Self-in-a-vat: On John Searle's ontology of reasons for acting

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 447-479

  Kaufmann, Laurence ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Agency; Free will; Ontology; Reasons for acting

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444439899     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0048393105282918     Document Type: Review

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