INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE STRUCTURE OF R&D JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS

Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth

Volumn 15, Issue , 2004, Pages 201-228

  Majewski, Suzanne E ^a   Williamson, Dean V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26944488873     PISSN: 10484736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1048-4736(04)01506-1     Document Type: Review

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