Preempting democracy: The case of Belarus

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 83-97

  Silitski, Vitali ^a  

^a National Endowment for Democracy   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744519740     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0074     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 51-65.
2. Quote from Lucan A. Way "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Political Liberalization in the Western Former Soviet Union, 1992-2004," forthcoming in World Politics.
3. Christian Haerpfer, "Electoral Politics in Belarus Compared," in Elena Korosteleva, Colin Lawson, and Rosalind Marsh, eds., Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 85-99.
4. For more details on Lukashenka's road to power, see Vitali Silitski, "Explaining Post-Communist Authoritarianism in Belarus," in Elena Korosteleva, Colin Lawson, and Rosalind Marsh, eds., Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship, The best Russian-language source is Alexander Feduta, Lukashenka: Politicheskaya biografiya (Lukashenka: Political biography) (Moscow: Referendum, 2005).
5. To attract more public interest in the referendum and support for the change in the constitution, Lukashenka proposed three additional questions. Two of them were entirely populist: Voters were asked to reject the abolition of the death penalty and to disallow private ownership of land. The last question aimed at a further destruction of Belarusian nationalism: Lukashenka suggested shifting the celebration of independence day from July 27, the day that the declaration of sovereignty was adopted in 1990, to July 3, the day Minsk was liberated by the Soviet army from the Nazis. The Supreme Council put three questions in response, asking the voters to approve its own draft of the constitution that eliminated the presidency altogether; to authorize direct election of provincial governors; and to ban uncontrolled presidential funds.
6. Andrei Jekadumau, "Aficyinya vyniki referendumu 1996 body i dadzenya sacyalahichnyh dasledvanniau" (Official results of the 1996 referendum and sociological survey data) in Belaruskaya palitychnaya systema i prezydenckiya vybary 2001 (The Belarusian political system and the 2001 presidential election) (Warsaw: IDEE, 2001), 65.
7. This was not the only loss by the opposition in 1999. Henadz Karpenka, deputy leader of the United Civil Party, died on April 8 under mysterious circumstances, ostensibly from a brain hemorrhage, at the age of 50. Although no credible evidence emerged about the authorities' involvement, Karpenka's abrupt death could not have arrived at a more convenient time for Lukashenka.
8. The logistics of the balloting were as follows: Opposition activists carried ballot boxes from door to door, asking the residents to cast votes for one of the two candidates who joined the race. One candidate was in exile (BPF leader Zianon Pazniak) and the other was in prison on corruption charges (former prime minister Mikhail Chyhir). Hanchar declared that 53 percent of the electorate took part in the vote, whereas independent opinion polls discovered that only 5 percent did so.
9. According to media reports, evidence produced by former security officers who defected to the West, and the findings of international investigators, the unit was created out of several security agencies and special operations forces in 1998.
10. "Republic of Belarus Presidential Election," final report of the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Observation Mission, 9 September 2001, 23-24. Available at www.osce.org/ documents/odihr/2001/10/1237_en.pdf.
11. Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies polls gave Lukashenka 48 percent of the total electorate, with 27 percent for Hancharyk. With 83 percent turnout recorded in the election, this would have translated into 56 percent and 32 percent, respectively. See "25% Rigged," Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta (Minsk), 12 November 2001.
12. IISEPS poll conducted in October 2001, available at www.nisepi.by/ presl.html.
13. Vitali Silitski, "Belarus: The Fall of the Patriarch?" RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 5, 20 May 2003. Available online at www.rferl.org.
14. "Majority of Belarusians Are Against Changes in Constitution," Charter '97 News Service, 9 September 2004. Available at www.charter97.org.
15. Alexander Dautin, "Kniga ne dla Shirokogo Chtenia" (A book not to be widely read), Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 14 September 2004.
16. "Shutki v Storony" (No jokes), Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 19 April 2004.
17. Don Hill, "Belarus: Election Officials Say Voters Back Lukashenka," RFEI RL, 18 October 2004. Available at www.rferl.org.
18. On presigned protocols, see www.charter97.org/bel/news/2004/10/14/ elections; on stuffed ballot boxes, see
19. www.oscepa.org/index.aspx?articleid= +367+367&newsid=255;
20. on premarked ballot papers, see www.charter97.org/bell news/2004/10/17/lebedka.
21. Vitali Silitski, "They Knew Too Much: Leading Independent Think-tank Faces Attack," RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6, 29 December 2004. Available at www.rferl.org.
22. "Exit Poll and Election Success," International Republican Institute external memo, 19 October 2004.
23. Jan Maksymiuk, "Lukashenka Plans 'No Democratic Change' for Belarus," RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 7, 25 April 2005. Available at www.rferl.org.
24. "Vnutrenniye voiska vypolnyat lyuboy prikaz tirana" (Interior troops will fulfill any tyrant's order). Charter '97 News Service, 1 February 2005. Available online at www.charter97.org.
25. David Marples, "Belarus: The Return of Sheiman," Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, 8 December 2004.