The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: Message authentication

Journal of Computer Security

Volumn 12, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 865-891

  Guttman, Joshua D ^a   Thayer, F Javier ^a   Zuck, Lenore D ^b  

^a MITRE CORPORATION   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY; CRYPTOGRAPHY; FUNCTIONS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA;

ABSTRACT PROTOCOLS; ASYMPTOTIC BOUNDS; HASH FUNCTIONS; PROTOCOL ANALYSIS;

ABSTRACTING;

EID: 27844571925     PISSN: 0926227X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2004-12603     Document Type: Article

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