The not so minimum content of natural law

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 219-255

  Epstein, Richard A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 27744467251     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqi012     Document Type: Review

References (120)

1. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
2. J. Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th edn, 1942).
3. J. Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (1909).
4. H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré, Causation in the Law (1959).
5. H. L. A. Hart, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights in XLIX Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series) (1949) 171-94, reprinted in Logic and Language (First Series), Antony Flew (ed) (1963) 145-66 [citations to Logic and Language].
6. R. A. Epstein 'Pleadings and Presumptions', 40 University of Chicago L Rev 556 (1973).
7. Hart and Honoré, above n 4 at 24.
8. See, e.g. J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (1961);
9. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (1962);
10. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1962).
11. See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963).
12. F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960).
13. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
14. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
15. See, e.g. H. L. A. Hart 'Between Utility and Rights,' in H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983) 202-08.
16. See L. Fuller 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart', 71 Harvard L Rev 630 (1958).
17. Hart, Concept at 189.
18. H. L. A. Hart 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', 71 Harvard L Rev 593 (1958), reprinted in H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 49-87 (1983) [citations to Essays].
19. Ibid at 52, quoting J. L. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H. L. A. Hart (ed.) (Library of Ideas edn, 1954).
20. See L. Fuller 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart,' 71 Harvard L Rev 630 (1958).
21. Hart, Concept, at 92.
22. See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945);
23. H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (967).
24. Hart, Concept at 189.
25. Ibid at 254.
26. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (ed.) (1962) [1651], chs 14 and 15.
27. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (1888) [1739], Book III, Section II, esp. §st 2, 4-7.
28. United States Constitution, Art II, §1.
29. Ibid, Art. II, §4.
30. Ibid, Art. I, §2 (qualifications for members of the House of Representatives);
31. Art I §3 (qualifications for Senators).
32. Gaius, Institutes, 1.1.
33. See Justinian, Institutes, 1.2.1, for the analogous passage.
34. Justinian, Institutes, 1.2.pr.
35. Ibid at 1.2.2. The 'initially' is a tacit recognition that the state of affairs no longer applies.
36. Here is a brief sampler: The rule of first possession for wildlife, Gaius 2.66; the rule on self-defence, Justinian, above n 29 at 9.2; things captured from the enemy become ours by natural reason.
37. Ibid 2.60. Alluvial accretions, 2.70; buildings that another puts on my land become mine by natural law, Gaius, above n 28 at 2.73; the law of specificatio is governed by natural law, Gaius, 2.79.
38. Hart, Concept at 187.
39. Ibid at 191-92.
40. Hume, above n 24 Book II, Section. II ('tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin').
41. Hart, Concept at 189.
42. Ibid at 182-83.
43. Ibid at 190.
44. Ibid at 192.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid at 193.
48. Ibid.
49. Hume, above n 24, Book II, Section III.
50. Ibid at 503.
51. Ibid, Book III, Section IV.
52. Ibid, Book III, Section V.
53. Nozick, above n 12.
54. Ibid at 151.
55. Ibid at 152-53.
56. See Hart, Concept at 182-83
57. Hart 'Utilitarianism and Natural Rights,' Essays, 181-97
58. 'Between Utility and Rights,' Essays at 198-222.
59. See J. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969) 33-42.
60. Hart, 'Ascription', Logic at 149.
61. Ibid at 150.
62. H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law preface (1968).
63. P. T. Geach 'Ascriptivism', 69 Philosophical Rev 221, 221-25 (1960).
64. G. Pitcher 'Hart on Action and Responsibility', 69 Philosophical Rev 226, 226-35 (1960).
65. See, e.g. G. P. Baker, 'Defeasibility and Meaning' in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart 26-57 (1977);
66. R. H. S. Tur 'Defeasibilism' (2001) 21 OJLS 355, 355-68.
67. Gaius, Institutes 3.91.
68. Gaius, Institutes 4.126-29.
69. See, e.g. R. Sutton, The Personal Actions at Common Law (Butterworth, 1929).
70. For an early account, see R. A. Epstein 'Pleadings and Presumptions,' 40 University of Chicago Law Review 556 (1973);
71. R. A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom: The Modern Case for Classical Liberalism (Chicago, 2003).
72. See Tur 'Defeasibilisim' (2001) 21 OJLS 355, 359.
73. See, e.g. N. MacCormick, 'Defeasibility in Law and Logic' in Z. Bankowski, I. White and U. Hanh (eds), Informatics and the Foundation of Legal Reasoning (1995) 100.
74. J. Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (1985) 61-77, discussed in MacCormick, 'Defeasibility', Informatics at 105.
75. F. Schauer 'Exceptions', 58 University of Chicago Law Review 871, 880-86 (1991).
76. See Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
77. R. A. Epstein 'A Theory of Strict Liability', 2 Journal of Legal Studies 151 (1973).
78. R. A. Epstein 'Defences and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability', 3 Journal of Legal Studies 165 (1974), where the title was self-consciously chosen to showcase the relationship between the substantive and procedural dimensions of tort theory.
79. Weaver v Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K. B. 1616).
80. Epstein, 'Strict Liability' at 175-76.
81. Weaver v Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K. B. 1616).
82. Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
83. Hart and Honoré, above n 4 at 64-76.
84. See Hart, 'Ascription', Logic at 162.
85. For the more systematic explication, see Epstein, 'Strict Liability', at 167-68.
86. See Hart, 'Utilitarianism and Natural Rights,' Essays at 194; nn 34 and 35. His citations are, Rawls, A Theory of Justice 22-24, 27, 181, 183, 187
87. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977);
88. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977);
89. Nozick, above n 12
90. B. Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1972). He also notes that this point offers the sympathetic point of departure of Nozick's work, which he thereafter criticizes as 'woefully deficient'. Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights,' Essays at 202-208.
91. See, e.g. Hart, 'Utilitariansim and Natural Rights', Essays at 188
92. Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights', Essays at 199.
93. Hume, above n 24 at 503.
94. See Digest, 9.2.7.6. The progression is undertaken with lots of precision. For my account of how it all works, see R. A. Epstein 'A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation', 72 Boston U. L. Rev. 699, 707-10 (1992). The reference to American constitutional law stems from the fact that its basic constitutional texts all contain general, and defeasible, propositions that require extensive judicial modification to allow the state to limit freedom of individuals to, for example, cause ordinary common law nuisances.
95. Ibid at 720-25.
96. Digest, 9.2, 7, 6 & 9 pr-1.
97. Aristotle, 'Nicomachean Ethics' in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon (ed.), A. D. Ross (trans.) (1941), Book II, 1110b, covering acts under compulsion and acts done by reason of ignorance.
98. 15 P. 15 (1889), cited in Hart & Honoré, above n 24 at 136, 142, 147, 156, 379.
99. Hart & Honoré, Causation, 134-151.
100. Ibid at 69-70.
101. Ibid at 129. I also think that this formulation is wrong with respect to omissions. Suppose we have a situation in which A throws a rock in B's direction, and while the stone is in flight, C deliberately knocks down a barrier that allows it to strike B. Here the removal of the barrier does not negate the (strict prima facie) case: A hit B. Once again, a possible action over lies because of the deliberate nature of C's act. C could also be held directly liable to A. It is not likely that this would happen if C knocked something down without knowing that it protected A.
102. I discuss these structural issues at length in R. A. Epstein, 'Intentional Harms' (1975) 4 Journal of Legal Studies 391, 423-41,
103. and more recently, in R. A. Epstein, Free Markets Under Siege, Cartels, Politics and Social Welfare (Institu, 2004).
104. Hart and Honoré, Causation, 276-91.
105. The leading American authority that bans the contracts is Tunkl v Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
106. For a criticism of Tunkl, see G. Robinson 'Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks between Patients and Providers', 49 Law & Contemporary Problems 172 (1986).
107. For a defence of the current restrictions on contract, see 'Patrick Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary', 49 Law & Contemporary Problems 287 (1986).
108. My sympathies lie with Robinson, see R. A. Epstein 'Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract', 1 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 87 (1986).
109. Thus the good faith duty in insurance contracts requires the insurer in settlement negotiations to treat the potential losses to the insurer as though they had the same weight as their own. This is important in case of limited coverage where an insurer might have a temptation to roll the dice because any large verdict would disproportionately harm the insured. See, for more detailed explication, Merritt v Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Cal. App. 1973),
110. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch 15 at 117: 'The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors; and therefore the just value, is that which they are contented to give'.
111. H. L. A. Hart 'Rawls and Liberty and Its Priority,' 40 University of Chicago L Rev 535 (1973), reprinted in Hart, Essays at 226.
112. Hume, above n 24 Book III, Section III, at 505 (listing occupation, prescription, accession and succession).
113. See Gaius, above n 28 3.73-79
114. Justinian, above n 29 2.1.20-34.
115. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, C. B. Macpherson (ed.) (1980) [1689), ch 5, ¶28.
116. See, e.g. R. A. Epstein 'Possession as the Root of Title', 13 Georgia L Rev 1221 (1979);
117. R. A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the Common Good (1998), 25-31, 251-278
118. R. A. Epstein 'One Step Beyond Nozick's Minimal State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory', Social Philosophy & Policy, forthcoming (2004).
119. Nozick makes the point in Nozick, above n 12 at 169.
120. Hart's criticism is found in Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights,' in Essays at 202-208, esp. 206.