Psychiatry, philosophy and the self

Current Opinion in Psychiatry

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 649-652

  Hansen, Jennifer ^a   Maynes, Jeffrey ^b  

^a GETTYSBURG COLLEGE   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Dissociative identity disorder; Embodiment; Narrative; Personal identity; Personhood

Indexed keywords

BRAIN REGION; DISSOCIATIVE DISORDER; HUMAN; MEMORY; MENTAL DISEASE; PERSONALITY; PERSONHOOD; PSYCHOANALYSIS; PSYCHOTHERAPY; REVIEW; SELF CONCEPT; SEMANTICS; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 27644503110     PISSN: 09517367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/01.yco.0000184415.44329.11     Document Type: Review

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