Alternative internal controls as substitutes of the board of directors

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 856-866

  Fernández, Carlos ^a   Arrondo, Rubén ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OVIEDO   (Spain)

Author keywords

Board of directors; Ownership structure; Substitution among controls

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744535641     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00476.x     Document Type: Article

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