Constituents versus fat cats: Testing assumptions about congressional access decisions

American Politics Research

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 751-786

  Chin, Michelle L ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Campaign contributions; Congress; Congressional staff; Interest groups; PACs; Political influence

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744521783     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X05275632     Document Type: Review

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