Forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 699-714

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Plott, Charles R ^b  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26644435101     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbi049     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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