Three themes from Raz

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 503-523

  Green, Leslie ^a,b  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744542290     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqi025     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. 'Symposium: The Work of Joseph Raz', 62 Southern California Law Review (1989)
2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
3. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
4. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
5. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
6. Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, H.L.A. Hart (ed.) (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 192.
7. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, M. Knight (trans.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 349.
8. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, P.A. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1994), 136.
9. J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 75.
10. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
11. The leading account in jurisprudence is Endicott's own, Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
12. Endicott does not want us to say, as Raz sometimes does of such cases, that it is 'neither true nor false' that it is fair. I will not address his argument on this point.
13. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 24 (1).
14. 39 USC s 403 (2002).
15. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 349-51.
16. Ibid at 349.
17. US 137 (1803) (Cranch).
18. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, 'Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It always makes sense to ask, "Discretion under which standards?"' Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1979), 31.
19. Concept of Law, 132.
20. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 35.
21. Raz, Morality of Freedom, ch 3
22. Ethics in the Public Domain, ch 10.
23. H.M. Hart and A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, W.N. Eskridge and P.P. Frickey (eds) (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1994).
24. In Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 104, to which he here refers, Waldron says more cautiously: 'I believe that PC [the partial conflict coordination problem] suggests a lot that is important about law in the circumstances of politics'.
25. Joseph Raz 'Facing Up: A Reply', 62 Southern California Law Review 1190-94 (1989).
26. L. Green 'Law, Legitimacy, and Consent', 62 Southern California Law Review 795-825 (1989).
27. The distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' moral concepts goes back to early forms of moral descriptivism, including Philippa Foot's, but the most influential statement has been Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985).
28. See also Simon Blackburn, 'Morality and Thick Concepts: Through Thick and Thin' (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 285-99.
29. Raz, Engaging Reason, 208-10.
30. Setting aside minor exceptions, such when acting as officers of the court they help create individual legal norms by subpoenaing witness and so forth. I do not think that this authority depends on their moral expertise.
31. Morality of Freedom, 208.
32. See Denise Réaume, 'Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods', 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 1-27 (1988).
33. Gerald MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', 76 Philosophical Review 312-34 (1967).
34. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, ch 6.
35. Raz, Morality of Freedom, 166.
36. Raz, Ethics and the Public Domain, ch 2.
37. Maurice Cranston, 'Human Rights, Real and Supposed' in D.D. Raphael (ed.), Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London: Macmillan, 1967).
38. I also argue this point in 'Pluralism, Social Conflict, Tolerance' in A. Soeteman (ed.), Pluralism and the Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 85-105.
39. Fran Liebowitz, 'Is Everything Sacred?' Vanity Fair (October 2004), 331.
40. Joseph Raz, 'Multiculturalism' (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 193-205 at 197.
41. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), ch 6.
42. Raz, Morality of Freedom, ch 9.
43. Endicott: 'It is unclear to me whether, in saying these things, I am disagreeing with Raz in any significant way'(113). Penner: 'It is not clear to me the extent to which Raz would disagree with this characterization of thick and thin evaluative concepts in legal and moral reasoning' (97). Waldron: 'I wonder whether in the end all that I have said might not be accommodated perfectly well within the four walls of Raz's conception' (69). Kymlicka: 'I'm not sure whether Raz really disagrees with any of this' (247).