On the possibility of constructing meaningful hash collisions for public keys

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3574, Issue , 2005, Pages 267-279

  Lenstra, Arjen ^a,b   De Weger, Benne ^b  

^a LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

^b EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; PROBLEM SOLVING; SECURITY OF DATA;

HASH COLLISIONS; PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS;

PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 26444521554     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11506157_23     Document Type: Conference Paper

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