The Nigerian federation at the crossroads: The way forward

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 383-405

  Adamolekun, Ladipo ^a  

^a FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Nigeria)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 26644450931     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pji027     Document Type: Review

References (55)

1. Both the Nigerian nationalist leaders and the British colonial power agreed that a federal system of government was best suited to accommodating the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and geographical divisions within Nigeria (see Table 1).
2. The only exception was the first military government, which assumed power in January 1966 and made an explicit commitment to establishing a unitary government. It was overthrown after approximately six months.
3. A roughly similar point was made by Ojo Madueke, special adviser to incumbent President Obasanjo, in a lecture marking the forty-fourth anniversary of Nigerian independence on 30 September 2004: "unless strategic moves both within and outside the polity and economy are undertaken in the months ahead, the nation is at risk of slipping back around 2007 to a failing state or even a failed state status with severe consequences" (cited in The Punch (Lagos), 12 October 2004).
4. Although the formal adoption of a federal system occurred with the 1954 Constitution, quasi-federal features were first introduced in 1939 into the unitary Nigerian colonial administration created in 1914. More federal features were introduced in the 1946 and 1951 constitutions as decolonization gathered pace. For details, see Adiele Afigbo, "Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21 (Fall 1991): 13-29.
5. Two notable developments in federal-regional relations during this period deserve mention: the declaration of a state of emergency in the western region in 1962 and the creation of the Midwest region as a fourth region in 1964. However, both developments had more to do with the dynamics of partisan political competition than with the true dimensions of federal power vis-à-vis regional governments. If the balance of partisan political competition had been different, the two events might not have happened.
6. The federal government produced a National Development Plan (1962-1968), but it had only a limited impact. According to a senior federal civil servant, this was due to a "regional-tribal nexus and sectionalized political rivalry" that compromised both plan design and implementation. These problems were largely absent in the regions where a combination of dominant party rule and strong political leadership ensured better results. See Ladipo Adamolekun, Politics and Administration in Nigeria (London: Hutchinson and Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1986), chaps. 3-4.
7. The main success factors were a visionary political leader at the head of a mass-oriented political party, administrative competence, and community participation both in cash (taxes) and in kind (labor).
8. This means that a constitutional amendment would be required before new local governments could be created.
9. It would not be incorrect to say that these were really partisan political preferences. Almost every top military officer in the supreme decision-making bodies belonged to two ethnic groups: his natural ethnic group and the military "tribe." It was not always clear which loyalty informed the positions that each officer took during deliberations.
10. In 1984, I was a member of a National Committee on Review of Local Government. I can confirm that the creation of new local governments in 1989 and 1991 was not informed by the recommendations of the committee, which had sought to obtain the views of Nigerians on the future of local governments. For balance, it is worth mentioning that the governor of Kano State has asserted that his state has more local governments than Lagos State because of its larger land mass (20,680 sq. km compared with 3,345 sq. km); see his "Why Kano Deserves 44 Councils," The Guardian (Lagos), 14 May 2005.
11. See Adedotun Phillips, "Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21 (Fall 1991): 103-111.
12. S. Akindele, O. Olaopa, and A. Obiyan, "Fiscal Federalism and Local Government Finance in Nigeria: An Examination of Revenue Rights and Fiscal Jurisdiction," International Review of Administrative Sciences 68 (Fall 2002): 557-577. The authors point out that during the civilian interlude of 1979-1980 through 1983, state and local governments raised between 6.5 and 9 percent, an average of 7.54 percent-slightly lower than the average of 9.34 percent for the entire twenty-seven-year period.
13. Of course, the military will always deserve credit for winning a civil war that helped to keep Nigeria one. But nurturing and sustaining the country's unity requires methods that are different from the centralism and uniformity that characterize military rule.
14. The battering suffered was at the hands of two military regimes that made somewhat confused efforts aimed at reorienting the civil service. The civil service leadership, too, was an accomplice in the weakening of the institution. See Adamolekun, Politics and Administration in Nigeria, chap. 5.
15. According to both national and international estimates, approximately 70 percent of Nigerians were living in poverty by 1999, that is, on less than US$1 per day.
16. It is only in a context of institutionalized or systemic corruption (corruption as a way of life, with the rottenness starting from the head of the national government) that President Sani Abacha and his family could have stashed overseas more than US$4 billion stolen from the public treasury. This ranks among the ten top thefts of a nation's wealth recorded in the world during the 1990s.
17. The overall verdict on about three decades of military rule in Nigeria would have to be that it was a failure. For a competent and insightful study of developments in the country up to the end of the military era in 1999, see Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public Affairs, 2003). He presents Nigeria as a failing state.
18. It was an interlude between a thirteen-year-plus military rule (January 1966-September 1979) and a longer period of military rule (January 1984-May 1999).
19. The "federal character" constitutional provision requires governments at all levels to ensure that both political and bureaucratic appointments reflect the different political subunits, nationalities, and communities within their respective territorial areas. For a review of the theory and practice of federal character, see Kunle Amuwo, Rotimi Suberu, Adigun Agbaje, and George Herault, eds. Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1998), pp. 99-210.
20. See Akindele et al., "Fiscal Federalism and Local Government Finance."
21. The plan provides the following excellent definition of a "developed society," to which Nigeria was to aspire: "a developed society. . . that is capable of recurrent self-renewal; one that is capable of borrowing from other societies without becoming merely imitative and thereby losing its own soul."
22. General Obasanjo was also the military head of state between 1976 and 1979.
23. The ethnic nationalities that have consistently sought to articulate and defend the interests of their groups since 1999 include the Ogonis in the Niger Delta, the Hausa-Fulani through the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the Igbos through Ohaneze, and the Yorubas through Afenifere. Although the ACF claims to represent all the hundred-odd ethnic groups in northern Nigeria, it is essentially the defender of Hausa-Fulani interests. (ACF, Afenifere, and Ohaneze are ethnic solidarity associations).
24. Complaints about marginalization are sometimes couched as criticisms of the implementation of the "federal character" provision in the Constitution.
25. Evidence that the distinction between partisan regional police forces and a neutral or impartial Nigerian Police is overstated is provided in Kemi Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: College Press and Publishers Limited, 2002). At a fundamental level, state governors, who are the chief security officers for their respective territorial areas, cannot discharge this responsibility effectively without control over a police force.
26. Between May 1999 and July 2004, thousands of people had been killed in communal clashes. An extreme case of breakdown of law and order resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency (by the president, with the approval of the National Assembly) in June 2004. The official casualty figures in Plateau State alone between September 2001 and May 2004 is 53,787. See The Punch (Lagos), 4 October 2004;
27. see also the editorial "State of Insecurity," The Punch (Lagos), 23 March 2004.
28. For example, the constitutional provision prohibiting public officials from operating foreign accounts is breached by several members of the president's cabinet. On the prohibition, see Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Constitution (Abuja: Federal Government Printer, 1999), Fifth Schedule, Part 1.
29. Lagos State, which has maintained its new local governments (thirty-seven new LGAs in addition to the existing twenty), has been unable to access the funds allocated to its LGAs in spite of a Supreme Court ruling that obliges the federal government to release the funds allocated to the twenty LGAs provided for in the 1999 Constitution. The federal government's argument is that it cannot guarantee that the funds will be distributed only to the twenty LGAs. But this means that it is flouting the decision of the High Court, delivered on 10 December 2004 (suit SC70/2004). See news report in The Punch (Lagos), 18 December 2004.
30. See news report in Vanguard (Lagos), 26 April 2005.
31. The established practice, spelled out in preindependence and postindependence constitutions, is discussed in Jadesola Akande, "The Legal Order and the Administration of Federal and State Courts," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21 (Fall 1991): 61-73.
32. The provision states that "the Government of the Federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion."
33. Between 2000 and 2004, 238 of 500 enterprises in Kano had closed down. See news report in The Punch (Lagos), 20 August 2004.
34. For an insightful discussion of this issue, see J. Isawa Elaigwu and Habu Galadima, "The Shadow of Sharia over Nigerian Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33 (Summer 2003): 123-144.
35. See, for example, Victor Atta (governor of oil-producing Akwa Ibom State), "Resource Control: A Misunderstood Phenomenon," The News (Lagos), 26 January 2004, p. 49.
36. The relevant case is SC28/2001, filed in the Supreme Court by the attorney general of the federation.
37. Revenues collected by the federal government from specified sources belong to all three tiers of government and are paid into a common pool, called the Federation Account.
38. For a competent and comprehensive study of the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria from the late 1990s to early 2003, see World Bank, "Nigeria: State Finances Study," Report No. 25710-UNI, April 2003, processed.
39. Urban and regional planning is another state function that the federal government is seeking to hijack. See news report in The Punch (Lagos), 21 June 2004. On primary education, the Universal Basic Education Act 2004 (UBE) initiated by the federal government and passed by the National Assembly is consistent with the Millennium Development Goals adopted by Nigeria. The act provides for free and compulsory education for all Nigerian children between the ages of seven and seventeen. However, successful implementation is doubtful because the act was not prepared in full collaboration with state governments. A good test of effective implementation would be the use by all three tiers of government of 2 percent of the NGN30 billion Consolidated National Revenue Fund allocated to the UBE. It is also noteworthy that a few states have been implementing their own basic education policies since 1999 (e.g., Lagos State).
40. National Planning Commission, Nigeria, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (Abuja: Communications Development Incorporated, 2004).
41. Although the current six geopolitical zones reflected in Table 1 had not been created at the time of this abortive coup (1990), they are used here for ease of reference. For more details on the different secession threats up to 1970, see Tekena Tamuno, "Separatist Agitations in Nigeria Since 1914," Journal of Modern African Studies 8 (Fall 1970): 563-583.
42. Ronald L. Watts, "The Distribution of Powers, Responsibilities and Resources in Federations," Handbook of Federal Countries, ed. Ann Griffiths (Montreal: Forum of Federations, 2002), pp. 448-471.
43. In 1999, the president established an all-party committee to review the Constitution. The committee submitted its report in early 2001 but no action has been taken on it. In late 2003, the National Assembly established a joint (Senate and House of Representatives) constitutional review committee that has yet to complete its work. In June 2004, the Judicial Service Commission submitted a memorandum containing its proposed modifications to the Constitution to the Joint National Assembly Constitution Review Committee.
44. See, for example, Amuwo et al., Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria;
45. see also Olu Falae, The Way Forward for Nigeria: The Economy and Polity (Akure: Flocel Publishers, 2004), pp. 59-90. Most advocates of political restructuring and autonomy would agree with Falae's viewpoints.
46. An example of a Supreme Court judgment that supports diminution of federal power was its ruling in November 2002 (suit SC 288/2002) that the freedom of association includes an unfettered right to create political parties without the authorization of the federal executive council (cabinet). But the Supreme Court supported expansion of federal power in upholding the right of the National Assembly to pass legislation binding on the entire federation in cases of perceived "general interest of the nation." See Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the federation (2002) on the extent of the jurisdiction of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC).
47. On the prevailing confusion over the application of the federal character principle to the military, see the editorial in The Guardian (Lagos), 10 June 2004.
48. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this very pertinent point.
49. At the end of the third conference in 1999, it emerged that Canada's union has three main planks: political, economic, and social. At the third conference, the nature of the social union was agreed upon in the Social Union Framework Agreement. For details on the Canadian experience, see Hamish Telford, "The Federal Spending Power in Canada: Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33 (Winter 2003): 23-44.
50. Amuwo et al., Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria;
51. Falae, The Way Forward for Nigeria.
52. A recent reminder of the huge trust deficit in the Nigerian federation was the action of the Movement for the Actualization for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), an ethnic militia. (Biafra was the name given to the part of Nigeria, inhabited by the Igbo ethnic nationality, involved in the secession that culminated in the 1967-1970 civil war.) MASSOB declared 26 August 2004 "Biafran Day," and its "stay-at-home order" was observed by a significant number of Igbos all over the federation. Several other ethnic militias also proclaim themselves as defenders of the interests of their respective ethnic nationalities. For more details on ethnic conflict in Nigeria, see Rotimi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).
53. On the terms of reference of the NPRC and the president's list of "settled areas," see "The Presidential Memo" (excerpts of President Obasanjo's speech at the inauguration of the conference), Tell (Lagos), 7 March 2005, pp. 29-31.
54. The adoption of a constitutional arrangement acceptable to the majority of Nigerians would be a first critical step toward averting the danger of Nigeria becoming a "failed state." This danger was highlighted in a report of U.S. experts on Africa's prospects and problems commissioned by the National Intelligence Council of the United States. The report discussed likely trends in Sub-Saharan Africa over the next fifteen years, 2005-2020. See "Nigeria May Become a Failed State - Report," The Punch (Lagos), 27 May 2005.
55. Wole Soyinka has paraphrased Pierre Trudeau's creative and effective strategy for checking centrifugal tendencies in the Canadian federation as follows: "Create conditions that make fragmentation undesirable. . . . Cultivate an overall national image that is so appealing that it makes separation unattractive." See his "Centralism and Alienation," International Social Science Journal 167 (March 2001): 16. In the Nigerian context, devolution along the lines recommended here would make fragmentation unattractive and undesirable.