Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Public Choice

Volumn 125, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 215-228

  Holler, Manfred J ^a   Skott, Peter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444467385     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Andreozzi, L. (2002a). Oscillations in the enforcement of law: An evolutionary analysis. Homo Oeconomicus, 18, 403-428.
2. Andreozzi, L. (in press). Rewarding law-enforcers increases the frequency of law infractions. Some more surprising results from the inspection game. Public Choice.
3. Aumann, R. J. (1985). On the non-transferable utility value: A comment on the Roth-Shafer examples. Econometrica, 53, 667-677.
4. Backus, D. & Driffill, J. (1985). Inflation and reputation. American Economic Review, 75, 530-538.
5. Budge, I. & Farlie, D. J. (1983). Explaining and predicting elections. London: Allen and Unwin.
6. Carmines, E. G. & Stimson, J. A. (1989). Issue evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7. Dixon, K. & Schofield, N. (2001). The election of Lincoln in 1860. Homo Oeconomicus, 17, 391-425.
8. Frey, B. S. & Holler, M. J. (1998). Tax compliance policy reconsidered. Homo Oeconomicus, 15, 27-44.
9. Harsanyi, J. C. (1977). Rational behavior and bargaining in games and social situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Holler, M. J. (1990). The unprofitability of mixed strategy equilibria in two-person games. Economics Letters, 32, 319-323.
11. Jacoby, W. G. (2000). Issue framing and public opinion on government spending. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 750-767.
12. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
13. Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Magee, S. P., Brock, W. A., & Young, L. (1989). Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Magee, S. P. (1997). Endogenous protection: The empirical evidence. In D. C. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on public choice: A handbook (pp. 526-561). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. & Spolaore, E. (1994). How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending. Journal of Public Economics, 55, 121-140.
17. Nannestad, P. & Paldam, M. (2002). The cost of ruling. In: H. Dorussen & M. Taylor (eds.), Economic voting. London: Routledge.
18. Paldam, M. & Skott, P. (1995). A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling. Public Choice, 83, 159-172.
19. Parks, T. (2003). Mad at the medicis. New York Review of Books, 50 (May 1), 36-38;
20. review of Lauro Marines. April Blood: Florence and the Plot Against the Medici. Oxford University Press.
21. Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 825-850.
22. Riker, W. (1982). Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: Freeman.
23. Riker, W. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
24. Saletan, W. (2004). Kerried away: The myth and math of Kerry's electability. Slate, Tuesday, Feb. 10.
25. Schofield, N. (in press). The quandaries of slavery and Civil War in the US. In Mario Ferrero (ed.), Revolution (Homo Oeconomicus 21). Munich: Accedo Verlag.