The margin of appreciation doctrine in the european court of human rights

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 638-650

  Hutchinson, Michael R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26844566540     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589300063478     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. See recent articles: Paul Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism”
2. Johan Callewaert, “Is There a Margin of Appreciation in the Application of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention?”
3. Clare Ovey, “The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention”
4. Søren Prebensen, “The Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9,10 and 11 of the Convention”
5. Yves Winisdoerffer, “Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 of Protocol 1”
6. Jeroen Schokkenbroek, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention and the Margin of Appreciation”
7. Michael O'Boyle, “The Margin of Appreciation and Derogation under Article 15: Ritual Incantation or Principle?”
8. Jeroen Schokkenbroek “The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights”
9. all in the report of a seminar on the subject held under the auspices of the Registry of the Court reproduced at 19 H.R.LJ., Apr. 1998.
10. Also, Paul Mahoney, “Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments” [1997] E.H.R.L.R. 364
11. Lord Lester of Heme Hill, “Universality versus Subsidiarity: a Reply” [1998] E.H.R.L.R. 73
12. Nicholas Lavender, “The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation” [1997] E.H.R.L.R. 380.
13. For a more comprehensive overview see Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (1996).
14. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.A/24, 1976.
15. The full Commission report on Cyprus v. UK was not published, but the Commission did state that, in its opinion, a State government “should be able to exercise a certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” (1958–1959) 2 Y.B.E.C.H.R. It was this discretion that grew, via the Lawless v. Ireland case, Ser.A/3, into the margin as expressed in Handyside.
16. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.B, 1960–1961, para.90, p.82.
17. Handyside, E.Ct.H.R., at p.22.
18. E.Ct.H.R.
19. Sunday Times v. UK (No.l) Ser.A/30, pp.36–37, where there was said to be a consensus on what limitations on freedom of speech could be said to be necessary to protect the independence of the judiciary.
20. On the question of the factors influencing width in general, see Schokkenbroek, E.Ct.H.R., at pp.34–35
21. Ovey, also E.Ct.H.R.
22. Handyside, E.Ct.H.R., at p.22. The case concerned the banning of a book on the grounds that this was necessary to protect morals, under Art.l0(2).
23. Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, 1998), p.88.
24. Leander v. Sweden, Ser.A/116, p.43.
25. On the field of application of the margin, see Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp.87–88.
26. See also Ovey, Prebensen and Lavender, all Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights
27. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.A/45.
28. Lester, E.Ct.H.R., esp. at pp.78–79.
29. See also by the same author “The European Convention on Human Rights in the New Architecture of Europe”, in Proceedings of the 8th International Colloquium on the European Convention on Human Rights (1996), p.227.
30. Van Dijk and Van Hoof, in Proceedings of the 8th International Colloquium on the European Convention on Human Rights, at p.93.
31. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.A/295-A.
32. Lester, in Proceedings of the 8th International Colloquium on the European Convention on Human Rights, at pp.79–80.
33. Lester, idem, p.80.
34. Although M. Delmas-Marty, “The Richness of Underlying Legal Reasoning”, in Delmas-Marty (Ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (1992) makes a valuable contribution, which is drawn on to some extent in what follows.
35. Mahoney (1997), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, at p.369. Emphasis in original.
36. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.
37. Handyside, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, at pp.22–23.
38. Some of the Court's cases do give a clear indication of where limits lie, e.g. Gaskin v. UK Ser.A/160, concerned Art.8 and the denial to the applicant of access to records concerning his period in State care at a young age. A breach of the Convention was found, and the Court gave quite detailed descriptions of what provisions would be required to move the State's social security provisions to within the margin, i.e., where the floor was located: idem, p.20. However, this is rare.
39. Guardian and Observer v. UK Ser.A/216, para.63, p.32.
40. E.g. in Handyside, idem, where the lack of a uniform European view on morals prompted a wide margin.
41. See idem.
42. idem, at pp.395–396.
43. See idem.
44. Goodwin v. UK (1997) 22 E.H.R.R. 123.
45. See the articles by Lester and Mahoney (1997) E.H.R.R.
46. See text accompanying E.H.R.R.
47. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.A/258-B.
48. See idem, p.54.
49. E.Ct.H.R. Ser.A/25.
50. Belgian Linguistics Case, Ser.A/6, p.34.
51. Idem, p.86. Emphasis added.
52. Idem, para.229, p.87.
53. E.g. the criticisms of Professor Colin Warbrick of Court decisions under Art.8, [1997] E.H.R.L.R. 32. He suggests that these have displayed some degree of both incoherence and arbitrariness. Such criticisms of Court jurisprudence are relatively common.
54. See text accompanying E.H.R.L.R.
55. O'Boyle, E.H.R.L.R., at p.26. It is hard to find any clear analysis of the margin in the jurisprudence, as it quickly became accepted as part of the Court's decision-making process. Such analysis as there has been in cases such as Handyside is consistent with O'Boyle's analysis, with the main emphasis on the subsidiary nature of the Convention system.
56. See e.g. Handyside, E.H.R.L.R., at p.22.
57. See e.g. Wingove v. UK (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 1
58. Handyside idem.
59. Otto-Preminger, idem.
60. Dudgeon, idem.
61. This factor in determining the width of the margin shows a clear link with the question of consensus; see Prebensen and Ovey, idem, at pp.14,11–12 respectively.
62. See Michael Addo, “Are Judges Beyond Criticism under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights?” (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 425.
63. O'Boyle, I.C.L.Q., at p.29.