Corruption and the shadow economy

International Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 817-836

  Choi, Jay Pil ^b   Thum, Marcel ^a  

^a DRESDEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744508264     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00347.x     Document Type: Review

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