South Asia's arms control process: Cricket diplomacy and the composite dialogue

International Affairs

Volumn 81, Issue 5, 2005, Pages

  Croft, Stuart ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 27444435280     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: 14682346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00501.x     Document Type: Review

References (143)

1. On the crisis, and ways forward, see Mario E. Carranza, 'Avoiding a nuclear catastrophe: nuclear arms control after the 2002 India - Pakistan crisis', International Politics 40: 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 313-14.
2. Shaharyar Khan, President of Pakistan's Cricket Board, was clear that cricket diplomacy had worked. See 'Cricket diplomacy has worked', the Rediff Cricket Interview, 6 April 2005, at http://www.rediff.com/cricket/2005/apr/ o6cinter.htm, accessed April 2005.
3. He amplified this theme in his book Cricket: a bridge of peace (Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 2005). Khan was appointed to the presidency of the Cricket Board by President Musharraf; previously, he had been Pakistan's Foreign Secretary (equivalent in Britain to the Permanent Secretary at die Foreign Office) from 1990 to 1994.
4. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the US government's advice to American citizens, rather than being primarily designed to alert them to immediate peril, was at least as much a tactic designed to put pressure on India and Pakistan to show restraint. The cancellation of tourist charters in the wake of the advisory notice seriously affected India's tourism, hospitality and airline industries, and thus brought home the importance of the issues at stake, all of which may well have been the purpose. Many thanks to P. R. Chari for insights on this issue.
5. Quoted in 'No breakthrough seen in cricket diplomacy', Reuters, 18 April 2005, in Express India, at ERLINK http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php? newsid=45013, accessed April 2005.
6. The full text of the Lahore summit agreements, including the Lahore Declaration and the memorandum of understanding, can be found on the Henry L. Stimson website at http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020109215, accessed January 2005.
7. In particular, western former policy-makers have been concerned with the nuclear developments on the subcontinent, and have shared those thoughts and concerns. See e.g. Michael Quinlan, 'How robust is India - Pakistan deterrence?', Survival 42, Dec. 2000, pp. 141-54;
8. Hilary Synnott, The causes and consequences of South Asia's nuclear tests, Adelphi Paper 332, Dec. 1999;
9. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: diplomacy, democracy and the bomb (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2004).
10. Estimates of the yield for the nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are around 15kt and 21kt respectively. Around 110,000 people were killed in these attacks, and some 230,000 more had died of radiation effects by 1950. The Stimson Center estimated that a 5kt detonation on Islamabad would lead to 400,000 fallout casualties, and the same yield in Mumbai would lead to 800,000 casualties. See Kishore Kuchibhotla and Matthew McKinzie, 'Nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents in South Asia', in Michael Krepon and Ziad Haider, eds, Reducing nuclear dangers in South Asia, Stimson Center Report no. 50, Feb. 2004.
11. The failure of the Agra summit was to lower expectations for the composite dialogue process: see e.g. Siddharth Varadarajan, 'Composite dialogue has unhappy past', Times of India, 28 Jan. 2004.
12. In many ways this shocking event impacted upon India with a force similar to that of 9/11 in the United States. The 'Attack on the parliament homepage' at www.rediff.com/news/pattack.htm is easily compared with 9/11 homepages,
13. such as 'The September 11 digital archive' at http://911digitalarchive. org
14. or 'September 11 News' at www.september11news.com.
15. For a careful policy analysis of the implications as drawn in India at the time, see Alexander Evans, 'India flexes its muscles', Foreign Policy, no. 130, May-June 2002.
16. See Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and beyond (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). This tension was the first time a nuclear threat - implicit, admittedly - had been issued by Pakistan.
17. There is a nice article on this on the Indian 'That's cricket' website; see 'Diplomacy South Asian style - when in doubt, watch cricket', 14 April 2005, at ainfo.com/2005/odi_series/ind-pak/1404diplomacy.html" http://thatscricket.indiainfo.com/2005/odi_series/ind-pak/1404diplomacy.html, accessed May 2005.
18. For an assessment, see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'Assessing the role of confidence building measures in the India Pakistan tangle', Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal 4: 1, Winter 2004., p. 1.
19. These are the two main cities in Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, respectively. See, e.g., Najmuddin A. Shaikh, 'Implications of the bus service', Dawn, 13 April 2005, at http://www.dawn.com/2005/04/13/op.htm, accessed May 2005.
20. Stanley A. Weiss, 'Trade offers sure path to peace; India and Pakistan', International Herald Tribune, 21 Feb. 2004.
21. For analysis, see Rashed Rahman, 'South Asian economic cooperation', Daily Times, 28 Sept. 2004.
22. 'Text of the joint statement signed between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan in Delhi, 18 April 2005', para. 5, at 5545.stm" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4455545.stm, accessed May 2005.
23. There is an enormous literature on the problems with and for Kashmir. One of the very best recent analyses is that by Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: roots of conflict, paths to peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
24. See e.g. 'Schedule of Indo-Pak talks announced", The Hindu, 7 Oct. 1998.
25. For discussion, see Cheema, 'Assessing the role of confidence building measures in the India Pakistan tangle', pp. 20-6.
26. Raja Mohan, 'Indo-Pak talks focus on Kashmir, CBMs', The Hindu, 14 Oct. 1998 (emphasis added).
27. On the 1998 talks, see Amit Baruah, 'India-Pakistan official level talks from Feb. 16', The Hindu, 28 Jan. 2004.
28. Seema Guha, 'Ready for talks but worries persist', Times of India, 17 Jan. 2001.
29. See e.g. 'No talks in. present circumstances, India says', the text of a report by the Indian news agency PTI, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 11 March 2002, citing extensive comments by the Indian External Affairs Ministry spokeswoman.
30. Michael Krepon and Ziad Haider, 'Introduction', in Krepon and Haider, eds, Reducing nuclear dangers in South Asia, p. 1.
31. This began, symbolically and practically, when Prime Minister Vajpayee made a speech on 18 April in Srinagar that opened the door to exploratory talks by offering the 'hand of friendship'. See Subrata K. Mitra, 'The reluctant hegemon: India's self-perception and the South Asian strategic environment', Contemporary South Asia 12: 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 399, 401;
32. and Amit Baruah, 'Ready to discuss India's concerns - Pak envoy', The Hindu, 21 Aug. 2003.
33. Of course, 'support' meant different things: to Pakistan, diplomatic and moral support; to India, material support to terrorists..
34. The text can be found in many places: see e.g. http://www.dawn.com/2004/ 01/07/top2.htrn (accessed April 2005).
35. See K. K. Katyal, 'After the breakthrough', The Hindu, 14 Jan. 2004.
36. A point ably made by Jehangir Karamat, whose comments were well reported in India; see e.g. 'This give and take will work: ex-Pak army chief', Times of India, 30 Jan. 2004.
37. On motivations, see 'India-Pakistan: breaking the deadlock', South Asia Monitor (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC), no. 67, 1 Feb. 2004, at www.csis.org/saprog/sam67.pdf, accessed April 2005.
38. 'Moreover it is to be hoped that the dispute [Kashmir] will top the agenda of the dialogue and that only after its satisfactory resolution other issues will be taken up': Editorial, Jang, 29 Jan. 2004. This is of course a restatement of the established Pakistani position that had apparently become much more flexible at the SAARC summit.
39. M. S. Qazi, 'Searching for lasting peace', The Nation, Jan. 2004: www.nation.com.pk/weekly/sreview/current/sreview6.htm, accessed April 2005.
40. 'Atut ang' or 'attot ang' means 'integral part': the idea is that Kashmir illustrates the secular nature of India as it is the country's only Muslim-majority state. 'In a clear enunciation of his Government's policy, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has described Kashmir as an integral part of India ... at the very core of Indian nationhood.' Cited in 'Door open for Indo-Pak talks: Jaswant', Hindustan Times, 23 Sept. 1999.
41. See also Bose, Kashmir, p. 171.
42. B. Muralidhar Reddy, 'Pakistan keen on political level talks', The Hindu, 14 Jan. 2004,
43. and 'More CBMs likely during talks', The Hindu, 28 Jan. 2004;
44. 'Composite dialogue should be at Foreign Secy level: Pakistan', 15 Jan. 2004, Tara News, www.taranews.com/noqnews/nnqview.php?ArtID=3026, accessed May 2005.
45. See e.g. the speech of Shahid Kamal, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Pakistan, in the United States at the 7th International Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington DC, Jan. 1999, at http://www.ceip.org/ programs/npp/kamal.htm (accessed April 2005).
46. The test for many Indians was action taken by Pakistan against terrorist camps on Pakistani soil, which they had not seen: on this, see B. Muralidhar Reddy, 'India, Pakistan agree on timeframe for talks', The Hindu, 18 Feb. 2004.
47. Author's interviews, spring 2004.
48. See paras 29-32 of the 12th SAARC summit 'Islamabad Declaration', at http://www.infopak.gov.pk/saarc/Islamabad_declaration.htm (accessed April 2005). On the Indian-Pakistani joint declaration, see note 24 above.
49. See B. Muralidhar Reddy, 'N-restraint regime offer made during talks: Pakistan', The Hindu, 21 Feb. 2004.
50. B. Muralidhar Reddy, 'India, Pakistan outline road map for dialogue', The Hindu, 19 Feb. 2004.
51. For results, see 'Indian election results' BBC News, 4 March 1998, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/s/w_asia/61612.stm (accessed April 2005).
52. See e.g. 'Vajpayee: a man for peace: Pak. MPs', The Hindu, 14 May 2003;
53. Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad's comments in 'Vajpayee is a man of peace, says Rashid', Daily Times, 17 November 2003, at com.pk/default.asp? page=story_17-11-2003_pg7_33 "http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=story_17-11-2003_pg7_33, accessed April 2005.
54. This was a common theme in his political 'obituary' after losing the election, as e.g. in Kerala Online on 13 May 2004: 'Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, set to resign Thursday after six years in power, will go down in history as a man who tried to end years of hostility with Pakistan': p=vaj.htm" http://www.keralaonline.com/dailydose/spotlight/display.asp?cap= vaj.htm (accessed April 2005).
55. K. Natwar Singh, the incoming Foreign Secretary, said that 'It [the dialogue] will continue ... We will discuss everything with Pakistan - Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear question, any other issues et al'. Cited in P. Jayaram, 'Peace talks with Pak to continue', The Economic Times, 24 May 2004.
56. See e.g. Malik Siraj Akbar, 'Singh's yearning to sustain peace process', Pak Tribune, 28 May 2004;
57. Ijaz Hussain, 'Change in Delhi and peace process', Daily Times, 4 June 2004.
58. The technical details vital to make these commitments realities were not discussed and agreed. On the agreements themselves, see 'Nuclear capabilities a factor for regional stability: India, Pak', 21 June 2004, at http://www.newindpress.comNewsitems.asp?ID=IEH20040620140522&Title= Top+Stories&Topic=0&, accessed April 2005.
59. The joint statement read: 'The existing hotline between the directors general of military operations would be upgraded, dedicated, and secured. A dedicated and secure hotline would be established between the two foreign secretaries through the respective foreign offices to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues.' See Ramananda Sengupta, 'Step at a time for Indo-Pak ties', 22 June 2004, at http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/ 22indpak.htm, accessed April 2005.
60. The joint statement is reproduced in 'Key to CBMs: strategic stability', Indian Express, 29 June 2004.
61. 'Key to CBMs: strategic stability', Indian Express, 29 June 2004.
62. This paragraph draws on author's interviews, Sept. 2004.
63. On this, see Swapan Dasgupta, 'Sweetly spoken: India and Pakistan are not yet ready to bury the hatchet', The Telegraph, 24 Sept. 2004.
64. Sec Akmal Hussain, 'A new beginning in the peace process', Daily Times, 28 Sept. 2004.
65. Sec e.g. Siddarth Varadarajan, 'India signals wariness on missile defence', The Hindu, 6 Sept. 2004.
66. There is an excellent comprehensive overview of the meetings and agreements in the process to this point on the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies website: see N. Manoharan, 'India-Pakistan composite dialogue 2004: a status report', article 1505, 22 Sept. 2004, at http://www.ipcs.org/ newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1517&subCatID=null&mod= null%20 (accessed May 2005).
67. See also Fazal Hakeem, 'Composite dialogue', Pakistan Observer, 26 Dec. 2004;
68. Moonis Ahmar, 'Assessing the dialogue process', Opinion, 17 Aug. 2004.
69. For a longer history of Indian-Pakistani negotiations, see 'Pugwash consultation on the Kashmir issue: chronology', 23 April 2005, at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/april2005-chronology.htm (accessed May 2005).
70. The joint statement is reproduced at http://www.iiss.org/showpage.php? mixedPagesID=99#8_Sept._2004, accessed April 2005.
71. For an account, see 'Talks with Musharraf "very good", says PM', The Navhind Times, 28 Sept. 2004.
72. For one reading, see Ramazan ul Mubarak, 'Composite dialogue needs sincerity', Pakistan Observer, 30 Oct. 2004., at http://pakobserver.net/200410/ 30/articles02.asp, accessed April 2005.
73. Cited in 'Manmohan, Musharraf vow to write new chapter in history', IndoLink, 24 Sept. 2004.
74. Cited in Akmal Hussain, 'Taking the peace process forward', Daily Times, 23 Sept. 2004.
75. An argument made by Teresita C. Schaffer in 'India-Pakistan peace talks: slow progress'. South Asia Monitor 75: 1, Oct. 2004.
76. See e.g. 'Pak-India composite dialogue heading in right direction: Shaukat', Pak Tribune, 12 Oct. 2004;
77. Shaukat Pracha, 'Former Indian foreign secretary optimistic about Indo-Pak talks', Daily Times, 14 Oct. 2004;
78. 'Pak-India dialogue to culminate in resolution of Kashmir Mirwaiz', Pak Tribune, 15 Oct. 2004.
79. Most of the 72 are non military: they include, for example, seminars on elementary education (no. 26), and the introduction of a joint commemorative stamp (no. 68). But this reflects a commitment to develop the whole range of the bilateral relationship. Author's interviews, Sept. 2004. See also Pranay Sharma, 'Behind bonhomie, Pak puts visit speedbreakers' (sic), The Telegraph, 14 Oct. 2004.
80. Author's interviews, Sept. 2004; 'India, Pak engage in track II diplomacy to solve Kashmir problem', Indo Link, 22 Oct. 2004, at www.indolink.com/ displayArticleS.php?id=102104105651 (accessed Oct. 2004).
81. 'Pak test-fires Ghauri Hatf V missile', The Tribune (India), 13 Oct. 2004.
82. See 'India, Pak., announce dates for expert-level talks', The Hindu, 20 Oct. 2004;
83. Hasan Akhtar, 'Next round of talks to begin on Nov. 29: rail, bus links and drugs control', Dawn, 21 Oct. 2004.
84. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Pakistan's paradox: terrorism threatens, yet ensures, general's survival, Times of India, 19 Oct. 2004.
85. See 'Indian agency RAW still encouraging terrorist activities', Pakistan Times, 24 Oct. 2004.
86. Cited in 'Musharraf withdraws plebiscite demand for Kashmir settlement', Pak Tribune, 26 Oct. 2004.
87. See 'India, Pak engage in track II diplomacy to solve Kashmir problem'.
88. Quoted in 'K-talks not through media: India tells Mush', Times of India, 26 Oct. 2004.
89. See also Priyam Bhasin, 'Militancy in J&K: living in fear', NDTV.com, 27 Oct. 2004.
90. For Pakistani reporting of this, see 'Composite dialogue to take up any suggestion on Kashmir: India', Pakistan Times, 27 Oct. 2004.
91. The Indian think tank SAPRA described Musharraf's ideas as 'preposterous': see 'Updates', 16 Nov. 2004, at http://www.subcontinent.com/ sapra/updates.html (accessed Nov. 2004).
92. Further, in his response to these comments, Prime Minister Singh fell back on tried and trusted Indian positions: that Jammu and Kashmir were an integral part of India, and that Pakistan must live up to its January 2004 commitment (at the SAARC meeting) not to allow cross-border terrorism. See Singh's comments in a joint press conference with the Dutch Prime Minister in The Hague, cited in 'PM rejects Musharraf's Kashmir formula', Sify News, 8 Nov. 2004.
93. Cited in 'Pak terror roadblock to peace: US', Times of India, 29 Oct. 2004.
94. Anhad Sharif, 'US roadmap being followed', Dawn, 13 Nov. 2004;
95. also published in The Tribune (India), 14 Nov. 2004.
96. See 'Composite dialogue not result of external pressure: Kasuri', Pak Tribune, 21 Nov. 2004
97. Reported by Ahmed Rashid, 'India and Pakistan's road to détente', BBC News, 11 Nov. 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/399507.stm, accessed January 2005.
98. 'Talks focus on peace, security: FO', Dawn, 28 Dec. 2004;
99. 'Pakistan dismayed over Indian claim on Kashmir', Pakistan Times, 29 Dec. 2004;
100. 'Pakistan and India decide to continue talks', Daily Times, 29 Dec. 2004; confidential correspondence with the author.
101. Ahmed Hassan, 'Breakthrough in talks expected: Rashid', Dawn, 6 Jan. 2005. This was rather a misleading title to the article: Rashid had actually said that Pakistan had been seeking an early breakthrough, which explained its 'policy of restraint' towards India.
102. Personal correspondence.
103. M. K. Narayanan was appointed National Security Adviser, although Satish Lamba was given the unofficial role of leading in the backchannel talks.
104. Pakistan had put particular weight on this meeting: see Hasan Akhtar, 'Need for dialogue at high level: FO', Dawn, 1 Feb. 2005, reporting the comments of the Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan. Nepal's King had just suspended democracy and had taken direct powers.
105. Brigadier M. Abdul Hafiz, 'Indo-Pak composite dialogue', Daily Star 5: 239, 26 Jan. 2005.
106. Indeed, more than bilateral support: both India's main communist parties, for example (the CPI and CPI-M), also endorsed the process, and went to Pakistan to make that clear: see 'Joint struggle needed against imperialism, globalisation', Pakistan Link, 4 March 2004.
107. See also the resolution of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) on 17 April 2005, at http://pd.cpim.org/2005/0417/04172004_indo- pak%20resoludon.htm (accessed April 2005).
108. Afzaal Mahmood, 'Moving ahead, haltingly', Dawn, 10 March 2005.
109. Chandan Mitra, 'A road beyond Muzzaffarabad?', The Pioneer, 7 April 2005.
110. Mitra, 'A road beyond Muzzaffarabad?'
111. The Editor, 'Kashmir bus or buzz?', Pakistan Times, 21 Feb. 2005.
112. Ijaz Hussain, 'Whither the bus service?', Daily Times, 2 March 2005.
113. See the comments by US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the Senate International Relations Committee, as reported in 'Powell takes credit for US diplomacy in Indo-Pak moves', Press Trust of India, 13 Feb. 2004.
114. See e.g. Hussain, 'Whither the bus service?'.
115. The comments were made by Laxminarayan Ramdas in Washington DC in March 2005. See 'Kashmir N-flashpoint, says Indian naval former chief', Pakistan Times, 25 March 2005.
116. Seymour Hersh, 'The coming wars', New Yorker, 24 Jan. 2005.
117. On South Asian coverage, see e.g. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Asian drama: after Iraq, US targets Iran with Pak support', Times of India, 20 Jan. 2005.
118. Jehangir Karamat, 'Pakistan-US relations: the next steps', Brookings Institution, 15 Dec. 2004, at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/comm/events/ 20041215karamat.pdf.
119. For an Indian take, see Seema Sirohi, 'Pakistan lays down the agenda for the US', Asia Times, 25 Dec. 2004, also at http://indiamonitor.com/news/ readCatFullNews.jsp?ni=5763&ct=USA-Pakistan, both accessed April 2005.
120. See 'F-16s could affect composite dialogue: India', Greater Kashmir Online, 7 April 2005;
121. 'US supply of F-16s to impact Indo-Pak dialogue'. Outlook India, 28 March 2005, www.greaterkashmir.com, accessed April 2005
122. See 'Arms race if India gets Patriots: FO', Hi Pakistan, 7 April 2005.
123. See the testimony at http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Mar/02- 649072.html, accessed April 2005.
124. Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Jehangir Karamat, has been working very hard to promote the trade and investment agenda in US-Pakistani relations too. See e.g. Faiz Rehman, 'Karamat invites US investment', Daily Times, 14 March 2005.
125. This was the language of Condoleezza Rice in her visit to New Delhi in March 2005. Prime Minister Singh and President Bush plan to visit each other's countries during 2005. For a review, see 'Bush's Indian gambit', The Australian, 21 May 2005.
126. See the coverage in Khalid Hasan, 'US confident of good ties with Pakistan, India', Daily Times, 14. May 2005. For different reasons, it is frequently remarked in both India and Pakistan that Tellis, though an American, was born in India.
127. See e.g. the report in 'Solution for Kashmir Musharraf calls for top-level talks', Pakistan Times, 16 March 2005.
128. M. K. Narayanan, cited in Harish Khare, 'We do not know what the General wants', The Hindu, 14 April 2005.
129. Cited in 'Breakthrough in peace with India: Musharraf', Daily Times, 25 April 2005.
130. Cited in 'Kashmir solution "within 2-3 years"', Jang, 26 April 2005.
131. The text of the joint statement, issued on 18 April 2005, is at http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/apr/18mush6.htm (accessed May 2005).
132. Joint statement, 18 April 2005, at http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/apr/ 18mush6.htm (accessed May 2005).
133. Cited in Syed Talat Hussain, 'A game of nerves', Newsline, 1 May 2005.
134. See e.g. 'India sets new timetable of talks with Pakistan', Pakistan Times, 6 May 2005.
135. See 'Pakistan, India hold talks to avert N-catastrophe', Hi Pakistan, 6 April 2005.
136. This concern was expressed by Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, to an Indian think-tank (the Bengal Initiative) in April 2005: see the report in Waqar Gillani, 'Kasuri concerned multiple initiatives can derail peace', Daily Times, 9 May 2005.
137. Or indeed that CBMs on the nuclear front might be delayed by lack of progress over Kashmir, or vice versa. On this, see Subhash Kapila, Pakistan's compulsions for peace dialogue with India, South Asia Analysis Group Paper 1111, 8 Sept. 2004, at http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1111.html (accessed Oct. 2004).
138. On this point, see V. R. Raghavan, 'The double-edged effect in South Asia', Washington Quarterly 27: 4, Autumn 2004., pp. 147-55.
139. For evidence that there is still some distance to travel, see e.g. the website of the Indian Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the papers on the untrustworthiness of President Musharraf. John Wilson John, 'Can Musharraf be trusted? He is bidding [sic] his time to strike', article 1717, 27 April 2005, at 2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1730&status=article&mod= a" http://www.ipcs.org/India_Pak_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue= 1730&status=aiticle&mod=a, accessed May 2005.
140. P. R. Chari, Nuclear crisis, escalation control, and deterrence in South Asia, Stimson Center Working Paper, Aug. 2003, at http://www.stimson.org/ southasia/pdf/escalation_chari.pdf (accessed April 2005).
141. Pakistan has spoken of four engagements: with India, Afghanistan, Iran and the United States. See Hussain, 'A game of nerves'.
142. See e.g. Shishir Prashant, 'Sir Creek dispute: accord in sight', Deccan Herald, 5 May 2005.
143. All these ideas are being discussed in India and Pakistan: author's interviews, Sept. 2004.