Epistemic norms and theoretical deliberation

Ratio

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 380-397

  Hookway, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26944438290     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00100     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. In 'The Sentiment of Rationality', James imagines climbing in the Alps, and being forced into a position from which the only escape is by means of a 'terrible leap'. Although he has no evidence of his ability to make such leaps he suggests that 'hope and confidence in myself make me sure I will not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute what without these subjective emotions would perhaps have been impossible'. Selected Writings, ed. G. Bird. (London: Dent, 1995) p. 43
2. See John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co, 1933), p. 31-2
3. This passage, and related ones, are also discussed by Linda Zagzebski in Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 173f)
4. Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, 'Freedom in thought and desire', Journal of Philosophy, 93, 1990
5. The importance of making sense of the idea that the fact that we do not have full reflective control over our cognitive activities need not compromise our freedom of mind is discussed in Hookway Scepticism (London: Routledge, 1990) passim
6. Thus considering the question will indeed provide 'relevant' information if 'relevance' is defined along the lines adopted by Dan Sperber and Dierdre Wilson in Relevance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) chapter three
7. This claim is defended further in 'Mimicking Foundationalism:on Sentiment and Self-control', European Journal of Philosophy, I, pp. 156-74
8. and 'Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. vol. 26, pp. 203-26
9. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1960), p. 19
10. 'Naturalized Epistemology and Epistemic Evaluation', Inquiry, 37, p. 476ff
11. The analogies between these phenomena and akrasia are evident from Myles Burnyeat's paper 'Aristotle on learning to be good', in A. Rorty (ed) Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980)
12. Linda Zagzebski also alludes to such cases in Virtues of the Mind, p. 150ff