Social heuristics that make us smarter

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 585-612

  Hurley, Susan ^a  

^a ALL SOULS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Collective Activity; Cooperation; Exogenous Units; Heuristics; Mind Reading; Mirroring; Rationality; Situated Cognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 27344438948     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080500264214     Document Type: Review

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