Killing with kindness: Funding the demise of a Palestinian state

International Affairs

Volumn 81, Issue 5, 2005, Pages

  Le More, Anne ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 27444434933     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: 14682346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00498.x     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. 'Ya'alon: IDF persuaded Palestinians to halt terror', Ha'aretz, 1 June 2005.
2. Conclusions of the European Council in Berlin, 24-25 March 1999, at https://www.europa.eu.int.
3. The Quartet is the highest multilateral diplomatic forum for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and is composed of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia.
4. Bilateral American aid to Israel is estimated to be over $4 billion a year if military and economic aid, loan guarantees and grants, hard and soft money are included (Interview with senior State Department official, Washington DC, 28 April 2004). As an indication, for the fiscal year 2003, the US Embassy to Israel estimated that US per capita assistance to Israel amounted to $654 as compared to $54 to the Palestinians. 'US assistance to Israel', at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il.
5. Disengagement, the Palestinian economy and the settlements (Jerusalem: World Bank, 23 June 2004), p. ii.
6. Stagnation or revival? Israeli disengagement and Palestinian economic prospects (Jerusalem: World Bank, December 2004), p. 3.
7. See also Ha'aretz, 10 July 2005.
8. For instance, had the wall a strictly security rationale, it could have been built on the Green Line (the 1967 armistice line separating Israel from the oPt). In some places the barrier goes as deep as six kilometres inside the West Bank. The impact of Israel's separation barrier on affected West Bank communities (Jerusalem: HEPG, May 2003);
9. and Update 3 (30 November 2003).
10. For a detailed analysis of this process of territorial fragmentation, see Anne Le More, 'Are realities on the ground compatible with the international state-building and development agenda?', in Michael Keating, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe, eds, Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground: the case of Palestine (London: Chatham House, 2005).
11. Aid effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza (Jerusalem: World Bank/Government of Japan, June 2000), p. 14.
12. Development under adversity: the Palestinian economy in transition (Jerusalem: MAS/World Bank, 1999), p. 2. 11
13. On the nature and impact of the humanitarian crisis, see United Nations 2004 Humanitarian Plan of Action for the Occupied Palestinian Territory (CAP) (New York and Geneva: OCHA, November 2003).
14. Fifteen months-intifada, damns and Palestinian economic crisis-an assessment (Jerusalem: World Bank, March 2002), pp. 34-6;
15. Twenty-seven months - intifada, closures and economic crisis - an assessment (Jerusalem: World Bank, May 2003), p. 7.
16. Four years - intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis - an assessment (Jerusalem: World Bank, October 2004), pp. 52-4.
17. For instance, 125,000 people were estimated to be on the PA's payroll in 2003-26% of those working in the oPt and 40% of all domestic wages. Twenty-seven months-intifada, closures and economic crisis - an assessment (Jerusalem: World Bank, May 2003), p. xiii.
18. On PA authoricarianism and neo-patrimonial practices, see Rex Brynen, 'The neopatrimonial dimension of Palestinian polities', Journal of Palestinian Studies 25: 1, Autumn 1995;
19. Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian state: the incomplete revolution (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997).
20. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) continues to be in charge of much of the social services, expenditure and employment of the refugee population covering 70-80% of the Gaza Strip and 30% of the West Bank populations. On the external dimension of the failures of Palestinian state formation and governance, see Mushtaq Husain Khan with George Giacaman and Inge Amundsen, State formation in Palestine: viability and governance during a social transformation (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2004).
21. As stated by Prime Minister Sharon in his televised address to the nation on the first day of the evacuation of the Israeli settlers from Gaza: 'Now the Palestinians bear the burden of proof. They must fight terror organizations, dismantle its infrastructure and show sincere intentions of peace in order to sit with us at the negotiating table'. 'Sharon's speech on Gaza pullout', 15 August 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4154798. stm.
22. Yediot Aharonot, 7 September 1993.
23. Quoted in Graham Usher, Palestine in crisis: the struggle for peace and political independence after Oslo (London: Pluto Press, 1995), pp. 71-2.
24. Fifteen months - intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis - an assessment (Jerusalem: World Bank, 5 March 2002), p. v.
25. Who governs the West Bank? Palestinian administration under Israeli occupation (Amman/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 28 September 2004), p. i.
26. Kidnappings between factions and of international civilians in Gaza have sharply increased in recent months, notably in the lead up to and in the immediate aftermath of Gaza disengagement. On 7 September 2005, the head of the PA military intelligence and cousin of former Palestinian President, Moussa Arafat, was murdered. See for instance 'Palestine, murder and fragmentation', Economist, 10 September 2005,
27. and Arnon Regular, 'PA boosts PA presence in Gaza Strip', Ha'aretz, 11 September 2005.
28. Karma Nabulsi, 'The state-building project: what went wrong?', in Keating et al., Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground.
29. Avi Shlaim, The iron wall: Israel and the Arab world (London: Allen Lane, 2000), pp. 11, 352.
30. The Allon Plan, proposed by senior Labor party official Yigal Allon just after the June 1967 war, called for Israel's annexation of up to a half of the West Bank, with the areas densely populated by Arabs forming two unconnected areas to the north and south supposed to become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian state. B'Tselem, Land grab: Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem: May 2002), p. 7.
31. See also Shimon Peres, The new Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 163-79.
32. Peter Ezra Weinberger, Co-opting the PLO: a critical reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993-1995 (unpublished Ph.D, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2002), pp. 10-11.
33. Khan, State formation in Palestine: viability and governance during a social transformation, p. 51.
34. The document stated that any agreement with the Palestinians must be guided by three key principles: the need to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinians that will entail 'the establishment of a Palestinian entity whose status will be determined in negotiations between the sides and limits of sovereignty will be detailed in the following section'; the need to uphold Israel's and Israeli citizens' security; and the need to maintain Israeli settlements 'in the Western Land of Israel'. The following sections stated inter alia that there will be no return to the 1967 borders, that settlements will not be dismantled, that the Jordan River will be the security border of Israel, and that Jerusalem will remain the eternal and unified capital of Israel. Importantly, in the section entitled 'Status of the Palestinian entity and limits on its sovereignty', the document mentioned that 'if the Palestinian entity subjects itself to the limits presented in this document, its self-determination will be recognized. According to an alternative opinion it will be regarded as an enlarged autonomy, and according to another opinion, as a state.' 'National Agreement regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians', available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/ process/docs/bei-eit_eng.htm, accessed March 2005.
35. 'Sharon's speech on Gaza pullout', 15 August 2005.
36. 'For first time, Jews are no longer a majority between the Jordan and the Sea', Ha'aretz, 11 August 2005.
37. This does not include either the approximate 100 'illegal' outposts in the West Bank or the 200,000 settlers living in East Jerusalem. 'State: West Bank settler population grew by 12,800 in past year', Ha'aretz, 26 August 2005.
38. International Crisis Group, 'The Jerusalem powder keg', Middle East Report, 44, 2 August 2005;
39. and 'PM ordered El police HQ built two months ago', Ha'aretz, 26 August 2005.
40. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon interview, Ha'aretz, Pesach Supplement, 5 April 2004.
41. Chris McGreal, 'Sharon in Palestine state u-turn', Guardian, 28 February 2003;
42. Akiva Eldar, 'Sharon's Palestinian "state" - in the eyes of the beholder', Daily Star, 21 June 2004.
43. Eldar, 'Sharon's Palestinian "state"'.
44. Eldar, 'Sharon's Palestinian "state"'.
45. Amal Jamal, 'The Palestinians in the Israeli peace discourse: a conditional partnership', Journal of Palestinian Studies 30: 1, Autumn 2000.
46. Transcript of remarks by Bush and Sharon on Israel, New York Times, 14 April 2004.
47. The physical and institutional damage incurred during Operation Defence Shield alone in April-June 2002 was estimated at US$342 million, or one-third of the total funds that donors disbursed in 2002 or about three-quarters of what they had disbursed on average per year for the period 1994-2000. Physical and institutional damage assessment. West Bank Governorates, March-May 2002. Summary Report (Jerusalem: LACC, 23 May 2002).
48. Barbara Balaj, Ishac Diwan & Bernard Philippe, 'Aide extérieure aux Palestiniens: ce qui n'a pas fonctionné', Politique Étrangère 3: 95, Autumn 1995.
49. West Bank and Gaza: an evaluation of Bank assistance (Washington DC: World Bank/OED, March 2002), pp. 4-5.
50. Twenty-seven months (Jerusalem: World Bank, May 2003), pp. 51-2.
51. World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian economy and the settlements (Jerusalem: World Bank, 23 June 2004), p. 3.
52. World Bank, Stagnation or revival? Israeli disengagement and Palestinian economic prospects, p. 1.
53. UNCTAD, Report on UNCTAD's assistance to Ute Palestinian people (Geneva: United Nations, 28 July 2003), p. 8.
54. David Shearer and Anuschka Meyer, 'The dilemma of aid under occupation', in Keating et al., Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground.
55. 'PM to tell UN: Israel's responsibility for Gaza is over', Ha'aretz, 13 September 2005.
56. International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, 'Legal Aspects of Israel's Disengagement Plan under International Humanitarian Law (IHL)', Policy Brief (Boston, MA: Harvard University, 30 August 2004).
57. Greg Myre, 'As Israelis pull out, the question lingers: who'll control Gaza?', New York Times, 11 September 2005.
58. World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian economy and the settlements, pp. i, ii.
59. World Bank, Emergency assistance program for the Occupied Territories (Washington DC: World Bank, April 1994). p. 7.
60. Rick Hooper, The international politics of donor assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1993-1997 (Research in Middle East Economics, 3), 1999, p. 64.
61. Hooper, The international politics, p. 76.
62. Sara Roy, 'Developing the Gaza Strip in the event of Israel's disengagement', in Rearing et al., Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground, p. 211.
63. The Declaration of Principles of September 1993 stipulated that final status issues (including borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security arrangements) would be dealt with in final status negotiations after a transitional period not exceeding five years. On an alternative to the Oslo gradualist approach, see International Crisis Group, Middle East Endgame II: how a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement would look (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 16 July 2002).