Beyond the crystal ball: Modelling predictions about Quebec and Canada

American Review of Canadian Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 559-575

  James, Patrick ^a   Lusztig, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844545919     PISSN: 02722011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02722019609481130     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. For more detailed treatments of the enhanced importance of trade to Quebec's political and constitutional aspirations in North America, see Meadwell and Martin (1996) and Martin (1994).
2. The concept of macro constitutional change, which entails issues that shape the fundamental identity and principles of the polity, is discussed most effectively in Russell (1991, 1992) and Manfredi (1993).
3. Constructive change refers to the Pareto criterion: All of those involved must gain or be at least as well off from whatever bargain arises. This rule emerges from rational choice theory, which provides the intellectual basis for the forthcoming analysis. For an exegesis of rational choice theory see Mueller (1989).
4. Important examples of such studies include Banting and Simeon (1983) and Whyte, Romanow, and Leeson (1984) on the constitutional negotiations leading to patriation in 1982; Monahan's (1991) comprehensive account of Meech Lake; and recent volumes edited by McRoberts and Monahan (1993) and Cook (1994) on the Charlottetown Accord. The failure of this last round renders the future of Quebec's role within Canada uncertain.
5. Research appears to be limited to Imbeau (1990, 1991, 1992), Imbeau and Laforest (1991/92), and Young (1995).
6. Examples include Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 1985), Morrow (1985), James (1988), and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992); for an interesting debate on the degree of success achieved by this research enterprise, see Simowitz and Price (1990, 1991), Morrow (1991), Ray (1994), and Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka (1996).
7. The description that follows is adapted from Bueno de Mesquita (1994).
8. A thorough presentation of expected utility bargaining appears in Bueno de Mesquita (1994).
9. With n actors there are n(n-1)/2 dyads to consider. For example, ten relevant actors would yield 45 dyadic profiles. It is important to note that the model's algorithm considers each dyadic profile simultaneously.
10. Complications associated with this second bargaining dimension are evident in the Charlottetown Round. In the West, in aboriginal communities, and even within Quebec, elites proved unequal to the task of responding sufficiently to the demands of their constituents. By the conclusion of bargaining over contents of the Charlottetown Accord, even non-state actors presented constitutional demands. Within the ROC, the active and largely successful campaign by pressure groups effectively diluted the perceived legitimacy of Quebec's aspirations. The sixty amendments that ultimately composed the Charlottetown Accord testify to the incoherence of the bargaining process.
11. This explains, for example, the PQ's decision under Premier René Lévesque to seek "sovereignty-association" - that is, political sovereignty with economic association - rather than complete independence from Canada during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Québec 1979).
12. The revised question read: "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?"
13. The most comprehensive study of this question, in the context of a Yes vote, is Young (1995).
14. Repeated applications have shown that the model operates most efficiently with two experts. For this project, our experts came to the project with widely divergent political orientations. Such ideological discrepancy, however, does not prejudice the results. Neither scholar is familiar with the mechanics of the expected utility model. It also might be noted that, even if an expert had familiarity with the model, its very complexity virtually rules out the potential to "rig" the results (Bueno de Mesquita 1994). To save space, the results generated by only one expert are presented here. Results from the other expert are similar.
15. The characterization of these players as "weak" may come as a surprise to some. However, it is important to reemphasize that our data are provided by area experts. There is no bias, in other words, towards any preexisting opinions that the authors may have held.
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