Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by occupying powers

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 661-694

  Sassòli, Marco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

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EID: 27844535440     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chi136     Document Type: Article

References (274)

1. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annex, 18 Oct. 1907, 1 Bevans 631-653 [Hague Regulations].
2. See forcefully Scheffer, 'Beyond Occupation Law', 97 AJIL (2003) 842, at 847-853.
3. SC Res. 1546 (2004), para. 2.
4. J. B. Scott (ed.), The Hague Peace Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (3rd edn, 1918).
5. Indeed, only the French text is authentic: D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict (4th edn, 2004), at 56.
6. Trial of the Major War Criminals, International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, published in 41 AJIL (1947) 172, in particular at 248-249
7. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ imwp/imwpframe.htm, at paras. 89 and 124.
8. See E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (1993), at 8. Art. 43 reaffirms rules already contained in the 1874 Brussels Declaration (cf. infra notes 8 and 9).
9. See also G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory - A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (1957), at 95
10. D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice - The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (2002), at 57.
11. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 11.
12. Schwenk, 'Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations', 54 Yale LJ (1944-1945) 397. In the Brussels Declaration (see infra note 9) the obligation to restore and ensure public order and civil life and the obligation to respect local laws, unless in case of necessity, were contained in two distinct Articles (Arts. 2 and 3), which became a single Article in the Hague Regulations. This means that the obligation to respect local laws (and its exception) must be seen as a general principle.
13. This explanation has been proposed by Baron Lambermont, the Belgian representative at the negotiations for the Brussels Convention of 1874, which never entered into force, but is known as the 'Brussels Declaration', considered to codify many old rules of IHL. Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations combines Arts. 2 and 3 of the Brussels Declaration. See Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Belgique, Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles de 1874, at 23,
14. reproduced in Schwenk, supra note 8, at 393.
15. Cf. ibid., at 393, note 1
16. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 9
17. M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961), at 746
18. K. A. Berriedale, Wheaton's Elements of International Law (6th edn, 1929), at 783.
19. Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 58.
20. Supreme Court of Israel, Christian Society for Holy Places v Minister of Defence (1971), summarized at [1972] Israel YB Hum Rights 354.
21. See, e.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 1, Art. 46 on family rights, property and religious practice, Arts. 48-52 on taxation, contributions and requisitions, and Arts. 53, 55, and 56 on public property.
22. Thus the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (hereinafter Convention IV), Art. 56 deals with hygiene and public health, Art. 55 with medical and food supplies, Arts. 59-62 with relief, Art. 57 with hospitals, Art. 58 with spiritual assistance, Arts. 51 and 52 with labour, working conditions, and labour market measures and Art. 50(3) with some aspects of education.
23. See also Protocol (No. I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (hereinafter Protocol I), Art. 69 on relief and Arts. 63 and 64(3) on civil defence.
24. The distinction between an obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfil Human Rights was first suggested by A. Eide, Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right (Studies Series No. 1) (1989), at paras. 66-71.
25. Prohibited by Arts. 33, 53, 49, 31, 32, and 34, respectively, of Convention IV, supra note 12.
26. See Arts. 66-74 of ibid.
27. Art. 78 of ibid.
28. See Coalition Provisional Authority, Memorandum No. 3 (Revised): Criminal Procedures, 27 June 2004, CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03, which 'implements' CPA Order No. 7: Penal Code, 9 June 2003, CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07. This and all the Coalition Provisional Authority documents referred to below are available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org until 30 June 2005.
29. Art. 78 of Convention IV, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
30. See the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the 9th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug.-7 Sept. 1990, UN Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 112 (1990) (Basic Principles).
31. In Iraq, resistance groups certainly did not comply with the requirements that Art. 4(A)(2) of Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 UNTS 135, sets up for members of organized armed resistance groups to benefit from combatant status (in particular the conditions of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, of carrying arms openly, and of complying with the laws and customs of war).
32. See for such incidents, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds: Post-war Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by US Forces (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/iraq1003.pdf, at 38-39 (for the RPG attack) and 34-38 (for the killing of persons at a checkpoint).
33. See Arts. 51(5)(b) and 57 of Protocol I, supra note 13, and the largely corresponding customary law. (See for the latter M. Sassòli, Bedeutung einer Kodifikation für das allgemeine Völkerrecht, mit besonderer Betrachtung der Regeln zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung vor den Auswirkungen von Feindseligkeiten (1990), at 412-419 and 453-489).
34. See Basic Principles, supra note 20, Arts. 4 and 5.
35. See the UN Human Rights Committee's General Comments No. 29 (CCPR/C/21/ Rev.1/Add.11, of 31 Aug. 2001), at para. 3, and No. 31 (CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/ Rev.6, of 21 Apr. 2004), at para. 11
36. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at paras. 102-106
37. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at para. 25.
38. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
39. See for Israel Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at paras. 102 and 110
40. Roberts, 'Prolonged Military Occupations: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967', 84 AJIL (1990) 44, at 71-72 (hereinafter 'Prolonged Military Occupations'). The Coalition Provisional Authority's Administrator in Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer, is reported to have stated in a letter to Amnesty International that 'the only relevant standard applicable to the Coalition's detention practices is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949':
41. see Amnesty International, Iraq: Memorandum on Concerns Related to Legislation Introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, 4 Dec. 2003, (MDE 14/176/2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE141762003?open&of=ENG-IRQ.
42. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at paras. 107-112
43. See also references in W. Kälin, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 Jan. 1992, at paras 50-59
44. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel. 18/08/98, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, at para. 10
45. Loizidou v Turkey, and Cyprus v Turkey, infra note 131
46. General Comment No. 31 of the UN Human Rights Committee (see supra note 25), at para. 10
47. UK, Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), at para. 11.19 (hereinafter UK Manual).
48. See Basic Principles, supra note 20, Art. 8.
49. Cf. Art. 4(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 15(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS 221, and Art. 27(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, 1144 UNTS 143, and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 127.
50. Amnesty International, Iraq: The Need for Security (2003) (MDE 14/143/ 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ ENGMDE141432003?open&of=ENG-IRQ;
51. BBC News, 12 Apr. 2002, British 'breaching Geneva Convention', available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/2940739.stm.
52. Amnesty International, Iraq: Looting, Lawlessness and Humanitarian Consequences (2003) (MDE 14/083/2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140852003?open&of=ENG-IRQ (quoting an unidentified UK military official).
53. Ibid., quoting Agence France Presse.
54. See Amnesty International, Iraq: The Need for Security, supra note 31. These were open and operational by mid-June 2003 in Basra, for example.
55. Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historical Review of CPA Accomplishments (2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org.
56. Roberts, 'The End of Occupation in Iraq (2004)', International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Monitoring IHL in Iraq, available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=51, at 1-2
57. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 853-855.
58. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 22
59. Amnesty International, supra note 32.
60. 'From warrior to police': Human Rights Watch, supra note 22, at 4 and 5.
61. R. Kolb, Ius in bello, Le droit international humanitaire des conflits armés (2002), at 186-187.
62. UK Manual, supra note 28, at para 11.11.
63. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 397.
64. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 16.
65. Von Glahn, supra note 6, at 97 and 99
66. E. H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation (2000) (reprint of the original 1942 edition), at 89.
67. According to the ICRC Commentary, the drafters of Convention IV were so concerned about penal laws because Art. 43 was not sufficiently observed in past conflicts on this particular issue. See J. Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1958), at 335.
68. See for instance Dinstein, 'The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights' [1978] Israel Yb Hum Rights 114
69. Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 125 and 151
70. G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. II - The Law of Armed Conflict (1968), at 194-195.
71. Benvenisti, supra note 5, at 101.
72. Pictet, supra note 44, at 335.
73. Schwarzenberger, supra note 45, at 193.
74. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 101-103.
75. Drafting Committee No. 2 of Committee III (in charge of the draft convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war) at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference had a long debate about the future Art. 64 and in particular precisely about whether the adjective 'penal' should be added to the term 'provisions' in the second para. (cf. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (1950), iii, at 139). The draft submitted by the ICRC stated: '[t]he penal laws of the Occupied Power shall remain in force ...': Ibid., i, at 122 (emphasis added). The UK, whose suggested amendment was closest to the finally adopted text, formulated it without specific reference to penal laws: Ibid., iii, at 139). The USSR wanted to limit the provision to penal norms: Ibid., iia, at 670). The Netherlands, a state having been subjected to occupation, insisted, by way of compromise, on the insertion of an Article clarifying the complementary character of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions: Ibid., iia, at 672). The Drafting Committee finally let Committee III choose between two versions, one referring to 'penal provisions', another one more generally to 'provisions'. The latter was adopted by 20 votes to 8: Ibid., iii, at 139).
76. Thus, an occupying power could introduce criminal liability of public officials in an occupied territory for unlawful official acts if no such legislation existed, but not if the previous legislation specifically excluded such liability.
77. Pictet, supra note 44, at 337.
78. The French term 'indispensable' is even more restrictive and closer to the Hague Regulations.
79. McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 10, at 767.
80. See Arts. 64, 66, and 54, respectively, of Convention IV, supra note 12.
81. McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 10, at 768.
82. Feilchenfeld, supra note 43, at 89-90.
83. P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public (1921), at 228 ('Comme la situation est éminemment provisoire, il ne doit pas bouleverser les institutions du pays').
84. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 403.
85. Ibid., at 407
86. and McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 10, at 770.
87. Germany adopted a series of legislative measures with a view to separating the French-speaking and the Dutch-speaking populations of Belgium (cf. von Glahn, supra note 6, at 97).
88. Feilchenfeld, supra note 43, at 89.
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at para. 258.
90. Roberts, 'What is Military Occupation?', 55 BYIL (1984) 249, at 268-269
91. O. Debbasch, L'occupation militaire - Pouvoirs reconnus aux forces armés hors de leur territoire national (1962), at 250
92. Gerson, 'War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal System', 18 Harv Int'l LJ (1977) 525, at 530-532
93. Jennings, 'Government in Commission', 23 BYIL (1946) 112
94. the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg confirmed in Altstötter and others (Justice Trial), 6 War Crimes Reports (1948) 1 that the law of military occupation did not apply to the Allied military presence in Germany.
95. Art. 3(b) of Protocol I, supra note 13, goes even further.
96. Pictet, supra note 44, at 274.
97. Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation No. 6: Governing Council of Iraq, 13 July 2003 CPA/REG/13 July 2003/06.
98. Coalition Provisional Authority, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 Mar. 2004, Art. 4 (Transitional Administration Law).
99. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, 16 May 2003 CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01; Coalition Provisional Authority, Memorandum No. 1: Implementation of DeBa'athification Order No. 1, 3 June 2003 CPA/MEM/3 June 2003/01; Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities (And Annex), 23 May 2003 CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02.
100. See especially, Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 54: Trade Liberalization Policy 2004 with Annex A, 24 Feb. 2004 CPA/ORD/24 February 2004/54; Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 56: Central Bank Law and Annex A, 6 Mar. 2004 CPA/ORD/6 Mar. 2004/56; Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 87: Public Contracts, 14 May 2004 CPA/ ORD/14 May 2004/87; Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No.39: Foreign Investment (Amended by Order No. 46), 20 Dec. 2003, CPA/ORD/20 Dec. 2003/39; Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 64: Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997, 29 Feb. 2004, CPA/ORD/29 Feb. 2004/64.
101. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 395,
102. citing Meurer, Die Volkerrechtliche Stellung der vom Feind besetzten Gebiete (1915), at 23.
103. See Schwenk, supra note 8, at 395-397.
104. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 104.
105. See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 45, at 194.
106. Oppenheim, International Law - A Treatise (7th edn. by H. Lauterpacht, 1952), ii, Disputes, War and Neutrality, at 436 and 437.
107. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 393
108. M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959), at 224
109. Bothe, 'Occupation, Belligerent', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1997), iii, at 765.
110. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 401.
111. Feilchenfeld, supra note 43, at 89.
112. Dinstein, supra note 45, at 112,
113. citing Schwarzenberger, supra note 44, at 193. Dinstein adds that '[t]he necessity ... may be derived either from the legitimate interests of the occupant or from concern for the civilian population'.
114. Vité, 'L'applicabilité du droit international de l'occupation militaire aux activités des organisations internationales', 853 Int'l Rev Red Cross (2004) 17.
115. This article is based upon a larger study by R. Kolb, G. Porretto, and S. Vité, L'Articulation des règles de droit international humanitaire et de droits de l'homme applicables aux forces internationales et aux administrations civiles internationales transitoires (2003) (mimeo-typed version, to be translated and published in English).
116. For examples see reference to various court cases in E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (3rd edn., 2002), at 511.
117. For the practice of the Israeli Supreme Court see Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 61-72.
118. Schwenk, supra note 8, at 400
119. Pictet, quoted supra note 64
120. Debbasch, supra note 62, at 172
121. Von Glahn, supra note 6, at 97.
122. A. D. McNair and A. D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War (1966), at 369 mention three grounds for being 'absolutely prevented' from respecting local laws, namely the maintenance of order, the safety of the occupier, and the realization of the legitimate purpose of the occupation.
123. Von Glahn, supra note 6, at 100.
124. Exceptionally, the ICJ was able in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 137, to give an opinion on whether certain measures taken by an occupying power were necessary.
125. While it is not sufficient that legislation furthers its security, an occupying power has broad discretion in deciding what is essential to its security.
126. Cf. Arts. 33(1), 49(1), and 53 of Convention IV, supra note 12.
127. UK Manual, supra note 28, at para. 11.25.
128. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 19: Freedom of Assembly, 9 July 2003 CPA/ORD/9 July 2003/19, ss. 2 and 6.
129. See Final Record, supra note 48, iia, at 672 and 833.
130. See Coalitional Provisional Authority, Order No. 10: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, 5 June 2003 CPA/ORD/5 June 2003/10 and Coalition Provisional Authority, Memorandum No. 2: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, 8 June 2003 CPA/MEM/8 June 2003/02.
131. UK Manual, supra note 28, at para. 11.26
132. note 54.
133. See Governing Council, The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 10 Dec. 2003, 'Annex' to CPA Order No. 48, infra note 92. See especially Section Three: Jurisdiction and Crimes.
134. See Art. 66 of Convention IV, supra note 12.
135. See ibid., Art. 64(1)
136. See Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 48: Delegation of Authority Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal, 10 Dec. 2003 CPA/ORD/9 Dec. 2003/48.
137. See supra notes 89 and 92.
138. See infra, section 6.A.
139. See supra notes 25-28.
140. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 106.
141. Roberts, supra note 27, at 73, also mentions that 'discrimination in employment, discrimination in education and the import of educational materials ... are addressed in considerable detail in certain human rights agreements, and are not so addressed in the law on occupations. In respect of such issues, the application of international human rights standards is highly desirable.'
142. In 1949, a proposal by the Mexican Delegation to the effect that local legislation could be modified by the occupier only if it violated the 'Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man' was rejected (see Final Record, supra note 48, iia, at 671).
143. See Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 89: Amendments to the Labor Code - Law No. 71 of 1987, 5 May 2004, CPA/ORD/05 May 2004/89.
144. See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation No. 4: Establishment of the Iraqi Property Reconciliation Facility, 14 Jan. 2004 CPA/REG/14 Jan. 2004/04, Regulation No. 8: Delegation of Authority Regarding Establishment of a Property Claims Commission (Amended by Reg. 12), 14 Jan. 2004, CPA/REG/14 Jan. 2004/08, and Regulation No. 12: Establishment of the Iraq Property Claims Commission (As Amended and Restated) with Annex A, 24 June 2004, CPA/REG/24 June 2004/12, which recognizes 'that large numbers of people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in Iraq have been uprooted and forced to move from their properties ...' and attempts to set up a mechanism to resolve property disputes primarily related to the Kurdistan Regional Government area.
145. Pictet, supra note 44, at 336.
146. Cf. Art. 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess. Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), 71.
147. As suggested by Dinstein, supra note 45, at 113.
148. See Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 31: Modifications of Penal Code and Criminal Proceedings Law, 10 Sept. 2003, CPA/ORD/10 September 2003/31.
149. See ibid., s. 6.
150. According to Art. 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 'it shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement'. In its General Comment No. 08: Right to liberty and security of persons (Art. 9) 30/06/82, the Human Rights Committee stated that 'pre-trial detention should be an exception and as short as possible'. In Communication No 526/1993: Spain. 23/06/97, it emphasized that 'bail should be granted, except in situations where the likelihood exists that the accused would abscond or destroy evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction of the State party'. In my view, denial of pre-trial bail because of the seriousness of the suspected crime violates the right to be presumed innocent.
151. UK Manual, supra note 28, at paras. 11.16 and 11.25.1.
152. For other examples see reference to various court cases in David, supra note 78, at 507.
153. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 43: New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes, 14 Oct. 2003, CPA/ORD/14 October 2003/43.
154. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 86: Traffic Code with Annex A, 20 May 2004, CPA/ORD/20 May 2004/86.
155. See supra note 68.
156. See Order 39, supra note 68, ss. 7(2)(d), 11.
157. Equally critical are Roberts, supra note 36, at 7,
158. and Catán, 'Iraq Business Deals May be Invalid, Law Experts Warn', Financial Times, 2 Nov. 2003
159. Eviatar, 'Free-Market Iraq? Not So Fast', NY Times, 10 Jan. 2004. B9.
160. Lerquin, 'The German Occupation in Belgium and Article 43 of The Hague Convention of the 18th October 1907', 1 International Law Notes (1916) 55.
161. L. von Kohler, The Administration of the Occupied Territories, Vol. I - Belgium (1942), at 6,
162. cited in McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 10, at 746, writes that 'the life of the occupied country is not to cease or stand still, but is to find continued fulfilment even under the changed conditions resulting from occupation'.
163. Kolb, supra note 39, at 186.
164. Feilchenfeld, supra note 43, at 49.
165. See also Roberts, supra note 27, at 44.
166. Preamble to Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 49: Tax Strategy of 2004 with Explanatory Note and Annex, 20 Feb. 2004, CPA/ORD/20 Feb. 2004/49.
167. See also Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No.37: Tax Strategy for 2003, 19 Sept. 2003, CPA/ORD/19 Sept. 2003/37.
168. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 9-11.
169. See also McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 10, at 747,
170. Debbasch, supra note 62, at 172,
171. and Schwarzenberger, supra note 45, at 200-201.
172. First, the very constitution of new local authorities necessitates changes which go beyond the simple implementation of political rights under international human rights law. Secondly, as long as the occupation lasts, local authorities, even if freely elected (see infra note 131) are subject to the same restraints under IHL as the occupying power (see infra, at 6. A.). Newly established national authorities will, however, never comply with the limitations of legislative powers discussed hitherto.
173. Vité, supra note 77, at 28.
174. See also Ottolenghi, 'The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implications for the International Law of Belligerent Occupation', 77 Fordham L Rev (2004) 2177.
175. Order of 14 April 1992 in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v US) [1992] ICJ Rep 126.
176. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, United Nations, International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April 1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), UN GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm, at 29-365, para. 5 to Art. 40, referring to Nuclear Weapons, supra note 25, at para. 79.
177. See also Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second session in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1980), ii, Part Two, at 46, para. 28,
178. and Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para 520 (ICTY Trial Chamber 14 Jan. 2000).
179. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 852, considers that '[g]iven the widely varying circumstances that may trigger and even justify military occupation, it would be a mistake to regard many of the codified provisions of occupation law as peremptory norms of international law'. The ICJ disagrees, because it applied rules on state responsibility for serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law to violations of IHL of military occupation (see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 159).
180. See Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993 [1993] ICJ Rep 325, at 440-441, paras. 100-102.
181. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 160
182. See Meron, 'Prisoners of War, Civilians and Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis', 85 AJIL (1991) 104, at 106.
183. See UK Manual, supra note 28, at para. 11.11, n. 15,
184. and SC Res. 1483 (2003), para, 8(i).
185. See HC Debs., 20 Nov. 2003, vol. 413, col. 1304W and supra notes 110-112.
186. SC Res. 1483 (2003), para, 8(e).
187. See Art. 8 of the Draft Articles, supra note 122. The ICRC Commentary to Art. 29 of Convention IV considers that when a violation has been committed by local authorities, 'what is important is to know where the decision leading to the unlawful act was made, where the intention was formed and the order given' (Pictet, supra note 44, at 212.). In the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held, however, that overall control is the appropriate standard, and not effective control over the conduct to be attributed to a given state (Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment, paras. 116-144 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber 15 July 1999)).
188. This appears to be the ICRC position, which requalified the conflict in Afghanistan into a non-international armed conflict once the Karzai government was elected by the Loya Jirga (see Roberts, 'The Laws of War in the War on Terror', 32 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights (2002) 193).
189. See, however, the precedent of Northern Cyprus. The European Court of Human Rights considers it to be occupied by Turkey and attributes the conduct of local authorities, though freely elected, to Turkey in Loizidou v Turkey, Merits, ECHR (1996), Series VI, 2216 at 2235-2236, para. 56,
190. and Cyprus v Turkey, 10 May 2001, at paras. 69-77, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
191. See Arts. 1, 25, and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976).
192. SC Res. 1546, supra note 3, at para. 2.
193. Ibid., at para. 12.
194. Roberts, supra note 36, at 8.
195. See Protocol I, supra note 13, at preambular para. 5
196. the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the case of Wilhelm List et al., 8 July 1947-19 Feb. 1948, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, viii (The United Nations War Crimes Commission), at 34-76
197. see for this and other references M. Sassòli and A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? (1999), at 83-87, 665, 681, 682
198. Greenwood, 'The Relationship Between jus ad bellum and jus in bello', 9 Review of Int'l Studies (1983) 221
199. Bugnion, 'Guerre juste, guerre d'agression et droit international humanitaire', 847 Int'l Review of the Red Cross (2002) 523
200. H. Meyrowitz, Le principe de l'égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre (1970).
201. Letter of 5 June 2004 by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the President of the Security Council, annexed to SC Res. 1546 (2004).
202. This position is forcefully supported by Roberts, supra note 36, at 14-16.
203. Amnesty International, 'Iraq, Human Rights Protection and Promotion Vital in the Transitional Period', (2004) (MDE 14/030/2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140302004?open&of=ENG-IRQ, at 2, writes that IHL of military occupation continues to apply if the multinational forces continue to exercise effective control over Iraq.
204. Amnesty, supra note 138. Art. 77 of Convention IV reads: '[p]rotected persons who have been accused of offences or convicted by the courts in occupied territory, shall be handed over at the close of occupation, with the relevant records, to the authorities of the liberated territory'. In his letter (cf. supra note 137), Secretary of State Powell announces that the multinational forces will have recourse to 'internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security'.
205. As occupying powers, they would have a legal basis for such internment in Art. 78 of Convention IV, supra note 12.
206. Pictet, supra note 44, at 60.
207. Prosecutor v Naletilíc and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, paras. 218ff (ICTY Trial Chamber, 31 Mar. 2003).
208. Ibid., at para. 221.
209. See US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, US v Alfried Krupp, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, x, 1949, 130,
210. partly reproduced in Sassòli and Bouvier, supra note 136, at 668,
211. and Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 129, at para. 166.
212. Interestingly enough, IHL of international armed conflicts contains no provision similar to Art. 2(2) of Protocol [No. II] Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, which applies to non-international armed conflicts, and reads: 'those deprived of their liberty ... after the conflict for the same reasons [i.e. reasons related to the conflict] shall enjoy the protection [of the provisions relating to persons whose liberty has been restricted and penal prosecutions] until the end of such deprivation ... of liberty'.
213. This is envisaged by Amnesty, supra note 138, at 2, if the occupation has in fact ended.
214. See Sections II, I, and IV of Part II of Convention IV, supra note 12.
215. See ibid., Sections III, I, and IV.
216. See supra notes 140-142.
217. T. Findlay, The Use of force in UN Peace Operations (2002), at 375, indicates that there is a growing consensus that some type of peace enforcement in UN peace operations is possible and desirable. This concept remains controversial, however. While not dealing explicitly with the term 'peace enforcement', the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations supports a robust mandate.
218. See Brahimi Report, 21 Aug., 2000 (A/55/305, S/2000/809), at para. 49.
219. A. Roberts and R. Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War (3rd ed., 2002), at 26, indicate that the term applies to UN run and UN authorized peace operations. It refers to 'peacekeeping operations, whether conducted under UN or other auspices ...' (emphasis added). The Brahimi Report considers the 'NATO-led operations' in Kosovo which facilitate the functioning of UNMIK in the context of peace operations (supra note 149, at para. 104).
220. David, supra note 78, at 203-204.
221. See on the whole debate whether IHL applies to UN operations Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations', 1 Yb Int'l Humanitarian L (1998) 3
222. C. Emanuelli, Les actions militaires de l'ONU et le droit international humanitaire (1995)
223. C. Emanuelli (ed.), Les casques bleus: Policiers on combattants? (1997)
224. D. Shraga, 'The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law', in L. Condorelli, A.-M. La Rosa, and S. Scherrer (eds.), Les Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire, Actes du Colloque international à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire des Nations Unies, Genève, 19, 20 et 21 octobre 1995 (1996), at 317.
225. UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 Aug. 1999, also reproduced in Sassòli and Bouvier, supra note 136, at 460.
226. Shraga, supra note 152, at 328
227. Vité, supra note 77, at 19.
228. Ibid., at 27, replies that the Security Council does not derogate from IHL but creates a situation to which IHL on its own terms does not apply.
229. Ibid., at 24.
230. See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added)
231. Hoffman, 'Peace-enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law: Emerging Rules for "Interventional Armed Conflict"', 837 Int'l Rev Red Cross (2000) 193, at 203 and 204
232. Levrat, 'Le droit international humanitaire au Timor oriental: Entre théorie et pratique', 841 Int'l Rev Red Cross (2001) 77, at 95-96
233. Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo', 12 EJIL (2001) 469, at 483-485.
234. Roberts, supra note 62, at 291 (citing D. Bowett, United Nations Forces: a Legal Study of United Nations Practice (1964)) writes that most or all customary or conventional laws of war would apply.
235. M. J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations (1999), at 178.
236. See supra note 136.
237. Apparently contra are Kolb et al., supra note 77, at 112.
238. Vité, supra note 77, at 20-21, considers that IHL does not apply if an occupation has been authorized by the Security Council as part of a peace operation.
239. Roberts, supra note 62, at 291.
240. Ibid.;
241. Vité, supra note 77, at 21.
242. Kelly, McCormack, Muggleton and Oswald, 'Legal Aspects of Australia's Involvement in the International Force for East Timor', 841 Int'l Rev Red Cross (2001) 101, at 115
243. Sassòli, 'Droit international pénal et droit pénal interne: Le cas des territoires se trouvant sous administration internationale', in M. Henzelin and R. Roth, Le Droit Pénal à l'épreuve de l'internationalisation (2002), at 144.
244. Vité, supra note 77, at 23.
245. See, for e.g., Stahn, 'Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq', 97 AJIL (2003) 804, at 822.
246. See also Grant, 'The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice', 97 AJIL (2003) 823, at 825.
247. For a contrary view, see Falk, 'What Future for the UN Charter System of War Intervention?', 97 AJIL (2003) 590, at 596.
248. See supra, at 5.I.
249. Greenwood, supra note 152, at 28.
250. See supra note 121, and accompanying text.
251. Vité, supra note 77, at 27.
252. Sassòli, supra note 164, at 141-149
253. Vité, supra note 77, at 29-33
254. Kelly et al., supra note 164, at 115
255. David, supra note 78, at 501
256. UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, Lessons-Learned Unit, Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia, Apr. 1992-Mar. 1995 (Sweden, 1995), at para 57, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/UNOSOM.pdf.
257. Sassòli, supra note 164, at 145.
258. Kelly, supra note 158, at 311,
259. and Vité, supra note 77, at 29-30, support this line of argument.
260. Vité, supra note 77, at 30. In my view this is not very realistic and as far as Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations is concerned it means that the latter would not apply, as it precisely restricts a foreign administration from legislating.
261. This is what J. Pictet, The Principles of International Humanitarian Law (1967), at 50, calls the principle of normality.
262. Sassòli, supra note 164, at 146.
263. Ibid., at 128, 146-147.
264. Ibid., at 147.
265. Vité, supra note 77, at 27-28 and 32.
266. See on this distinction made by Israel concerning the territories it occupies, Roberts, supra note 27, at 62
267. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 6, at para. 93,
268. and references in Sassòli and Bouvier, supra note 136, at 802-872.
269. Vité, supra note 77, at 32.
270. For an overview of the UN standards as applicable to the maintenance of law and order by UN peace operations see United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, UN Criminal Justice Standards for Peace-Keeping Police (The Blue Book) (Vienna: Office of Crime Control and Drug Prevention, 1994), available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/ BlueBook/BlueBook/index.html.
271. G.A. Res. 34/169, annex, 34 UN GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 186, UN Doc. A/34/46.
272. Supra note 20.
273. Cf. Kolb et al., supra note 77, at 166; Art. 10 of the UN Charter.
274. Pictet, supra note 44, at 336.