respectively 22 percent and 38 percent; for immigrants and refugees 21 percent and 52 percent. "Visions of Canadian foreign policy," Innovative Research Group for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and The Dominion Institute, 2004.
13. Ibid.
14. This statement is not meant to overstate differences between Canadians and Americans. Rather, it seeks to highlight a growing gap between the two societies that public opinion pollsters have noticed following the events of 11 September 2001.
15. This is the proposal that developed countries commit to providing 0.7 percent of GDP in aid to developing states.
16. It should be noted, however, that this trend had begun much earlier due, in part, to cut-backs in Canada's foreign policy instruments and commitments following the decision to deal with the federal and provincial deficits in the early 1990s.
17. I borrow this formulation from David Malone, "Canadian foreign policy post 9/11."
18. See www.un.org.