Collusion in industrial economics - A survey

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

Volumn 5, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 163-198

  Feuerstein, Switgard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Capacity constraints; Collusion; Competition policy; International oligopolies; Leniency programs

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444436623     PISSN: 15661679     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10842-005-4868-5     Document Type: Review

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