Secrecy despite compromise: Types, cryptography, and the Pi-calculus

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3653, Issue , 2005, Pages 186-201

  Gordon, Andrew D ^a   Jeffrey, Alan ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CODES (SYMBOLS); COMPUTER PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA;

DYNAMICALLY-GENERATED MESSAGES; LANGUAGE-BASED SECURITY; PI-CALCULUS; SYMBOLIC CRYPTOGRAPHY;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 27244444891     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11539452_17     Document Type: Conference Paper

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