Auctions and land values: An experimental analysis

Urban Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 12, 2005, Pages 2245-2259

  Gwin, Carl R ^a   Ong, Seow Eng ^b   Spieler, Andrew C ^c  

^a BAYLOR UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LAND MARKET; MARKET CONDITIONS; PROFITABILITY; URBAN ECONOMY;

EID: 27844556404     PISSN: 00420980     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00420980500332007     Document Type: Article

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