An examination of historians' explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central Europe

East European Quarterly

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-26

  Rogers, Greg S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 27644587947     PISSN: 00128449     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (98)

1. Denis Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," Oriens Extremus, 19(1972), no. 1/2, p.181.
2. See also J.J. Saunders, The History of the Mongol Conquests (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971), pp. 85-86.
3. While most historians state that three groups formed the invasion force, some indicate that there were four or even five groups with the additional attacks directed toward Transylvania. For example, see Saunders, pp. 85-86, or the wonderful map printed in Magyarország hadtörténete [I]: A honfoglalástól a kiegyezésig (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1984), p. 42.
4. Most, if not all, historians believe that the campaign in Poland was initiated in order to curb any possible threats to the Mongols' right flank during their operations in Hungary and that "the Mongols had no immediate interest in Poland." George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 53. See also Saunders, p. 85.
5. Historians have presented various views concerning the ethnic and political makeup of the forces opposing the Mongols at Liegnitz. The two groupings provided here are only a sample of what could have been presented. Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland. Vol. I: The Origins to 1795 (New York: Columbia, 1982), p. 87.
6. John Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia: 1200-1304 (New York: Longman, 1989), p. 83.
7. The Cumans which arrived in Hungary with King Kötöny in 1239 were not well-received by the Hungarian magnates despite their importance to the Hungarian kingdom as a friendly military force. Riots in Pest against the Cumans exploded into bloodshed and King Kötöny, among many others, was killed. The remaining Cumans in the country soon departed for the Balkans, leaving Hungary ill-prepared to meet the upcoming Mongol onslaught.
8. Compounding Béla's problems was the death of Pope Gregory IX, who died in August 1241. The papal seat remained vacant, excluding a brief 17 day stint by Pope Celestine IV, until 1243 and the emergence of Innocent IV.
9. László Makkai, "The Independent Hungarian Feudal Monarchy to the Battle of Mohács: 1000-1526," in A History of Hungary (London: Collet's, 1975), pp. 59-60. In regards to summer and the Mongol military, see Saunders, pp. 85-86.
10. István Vásáry, Az arany horda [The Golden Horde] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiado, 1986), pp. 7-8.
11. Other historians say February 1242, e.g., László Makkai, "Transformation into a Western-type State, 1196-1301," in Peter Sugar (ed.), A History of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 27. Rogerius mentions in his description of events that the Mongols were, at first, afraid to cross the river and had to resort to trickery to verify the safety of the ice. They drove many horses and other animals to the river edge and, while leaving them there for three days without attendance, hid themselves out of view of the local community. Eventually some Hungarians arrived at the river edge and led the animals across the ice to safety on the other side. Only after observing this did the Mongols cross. Vásáry, p. 78.
12. Denis Sinor, History of Hungary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 75.
13. John Fine considers 1242 to be the first year that Bulgaria paid tribute to the Mongols although 1253 is the first year historians can actually verify this activity from the written sources. Fine states that the Tartars, after leaving Bulgaria in 1242, never reappeared before 1253 in numbers large enough to force Bulgaria to begin paying tribute. Therefore, this must have occurred in 1242. John V.A. Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), p. 155.
14. Fennell, p. 76.
15. Vernadsky, p. 50.
16. V.T. Pashuto, "Mongol'skii pokhod v glub' Evropy" [The Mongol Campaign Into The Depths Of Europe], in Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope [The Tartar-Mongols In Asia And Europe] (Moskva: Nauka, 1970), p. 209.
17. Vernadsky also includes the group of West Russian princes who fled to Hungary and Poland instead of submitting to the Mongols as a pretext, "if any were needed," for the subsequent invasion. Vernadsky, pp. 52-53.
18. Protests against harboring fleeing Cumans were also issued by the Mongols to the princes of South Rus' in 1223 before the battle of the Khalka, as mentioned by Fennell in his translated excerpt from the Novgordoskaia Pervaia Letopis'. "We have heard that you are marching against us, having hearkened to the Polovtsians (Cumans); but we have not attacked your land or your villages, nor have we marched against you; but we have come, sent by God, against our serfs and our grooms, the Polovtsians. Make peace with us. Should [the Polovtsians] escape to you, then drive them off and take their goods for yourselves. We have heard that they have done much evil to you, and for this reason we are fighting them." Fennell, p. 65.
19. Sinor, History of Hungary, p. 66.
20. David Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 128.
21. Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 46(1986), no. 1, pp. 45-46.
22. Joseph Fletcher, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Ibid., p. 47.
23. Vernadsky, pp. 57-58.
24. Saunders, pp. 87-88.
25. Vernadsky, pp. 57-58.
26. Christopher Dawson, The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 45.
27. Christopher Dawson, The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries Ibid., p. 65.
28. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 181.
29. It should be mentioned that in an earlier publication Sinor supported the political theory. Sinor, History of Hungary, pp. 75-76.
30. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 171.
31. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 171. Ibid.
32. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 172.
33. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 173.
34. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 174.
35. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 177.
36. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 177. Ibid.
37. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., pp. 177-78.
38. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 178. Thomas of Spalato, a contemporary observer to events taking place in Hungary, wrote that Kadan, while pursuing King Béla IV to Spalato (Split), arrived with only a portion of his army because "there was not enough grass for all his horsemen; it was early March with heavy frosts." Ibid.
39. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 179.
40. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 180.
41. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 180. Ibid.
42. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," Ibid., p. 182.
43. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 182.Ibid.
44. Ibid. Vásáry indicates that the Mongols declared an amnesty for individuals who had fled into the hills during the invasion so that these people would come back to cultivate the fields. After the harvest they were killed. Vásáry, p. 76. Similar events have been described by other historians. "Survivors were, therefore, lured out of their hiding places through promises of immunity so that they would work to produce the supply of food needed by the invaders...(b)ut when the harvest was over, the unfortunate folk were ruthlessly massacred or taken into captivity..." Makkai, "The Independent Hungarian Feudal Monarchy to the Battle of Mohács: 1000-1526," pp. 59-60.
45. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," pp. 182-83.
46. One historian of Inner Asian history has labeled statements that the Huns retained their nomadic society after arriving in the Hungarian plain as "doubtful notions." Rudi Paul Lindner, "Nomadism, Horses and Huns," in Past and Present, August 1981, p. 13.
47. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," pp. 182-83.
48. S.L. Tikhvinskii, "Tataro-mongol'skie zavoevaniia v Azii i Evrope. Vstupitel'naia stat'ia" [The Tartar-Mongol Conquest In Asia And Europe. Introductory Article], in Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope [The Tartar-Mongols in Asia and Europe] (Moskva: Nauka, 1970), p. 8.
49. S.L. Tikhvinskii, "Tataro-mongol'skie zavoevaniia v Azii i Evrope. Vstupitel'naia stat'ia" [The Tartar-Mongol Conquest In Asia And Europe. Introductory Article], in Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope [The Tartar-Mongols in Asia and Europe] (1970), p. 8. Ibid.
50. Pashuto, p. 216.
51. M.G. Safargaliev, Raspad zolotoi ordy [The Collapse Of The Golden Horde] (Saransk: Mordovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960), p. 23.
52. Václav L. Benes and Norman J.G. Pounds, Poland (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 32.
53. P. Petov, "Otslabvate na tsentralnata vlast. Izostriane na klasovata borba" [The Weakening Of Central Power. The Sharpening Of Class Struggle], in Istoriia na Bulgariia. Tom treti: Vtora bulgarska durzhava [History of Bulgaria. Volume Three: The Second Bulgarian Empire] (Sofiia: Izdatelstvo na bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1982), p. 266.
54. O. Halecki, A History of Poland (New York: Roy Publications, 1966), pp. 37-38.
55. Vásáry, pp. 76-77.
56. Dawson, p. 30. Carpini later adds that Batu eventually rallied them. It is interesting to note that Chinese sources state that Batu was willing to leave the battle at Muhi after the first bridge assaults were beaten back but then Subudei took charge and led the victorious river assault. Emma Lederer, "Tatarskoe nashestvie na vengriiu v sviazi s mezhdunarodnymi sobytiiami epokhy" [The Tartar Invasion Into Hungary In Union With International Events Of The Time], in Acta Historica, 2(1953), no. 1/2, p. 10.
57. Dawson, pp. 13-14.
58. Pashuto, p. 218, fn. 24.
59. Makkai, "The Independent Hungarian Feudal Monarchy to the Battle of Mohács: 1000-1526," pp. 59-60.
60. It should be noted that Makkai has recently used the "political" theory. Makkai, "Transformation into a Western-type State, 1196-1301," p. 27.
61. "A tatárjárás (1241-1242)" [The Tartar Invasion (1241-1242)], in Magyarország Története. I/2: Elözmények és magyartörténet 1242-ig [History of Hungary. I/2: Precedents and Hungarian History to 1242) (Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1984), p. 1439.
62. V.P. Shusharin, "Skladyvanie i formlenie feodal'nykh otnoshenii. Rannefeodal'naia monarkhiia (XI - seredina XIII vv." [The Composition And Formation Of Feudal Relations. The Early Feudal Monarchy (The 11th To The Mid-13th Century)], in Istoriia Vengrii: Tom 1 [History of Hungary: Volume 1] (Moskva: Nauka, 1971), p. 148.
63. Dawson, p. 44.
64. Ödön Schütz, "A mongol hóditás nehány problémájáról" [Regarding Several Problems Of The Mongol Invasion], in Századok, 24(1959), p. 230.
65. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 181. Factual errors aside, it should also be mentioned that Carpini mentions very strange things in his text (taken from conversations during his trip with various individuals), such as creatures with "small stomachs and tiny mouths" that nourish themselves by inhaling the steam of cooked meat. Dawson, p. 30. It can be argued that such descriptions, interspersed among important material describing Mongol society, could lead one to wonder about the absolute validity of Carpini's writings.
66. Boyle, pp. 65-66.
67. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 181.
68. See also "A tatárjárás (1241-1242)," p. 1439.
69. Sinor mentions that "the troops that left Hungary settled in the South Russian steppes where they were to remain for centuries." Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 181. This is in complete opposition to Vernadsky's assertion "that when the Mongol army did return to South Russia from Hungary, most of the non-Juchid princes went back to Mongolia with their troops". Vernadsky, p. 60
70. Saunders, pp. 87-88.
71. Boyle, p. 120.
72. Ibid., p. 107-08.
73. Schütz, p. 231.
74. Fletcher, p. 26.
75. Later events indicate that Batu had ample reason to fear heading east. Peter Jackson states that once Guyuk ascended to the Mongol throne in 1246, plans were immediately developed for an attack on Batu and his forces. Guyuk's death in 1248, however, put a stop to these preparations. Jackson, p. 200. George Vernadsky indicates that Guyuk died as Batu was heading eastward to meet him at a point halfway between Mongolia and the South Russian steppes. He mentions that rumors were rampant at the time that Guyuk was planning to poison Batu during their encounter. Vernadsky, pp. 65-66.
76. Schütz, pp. 231-32.
77. Saunders, p. 89.
78. Pashuto, p. 216.
79. Schütz, p. 230, fn. 123.
80. Ibid.
81. Others have argued, in addition, about the accuracy of Sinor's numbers. Such complaints can be expected when one is working with statistical averages concerning land yield and the number of horses needed per mounted Mongol warrior. However, since the authors of these complaints have not tried to prove mathematically that the Hungarian plain could support the Mongols' nomadic society, their criticisms have not been included in this paper.
82. Halperin, pp. 47-48.
83. Ibid. As noted earlier, the Mongols did, in fact, worry about the availability of pasture land. "Quartermasters" were sent out in 1252 before Great Khan Möngke's military campaigns to ensure the necessary grazing grounds. Perhaps Batu's 1241 campaign provided a lesson that was later remembered. One can also mention Chingis Khan's plan, which was never instituted, to raze North China and eradicate its ten million inhabitants for the sake of providing pasture land. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," p. 181.
84. Fletcher, p. 47.
85. Vernadsky, pp. 52-53. The Huns, as mentioned in footnote 42, most likely did not retain their nomadic society after settling in the Carpathian basin. Lindner, p. 13.
86. Saunders, pp. 83-84.
87. Halperin, p. 47.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Fletcher, p. 45.
91. Sinor, History of Hungary, pp. 75-76.
92. Pashuto, pp. 204-05.
93. Vásáry, p. 76.
94. Morgan, pp. 139-40.
95. It can also be asked whether other explanations for the withdrawal besides the four presented in this paper are possible. One proponent of an alternate hypothesis is Tibor Halasi-Kun, who recently noted that in "old nomadic custom, if a ruler was killed, captured or otherwise defeated and his capital was conquered, everything under his rule became the victor's rightful spoils". Although Halasi-Kun's intention was to interpret this custom for Ottoman behavior in Hungary during the 16th century, he also drew conclusions concerning its importance for Mongol relations with King Béla IV and the attempts made to capture both him and the royal residence of Esztergom. As Halasi-Kun states, "(b)esides the usual explanation (the preparations for the election of a new great khan), the fact that the conquest of Hungary had not been completed, its king was safe and its capital had not fallen played a considerable role in Batu Khan's withdrawal." Tibor Halasi-Kun, "Ottoman Toponymic Data and Medieval Boundaries in Southeastern Hungary," in János M. Bak and Béla Király (eds.), From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary (Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), pp. 244, 249 (fn. 15).
96. The "gradual conquest" explanation assumes that the Mongols knew in advance that they would return to do this.
97. See footnote 10. For more information on the relationship between the Mongols/Tartars and Bulgaria, see P. Nikov, Tatarob'lgarski otnosheniia pr' 'z' sr' 'dnit' ' v' 'kove s' ogled' k'm' tsaruvaneto na smiletsa (Sofiia: D'rzhavna Pechatnitsa, 1921).
98. The complex question regarding the ethnic makeup of the Second Bulgarian Empire's in its early years is discussed in an enlightening way in: George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 404, fn. 1.