The political economy of IMF conditionality: A common agency model

Review of Development Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 449-466

  Mayer, Wolfgang ^a   Mourmouras, Alexandros ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; IMF; MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 28244486444     PISSN: 13636669     EISSN: 14679361     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00287.x     Document Type: Article

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