Imagining Europe: Symbolic geography and the future

Mediterranean Quarterly

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 67-85

  Liotta, P H ^a  

^a SALVE REGINA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SYMBOLISM;

EID: 27144525056     PISSN: 10474552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/10474552-16-3-67     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Some of the features following have been adapted from Barbara A. Chernow and George A. Vallasi, eds., Columbia Encyclopedia, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 1,688-9.
2. Thus, in the Mercator projection, the meridians of longitude, which converge at the poles of the earth, are shown as parallel to one another; by contrast, the parallels of latitude, which on the projected globe itself are equidistant, are drawn with increasing separation as their distance from the equator itself increases-in order to preserve shapes. This effect is most pronounced at the poles (which themselves cannot be represented on a Mercator projection): Greenland is enormous, and Antarctica covers the entire span of all other continents. See, in particular, Lev M. Bugayevskiy and John P. Snyder, Map Projections: A Reference Manual (London: Taylor and Francis, 1995), 49-63;
3. John P. Snyder, Flattening the Earth: Two Thousand Years of Map Projections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 43-8.
4. Although I have used the term mental maps for many years in teaching at hte Naval War College, it would be imprudent not to acknowledge the useful consideration by Martin Walker of such maps relative to Greater Europe that appeared as "Variable Geography: America's Mental Maps of Greater Europe, "International Affairs 76, no. 3 (2000): 459-74.
5. James Thomson, "US Interests and the Fate of the Alliance," Survival 45, no. 4 (2003-4): 218.
6. Adapted from Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 18.
7. Admittedly, Ukraine has fallen drastically from favor and the high regard in which it was held in the 1990s. Whereas both NATO and the Clinton administration spoke of a "special relationship" with Ukraine, such a relationship has become strained of late. Having lost both Brussels's and Washington's support, and plagued with political scandals and accusations (and counter-accusations) of corruption, Ukraine now appears increasingly marginalized within the context of Greater Europe. A useful analysis can be found in Paul Kubicek, "US-Ukrainian Relations: From Enlargement to Estrangement," Problems of Post-Communism 50, no. 6 (2003).
8. "EMU and International Conflict," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 60-73.
9. Maria Nikolaeva Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 160, 139.
10. Given the more recent admission of new NATO member states, this graphic illustration is out of date, but it demonstrates how swiftly Europe is changing, and has changed. See Strobe Talbott, "From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002): 48a.
11. Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 3 (2003), contains a number of useful essays on these potentially conflicting perspectives and institutions.
12. In particular, see Michael Breener, "The CSFP Factor: A Comparison of United States and French Strategies";
13. Christina M. Schweiss, "Sharing Hegemony: The Future of Transatlantic Security";
14. Jolyon Howorth, "ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?";
15. and Susan E. Penska and Warren L. Mason, "EU Security Cooperation and the Transatlantic Relationship."
16. P. Terrence Hopmann, "Managing Conflict in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The Role of the OSCE in Europe's Security 'Architecture,"' International Politics 40 (March 2004): 75-100.
17. Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (1999): 190-203.
18. Nikolai Pavlov, "After the War: Nine Foreign Policy Conclusions," International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 49, no. 3 (2003): 5.
19. Christopher S. Browning, Research Fellow, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, "Competing or Complementary Policies? Understanding the Relationship between the NEI and NDL presented at the Forty-Third Annual ISA Convention, "Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus Between Comparative Politics and International Relations," New Orleans, Louisiana, 2004. Availble at the conference archives page of the ISA website at www.isanet.org/nopaperarchive.html.
20. The English text of the Barcelona Declaration was published in Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 1 (1997): 177-87.
21. The best overall text on the Barcelona Process and various regional perceptions is Abdelwahab Biad, Hans Günter Branch, and Antonio Marquina, eds., Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century (London: Macmillan, 2000). Unquestionably, one could make the argument that the diversity of all these mutual Mediterranean dialogues is as disruptive as helpful. Alberto Bin, former coordinator for NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, forcefully pointed out in remarks made at the International Peace Research Association summit in Tampere, Finland, August 2000, that NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is unique in its predominantly bilateral relationship with Mediterranean nations. NATO, as an organization, meets individually most often with individual dialogue states rather than in a multilateral context. Further, among agenda items such as information, civil emergency planning, crisis management, and scientific cooperation, aspects of a "military dimension" receive perhaps the least emphasis in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.
22. Sven Biscop, "Opening up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehensive and Cooperative Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security," Security Dialogue 34, no. 2 (2003): 183-97.
23. Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of US Primacy," Political Science Quarterly 18, no. 2 (2003): 225-6.
24. Stuart Eizenstadt, Address to the Secretary's Open Forum, quoted in Walker, n. 11.
25. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.) Huntington perhaps best defines identity and culture by not being able to define what these aspects are, only what they are not: "People define their identity by what they are not. As increased communications, trade, and travel multiply the interactions among civilizations, people increasingly accord greater relevance to their civilizational identity" (see page 67). By his own admission, Huntington avoids precise and "unrealistic" nineteenth-century German attempts to isolate culture and civilization as separate identities (page 41). Such blurring of distinctions also allows generalizations that often proved true in the post-Cold War world-and prove true in the post-11 September era. In the Balkans, the seeming emergence of religious warfare, for some, appears to be the controlling dynamic. Henry Kissinger, for example, argued that the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995 was "more akin to the Thirty Years War over religion [than] to political conflict." Yet the danger of generalization and the lack of clearer understanding about the complexity of culture can lead to dangerous outcomes. At the least, some definition of culture is necessary. The broadest possible understanding of culture, thus, should be understood as a set of meanings, values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking that inform a common way of life.
26. C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries (1934-1954) (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 35.
27. Adapted from Davies, 1,238.
28. Cited in Sean Kay, "After Kosovo: NATO's Credibility Dilemma," Security Dialogue 31, no. 1 (2000): 78.
29. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview, BBC World Service, "The New Europe: What Is Europe?" April 1998, quoted in Walker, n. 13.
30. Equally, former Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz rejected participation in a so-called European conference that would focus on crime, drugs, and other security issues in a pan-European context. Juncker stated, "Europe does not reject Turkey. We are not a club of Christians, but we are a club with high standards." See Barry James, "Turkey Is Rejected for EU Membership: Amid Signs of Showdown on Cyprus, Ankara Ends Political Dialogue,"International Herald Tribune, 15 December 1997, 10.
31. "French Minister: 'EU Should Not Become a Christian Club,"' obtained from the Turkish General Directorate of Press and Information, extracted from Hurriyet. My thanks to John Nomikos, research director of the Research Institute for European Studies, for this information.
32. Huntington, 271.
33. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, Council of Ministers' Document, 10-11 December 1999. Maartje Rotten has edited an invaluable compilation of some of the major EU security and defense declarations for the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, titled "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents," Chaillot Papers 76 (May 2001), at www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf
34. J. G. A. Pocock, "What Do We Mean by Europe?" Wilson Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1997): 14.
35. Warren Christopher, "Toward a More Integrated World." Statement made at the OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, 8 June 1994.
36. See also by Christopher, "The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Shared Values." Statement to the Planetary Session of the Conference on Security snd Cooperation in Europe, Rome, 30 November 1993.
37. Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (1995): 38-51. At the time this article was published, Holbrooke was assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs. "Architectural moments" in Europe, according to Holbrooke, were the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the failed Wilsonian vision from Versailles in 1919, the shared achievements rising in 1947 from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the NATO partnership.
38. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 167.
39. Bismarck was not without his share of ethnocentric tendencies, either. That he was trying to be clever aside, his comment that "an Austrian is a cross between a Bavarian and a human being" did not bode well for future Europe. In 1997, an EU poll revealed that almost one-third of all Europeans-and over 40 percent of all Austrians-considered themselves "racist" and intolerant of minority ethnic groups in their own countries. Reported on All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 19 December 1997.
40. Kissinger, 169.
41. Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York: Times Books, 1992), 287.
42. Adam Gopnik, "The Good Soldier," New Yorker, 24 November 1997, 114.
43. For an extended consideration of Emma Rothschild's thoughts on the subject, see "The Last Empire: Security and Globalization in Historical Perspective," Levy Occasional Papers on Economic Geography and World Order, no. 5, at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/levypapers/ toc.htm
44. Partially inspired by Walker, 474.