The impact of UK electoral systems

Parliamentary Affairs

Volumn 58, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 198-213

  Dunleavy, Patrick ^a   Margetts, Helen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 27144526624     PISSN: 00312290     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsi068     Document Type: Review

References (26)

1. J. Colomer, 'It's Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws upside down)', Political Studies (2005), 53(1), pp. 1-21.
2. See P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts, 'From Majoritarian to Pluralist Democracy: Electoral Reform in Britain since 1997', 13 Journal of Theoretical Politics 3, 2001, pp. 295-319:
3. also part republished as 'United Kingdom: Reforming the Westminster Model' in J. Colomer (ed.), Handbook of Electoral Choice, Palgrave, 2004, pp. 294-305.
4. Also see P. Dunleavy, 'Facing up to Multi-Party Politics: How Partisan Dealignment and PR Voting have Fundamentally Changed Britain's Party Systems', Parliamentary Affairs, July 2005, forthcoming.
5. See P. Dunleavy, 'Political Behaviour: Institutional and Experiential Approaches' in R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingemann (eds), A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.276-393.
6. Dunleavy, 'Facing up to Multi-Party Polities', p. xxx.
7. For a discussion of longer-term, historical trends in major party vote shares and governmental dominance, see P. Dunleavy, 'Electoral Representation and Accountability: The Legacy of Empire' in A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Parry (eds), Fundamentals in British Politics, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 204-30.
8. See H. Margetts, P. John and S. Weir, 'Latent Support fo the Far-Right in British Politics: The BNP and UKIP on the 2004 European and Local Elections', Paper to the PSA Elections, parties and Public Opinion Conference, University of Oxford, 10-12 September, 2004.
9. Dunleavy, 'Facing up to Multi-Party Polities', pp. 3-8.
10. For a fuller exposition of how the index works, see P. Dunleavy and F. Boucek, 'Constructing the Number of Parties', Party Politics 3, 2003, 9(3), pp. 291-315.
11. See R. Taagepera and M. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 273.
12. See Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, Chapter 10.
13. See Dunleavy and Margetts, 'The Electoral System" for this effect in 1997;
14. and P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts, 'The Experiential Approach to Electoral System Effects' in D. Beetham (ed.), Indices of Democratization, Sage, 1994, pp. 155-81, for cross-national evidence of similar results.
15. 1), where DV is the conventional DV score and V, is the vote share of the largest party.
16. A score above 100% is feasible in several ways, for example if all or most of the seats are won by the second largest party.
17. For earlier, more extensive and more sophisticated simulation work on the 1992 and 1997 elections, see P. Dunleavy, H. Margetts and S. Weir, The Politico's Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain, Politico's, 1998.
18. and the same authors' Making Votes Count 2: Mixed Electoral Systems, Democratic Audit of the UK, 1998.
19. and Replaying the General Election of 1992: How Britain Would Have Voted Under Alternative Electoral Systems, LSE Public Policy Group/Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 1992;
20. P. Dunleavy, H. Margetts, B. O'Duffy and S. Weir, Making Votes Count: Replaying the 1990s General Elections Under Alternative Electoral Systems, Democratic Audit of the UK, 1997.
21. Dunleavy, 'Facing up to multi-party polities', discusses this issue in detail.
22. See Jenkins Commission, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System, Cmnd 4090-I, Stationary Office;
23. Dunleavy et al., Politicos' Guide to Electoral Reform analyses the proposals in detail.
24. See P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts, 'How Proportional are the British AMS systems?', Representation, 2004, 40(4), pp. 317-29.
25. Dunleavy and Margetts, 'How Proportional are the British AMS Systems?'
26. For comparable 1992 and 1997 data see Dunleavy and Margetts, 'The Electoral system', pp. 744-6.