On the use of the prisoners’ dilemma to analyze the relations between employment security, trust, and effort

Review of Social Economy

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 153-175

  Smith, Michael R ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Effort; Employment security; Prisoners dilemma; Tit for tat strategy; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 28244475935     PISSN: 00346764     EISSN: 14701162     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/003467600402521     Document Type: Article

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