Hybrids on the rim? The European Union's Mediterranean aid policy

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 461-480

  Holden, Patrick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

European Union aid; Governance reform; Hybridization

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; EUROPEAN UNION; WORLD;

EID: 26944462366     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340500225970     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. Indeed Robinson argues that the two aid agendas cohere in the negative sense that they foster the development of polyarchic political systems to the detriment of genuine democracy. William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. See Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds), The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (London: Frank Cass, 2002);
3. Richard Youngs, The European Union as a Promoter of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and East Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002);
4. Said Haddadi, 'The EMP and Morocco: Diverging Political Agendas?', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2003), pp.396-421.
5. Bradford Dillman, 'International Markets and Partial Economic Reforms in North Africa: What Impact on Democratization', in Gillespie and Youngs (note 2), pp.63-86.
6. This is apparent from official rhetoric and also emphasized in private interviews by EU officials.
7. See the preamble to Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) no 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (30.07.1996 OJ L 189).
8. Most famously the United Nations Development Programme, 'Arab Human Development Report' (2002) has outlined the link between lack of freedom and economic stagnation. The report is available at .
9. John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite - a Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). Although dated, the fundamentals of this analysis still hold true.
10. See also Abdellah Hammoudi, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
11. John Waterbury, 'Endemic Corruption in a Monarchical Regime', World Politics, Vol. 15, No.4 (1973), pp.533-5.
12. Clement Moore Henry, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent! Money and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 157-8.
13. Ibid.
14. Abdeslam Maghraoui, 'Political Authority in Crisis. Mohammed VI's Morocco', Middle East Report, no.218 (2001) ().
15. In particular, the army's own interests may conflict with a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict. See Richard Gillespie, The Sahara Conflict: Bilateralism or Sub-Regionalism?, EuroMesco Working Paper 35 (September, 2004) pp.5-6.
16. Figures are for sums actually received rather than commitments made. The Development Cooperation Directorate Website of the OECD, Statistical Annex of the 2003 Development Cooperation Report, Recipient Aid Chart, available at .
17. Chris Patten, Speech to the European Parliament, Brussels, 31 January 2001.
18. Goran Hyden and Julius Court, Governance and Development: Trying to Sort Out the Basics, United Nations University, World Governance Assessment Working Paper No 1 (February 2001), p.14.
19. European Commission, The European Union's role in promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries. COM(2001) 252 (Brussels: European Commission), p.8.
20. Peter Burnell, 'The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda', European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 16, No.2 (2004), pp.396-416.
21. Dillman (note 3) focuses on distributional coalitions.
22. The Arab system is described as authoritarian corporatism in Emma Murphy and Elueshami Anoushiravan, 'Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East', Third World Quarterly, Vol.17, No.4 (1998), pp.753-72.
23. Beatrice Hibou, 'The World Bank: Missionary Deeds and Misdeeds', in P. Schraeder (ed.), Exporting Democracy. Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.181.
24. Dillman (note 3).
25. Murphy and Anoushiravan (note 18).
26. Thomas Carothers, 'Struggling with Semi-Authoritarians', in Peter Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp.210-25.
27. Charles Shamas and Ian Byrne, The Human Rights Implications of the MEDA Programmes (Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2002), pp.148-72.
28. Others have criticized the EU's lack of 'intellectual capacity' in regard to using conditionality and aid. See Carlos Santiso, 'Responding to Democratic Decay and Crises of Governance: The European Union and the Convention of Cotonou', Democratization, Vol. 10, No.3 (2003), p. 168.
29. European Commission, Maroc Document de Strategie 2002-2006 et Programme Indicatif National 2002-2004 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001). All CSPs available at ).
30. Article 5, Council of the European Union.
31. European Commission, Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners, COM (2003) 294 (Brussels: European Commission), p.16.
32. The EIDHR was allocated €7.1 million for the Mediterranean region in 2003. Total MEDA commitments for that year amounted to €600.3 million. MEDA figures taken from ; EIDHR figures taken from European Commission, The European Initiativefor Democracy and Human Rights Programming Update 2003 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001).
33. European Commission, The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Programming Document 2002-2004 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001).
34. Selected in the original programming document. Some focus countries were added in later updates but not to the Mediterranean region.
35. Ibid.
36. Interview with Commission official July 2003.
37. Youngs (note 2), pp.200-201.
38. Interview with official from DG Development 2003.
39. Kunibert Raeffer, Cotonou-Slowly Undoing Lomé's Concept of Partnership, European Development Policy Study Group: Working papers, 2001, pp.15-16.
40. Gordon Crawford, 'Promoting Democracy From Without-Learning From Within, Part I', Democratization, Vol.10, No.1 (2003), pp.77-98. Such problems also apply to conditionality, and indeed call into question whether allocative conditionality is a feasible mechanism as (as argued above) relatively rigorous criteria are needed for it to be operate effectively.
41. European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report Morocco, SEC (2004) 569 (Brussels: European Commission, 2004).
42. European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 final (Brussels: European Commission).
43. Dillman (note 3).
44. Stuart Corbridge, 'Development as Freedom: the Spaces of Amartya Sen', Progress in Development Studies, Vol.2, No.3 (2002), p.203.
45. See the recommendations of an official EC evaluation; European Commission, Evaluation de la Strategie-Pays pour le Maroc (Brussels: European Commission 2003), available at .
46. See Carothers (note 22). While Carothers was referring to donors of democracy aid it is also applicable to the sphere of economic reform and transition.
47. Hibou (note 19), p.173-81.
48. Gillespie, for example, points out how the Spanish Presidency's agenda for invigorating Mediterranean policy differed the Commission's proposals in giving less prominence to democracy promotion issues. Richard Gillespie, 'The Valencia Conference: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process', Mediterranean Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (2002), p.108.
49. The point by Youngs (note 2), p.199 that different logics coexist for EU strategy making is well founded. However, as stated above, this article is not so much concerned with speculating upon the 'ultimate aspirations' of EU policy makers as with what can reasonably be extrapolated from the EU's policy outputs.