A framework for market discipline in bank regulatory design

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

Volumn 32, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 183-209

  Hamalainen, Paul ^a   Hall, Maximilian ^b   Howcroft, Barry ^c  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c Department of Retail Banking ^*

Author keywords

Bank regulation; Mandatory subordinated debt; Market discipline

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844585947     PISSN: 0306686X     EISSN: 14685957     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00592.x     Document Type: Article

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