The tragedy of the political commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate roll call votes on environmental legislation

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 353-364

  Hussain, Anwar ^a   Laband, David N ^a  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Environmental legislation; Majority voting; Political commons; Roll call

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444553956     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2052-4     Document Type: Article

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