How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 378-397

  Albrecht, Holger ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Authoritarianism; Egypt; Islamism; Opposition; Political elites

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; ELITE POLITICS; ISLAMISM;

AFRICA; EGYPT; NORTH AFRICA;

EID: 27944466655     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340500126798     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. William Zartman, 'Opposition as Support of the State', in Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman (eds), Beyond Coercion. The Durability of the Arab State (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1988), pp.61-87.
2. cf. Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, '"Waiting for Godot": Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East', International Political Science Review, Vol.25, No.4 (2004), pp.371-92.
3. One might be tempted to use the terms resistance and anti-systemic opposition synonymously. The critical difference lies in the means of political action: while resistance usually includes the use of violence, anti-systemness refers to an 'ideological distance' only, cf. Giovanni Capoccia, 'Anti-System Parties. A Conceptual Reassessment', Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.14, No.1 (2002), p.14.
4. Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt. Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p.19.
5. cf. Hillel Frisch, 'The Role of Religion in the Militaries of Egypt, Syria and Jordan', Orient, Vol.43, No.2 (2002), p.219.
6. This subliminal conflict is even more interesting to follow up when considering that the rise of Gamal Mubarak into the political arena gives a clue to his ambitions to take power after his father.
7. See Michael Hudson, Arab Politics. The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), p.236;
8. Hamied Ansari, 'Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion', The Middle East Journal, Vol.38, No.3 (1984), pp.397-418.
9. Steven Barraclough, 'Al-Azhar; Between the Government and the Islamists', Middle East Journal, Vol.52, No.2 (1998), p.237.
10. The Islamic Research Centre of al-Azhar has censorship responsibilities limited to 'Islamic issues' only; however, the Centre's 'recommendations' are hardly ever left unimplemented and, more often than not, al-Azhar determines what constitutes 'Islamic issues' and what not (Steven Barraclough, Middle East Journal, ibid., p.242).
11. Steven Barraclough, Middle East Journal, Ibid., p.241.
12. Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion. Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p.113.
13. Essam Fawzy and Ivesa Lübben, 'Zensur und Inquisition in Ägypten - Das Dilemma des ägyptischen Legitimationsdiskurses', INAMO, Vol.23/24 (2000), pp.54-9.
14. Kienle (note 11) p.42.
15. According to Nasser Amin, director at the Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, the CC and the SAC are the most independent legal units while the lower courts are much more subject to regime control. The SCC lost some credibility after the appointment of Fathi Naguib in August 2001. A former assistant to the minister of justice, Naguib was the first ever chief justice appointed from outside of the court (author's interview, Cairo, 9 March 2003).
16. Kienle (note 11), p.45.
17. Interview with Nasser Amin (note 14).
18. With the overwhelming NDP-majority in parliament the regime can alter the constitution whenever deemed necessary. The state of emergency is another legislative tool to circumvent the constitution; cf. Diane Singerman, 'The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt', Current History, Vol.101, No.651 (2002), pp.29-35.
19. According to Magdi Qorqor, deputy secretary of the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), the party received 11 rulings from the courts between May 2000 and November 2001 which called to lift the ban on the party and its mouthpiece ash-Sha'ab. However, the verdicts have not been implemented by the authorities (interview by author, Cairo, 10 March 2003).
20. Along with political parties and NGOs, some 'state-regulated organizations', like the professional syndicates, labour unions and student organizations, slipped away from direct government control. The most prominent examples are the professional syndicates some of which have been dominated by Islamist members since the 1980s; cf. Ninette Fahmy, 'The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform?', Middle East Journal, Vol.52, No.4 (1998), pp.551-62.
21. The Muslim Brotherhood is not legally recognized on the formal grounds that the Egyptian constitution prohibits parties based on religion. The moderate Islamists subsequently adapted their strategy to gain parliamentary representation and forged alliances with legal parties in the parliamentary elections of 1985 (with the Neo-Wafd) and 1987 (with the SLP and the LP) respectively.
22. In the recent parliament, four out of seven Wafd-members have left the party over serious conflicts with the new leader Nomaan Gomaa. Hamdine Sabahy, a prominent member and the only MP, left the ADNP and founded a new movement with Nasserist leanings, Harakat al-Karama (Dignity Movement).
23. From a total of 444 seats, the Neo-Wafd received seven, Tagammu six, the Nasserists two (plus five independent Nasserists), and the Liberal Party one. Unaffiliated independents won 14 seats; cf. Mona Makram-Ebeid, 'Egypt's 2000 Parliamentary Elections', Middle East Policy, Vol.8, No.2 (2001), pp.32-44.
24. This is not to deny the manifold restrictions on the press and the harassment of the media. Nevertheless, the parties' mouthpieces play an important role in Egypt's political discourse. Some observers emphasize that the parties' publications are much better organized than the whole party apparatuses. Indeed, the post of chief editor comes, at least, second in importance after the party leadership. Best examples are the leftist-turned-Islamist Magdi Hussain and MP Hamdine Sabahy who both rose to prominent opposition figures during the 1990s as the editors-in-chief of the Labour Party's ash-Sha'ab and the Nasserists' al-Ahali respectively.
25. This is the formula shared by the opposition parties, actors of civil society and the so-called 'reform faction' within the government. The 'Islamist threat' is the joint denominator for the Egyptian 'democracy-business' to perceive the sudden advent of democracy as a second-best option compared to a step-by-step development.
26. cf. May Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy. Governance in Contemporary Egypt (Reading, PA: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp.75-125.
27. Estimates by Haggag Ahmed Nail, executive director of the Arab Program for Human Rights Activists (APHRA); interview with author, Cairo, 31 March 2003.
28. NGOs had to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs on the basis of Law No.32 of 1964, which was designed to exert tight control over private voluntary associations. Many political NGOs, thus, registered as non-profit companies. In May 1999, Law No.32 was replaced by a new association law (No. 153) which was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2000 and replaced again by Law No.84 of 2002. According to this new law, all NGOs had to register until 4 June 2003.
29. The applications of the New Woman Research Centre and the Land Centre for Human Rights (LCHR) were turned down 'for security reasons'. According to Karam Saber, executive director of the LCHR, the Ministry of Social Affairs was entrusted with registration procedures and complied with orders from state security forces (interview with author, Cairo, 21 June 2003).
30. Haggag Ahmed Nail, interview with author, Cairo, 31 March 2003.
31. cf. Sheila Carapico, 'NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs. Making Sense of Non-Governmental Institutions', Middle East Report, Vol.30, No.1 (2000), pp.12-15.
32. The most active support for political NGOs originates from Western governments and international organizations emphasizing their perceived importance in a hoped-for democratization process. However, this support is limited given the foreign governments' reluctance to intervene directly into Egyptian 'internal affairs'. Rather, it brings about some protection from harsh repression by the regime - at least at prominent instances like the Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim case.
33. Diane Singerman, Avenues of Participation. Family, Politics and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.245.
34. Other Islamist groups are either close allies or break-away factions of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Socialist Labour Party (SLP), a formerly Marxist party, is now internally divided with a strong Islamist faction around the Secretary General Magdi Hussain. Following several press campaigns against government ministers, the SLP and its mouthpiece ash-Sha'ab were 'frozen' by the government in May 2000, but the party organization remained working ever since (Magdi Qorqor, deputy secretary-general of the SLP, interview with author, Cairo, 10 March 2003). The Wasat movement came into being in 1996 as a break-away faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, some prominent middle-aged activists attempted to gain official party status and enter legal politics. After two attempts had failed, most of the founding members returned to the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement appears today as an independent group headed by Abu Ela Maadi and remains a platform for discourses about the modernization of Islam and its compatibility with democracy; cf. Josh Stacher, 'Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party', Middle East Journal, Vol.56, No.3 (2002), pp.415-32;
35. and Carrie Wickham, 'The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party', Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.2 (2004), pp.205-28.
36. Nabil Abdel Fattah, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS), observes a general 'transformation of the Islamist phenomena from the political field to social, cultural, and symbolic markets'. Popular Islamists would use the education system and the media to occupy the social field which, at the same time, marks a retreat from politics proper; interview with author, Cairo, 29 April 2003.
37. cf. Fahmy (note 19).
38. Representatives of the Brotherhood feel 'besieged' by the regime; Essam al-Iryan, one of the prominent members of the organization's middle generation who were held in custody between 1995 and 2000, interview with author, Cairo, 27 May 2003.
39. The most stringent analysis of the Islamist movement's success, popularity and capacities of public mobilization is by Carrie Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
40. With 17 members, formally independent but affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement represents the largest opposition block in parliament.
41. See Paul Schemm, 'Working Together. The State and the Brotherhood Cooperate and Demonstrate', Cairo Times, 3-9 April 2003, p.9.
42. cf. Mona El-Ghobashy, 'Maverick. Is Abdel Mohsen Hammouda a Visionary or a Quaintly Idealistic Activist?', Cairo Times, 5-11 June 2003, pp.24-6.
43. The organization did not apply for legal recognition by the new NGO law, as prospects to be accepted were perceived as marginal (Ahmad Saif al-Islam, interview with author, Cairo, May 2003).
44. During his political career, Hassanein had been member of the Nasserist Party, the SLP, and the Neo-Wafd respectively and broke with each organization mainly for their lack of democratic principles (interview with author, Cairo, 27 May 2003).
45. The four pamphlets ('Silsila Tashih al-Mafahim' [The Revised Concepts Series]) are published by Maktaba at-Turath as-Salami, Cairo 2002. The issue remains hotly debated among radical Islamists to date; for instance, Muntassir az-Zayat, a lawyer and spokesman of the Jama'a Islamiya, still advocates an 'Islamic revolution' (interview with author, Cairo, 2 April 2003). However, at the time of writing, there are convincing signs that the Jama'a's denouncement of violence is more than mere lip-service.
46. Ahmad himself, from the state-owned Musawwar newspaper, had been a target of the Islamists. He published his findings in Mu'amara 'am Muraga'a? Hawar ma'a Qada al-Tatarruf fi Sign al-Aqrab [Conspiracy or Revisionism? Encounter with the Leadership of Extremism in al-Aqrab Prison] (Cairo: Dar ash-Shourouq, 2003).
47. cf. Diaa Rashwan, Transformation Among the Islamic Groups in Egypt (Cairo: ACPSS, 2000).
48. Diaa Rashwan, Transformation Among the Islamic Groups in Egypt (Ibid., p.48. The journalist Kamal Habib, a member of the historical leadership and an intellectual pioneer of Jihad, encourages the transformation into a legal movement. According to him, the Egyptian state was never the main target of Jihad, coming only third behind the United States and Israel. This was the reason for the main faction of the group to side with the al Qaeda movement (interview with author, Cairo, 4 June 2003).
49. Rashwan (note 45) p.48.
50. cf. ibid., pp.37-44; Ivesa Lübben and Issam Fawzi, 'Ein neuer islamischer Parteienpluralismus in Ägypten? - Hizb al-Wasat, Hizb al-Shari'a und Hizb al-Islah als Fallbeispiele', Orient, Vol.41, No.2 (2000), pp.229-81.
51. Not all members of Jihad and Jama'a Islamiya have been imprisoned or forced into exile. Some, like Kamal Habib, spent a limited term in prison; others, like Muntassir az-Zayat, never made the experience of prolonged custody. 2003 saw a careful loosening of the iron fist against the militants, when some leading figures were released from prison.
52. R. Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism (New York: Oxford University Press), p.8.
53. Daniel Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.4 (2002), p.56.
54. cf. Clement H. Moore, 'Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society. The Case of Nasser's Egypt', Comparative Politics, Vol.6 (1974), pp.193-218;
55. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat. The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
56. Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule. The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition', Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.2 (2004), pp.159-79 argues that it is a useful strategy for a political regime to divide domestic opposition in loyal and radical camps, in order to stem social unrest.
57. In an attempt to organize anti-Iraq-war rallies, the Tagammu - obviously disturbed by the initiatives of some independent leftist groups and even the Muslim Brotherhood co-operating with the state's security forces - forged its own arrangement with the regime; Farida Naqqash, member of the Political Bureau of the Tagammu, interview with author, Cairo, 2 April 2003; and Hazem Mounir, Egyptian correspondent for the London-based periodical al-Hayat, interview with author, Cairo, 2 April 2003.
58. Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement', in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), p.66.
59. On the emergence of imitative institutions in the Middle East, see Albrecht and Schlumberger (note 2), pp.380-2.
60. Bianchi (note 50), p.23f.